This book gives unique insights into China’s and Denmark’s views on and contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.

Four officers from the Academy of Military Science (AMS) in Beijing and four officers and two civilians from the Danish Defence present their views on the importance of UN peacekeeping operations in promoting peace and stability. Under this headline, the authors discuss the future contributions and roles of Chinese and Danish defence within the UN. This includes contributions concerning China’s and Denmark’s participation in UN operations, China’s policy on the protection of civilians, Denmark’s contribution to the UN mission in Liberia, anti-piracy operations, and the prospective role of special forces in UN operations. The two forewords of the book have been written by Major General Hu Guangzheng from AMS and Rear Admiral Nils Christian Wang from the Royal Danish Defence College.

AMS is China’s primary military strategic research institution which advises the Central Military Commission, chaired by President Xi Jinping, on the role of Chinese defence in implementing China’s defence, security, and foreign policy. AMS plays a major role in the publication of China’s Defence White Papers. The latest version was published in May 2015 and declares that Chinese defence is to play a greater global role, emphasizing the importance of the UN as a framework due to its universal legitimacy. Denmark is similarly planning to continue its emphasis on contributions from Danish defence to UN missions. This book addresses the historical background and contemporary dynamics that determine the character of these contributions.
Preface

Major General Hu Guangzheng
Research Fellow, Former Chief of Department of Armed Forces Building Studies, AMS

*China's Military Strategy*, the White Paper published by the Information Office of the State Council in May 2015, states that “with the growth of national strength, China’s armed forces will gradually intensify their participation in such operations as international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and do their utmost to shoulder more international responsibilities and obligations, provide more public security goods, and contribute more to world peace and common development.”

China, along with Denmark, highly values the role of the UN, participates actively in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), and is committed to maintaining regional peace and stability. China sent her first military observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organization in 1990, since when Chinese participation in UNPKO has expanded significantly. In the last two-and-a-half decades, China has sent over 30,000 peacekeeping personnel, the largest contributor of peacekeeping forces among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. In 2014, at the request of the UN, China sent a full infantry battalion to implement peacekeeping operations in South Sudan; the first time combat forces were deployed to a UN peacekeeping mission. On 2nd June 2015, the battalion took over the guard duty of the UN Headquarters of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMISS), marking the fact that the battalion had now started to perform its mission independently. China’s deepening and widening engagement in UNPKO demonstrates, by sheer willingness, effort, and practice, that she is prepared to shoulder more international responsibilities and obligations.

This conference on UN peacekeeping operations is sponsored jointly by the Academy of Military Science (AMS), China and the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC). Participants from both China and Denmark have discussed the development and current situation of UN peacekeeping missions, examined difficulties in the peacekeeping operations, and explored possible measures for improvement. China’s engagement and experience in UN peacekeeping missions, international counter-piracy operations, and other related topics were also touched upon. This joint conference promoted studies UNPKO from various perspectives and helped consolidate the academic cooperation between AMS and RDDC.
Preface

Rear Admiral Nils Christian Wang
Commander, Royal Danish Defence College

Denmark has a long-established tradition for participating in UN peacekeeping operations, such as United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Denmark’s contribution to the UN Mali mission adds a new chapter to this tradition. On 25th April 2013, the UN passed resolution 2100, which, based on a broad mandate, authorized the establishment of the peacekeeping operation United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This resolution and resolution 2164 of 25th June 2014 tasked the mission to support domestic political processes, to protect civilians, and to ensure security, stabilization, and reconciliation. In March 2015, the Danish Major General Michael A. Lollesgaard was appointed force commander of the MINUSMA mission by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon.

Denmark’s participation in UN peacekeeping in Mali constitutes the latest development in a long history of Danish key contributions to UN efforts to promote peace and security in zones of conflict and human suffering. Denmark has been part of the UN since its establishment on 24th October 1945. Denmark subscribes to UN possessing the means and opportunities to ensure effective conflict management by committing to international collaboration and by investing in long-term multilateral agreements with a high degree of legitimacy and sustainability. Denmark considers collective action necessary to deal with global challenges such as poverty, peace, and stability. To this end, the UN system is considered an irreplaceable tool due to its unique authority and legitimacy. The Danish Defence plays a central role in fulfilling the ambition to sustain the UN as a key contributor to world-wide peace and security. Military capabilities can contribute to the prevention of conflicts and wars.

Denmark and China share a concern for keeping the UN at the centre of global efforts at security management. China is one of the main contributors to UN peacekeeping today. Both countries allocate considerable resources to collective defence efforts based on global legitimacy. To this end, the establishment of collaboration between the Royal Danish Defence College and the Academy of Military Science with the purpose of exchanging experience and ideas on how to sustain and improve UN peacekeeping constitutes an important development in the history of academic cooperation between the two institutions. Since 2012, continuous exchanges between students and staff from our two institutions have proved immensely fruitful contributions to the understanding of the role of the Chinese military in China’s international activities. It has also been an invaluable tool for identifying areas for defence dialogue and collaboration for Denmark and China.
Bibliographies

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Major General **Hu Guangzheng** graduated from the National Defense University of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1996. He joined the PLA in March 1968 and has served as an enlisted soldier, as squad leader at Beijing Military Regional Command, and as staff officer in the general office of the Central Military Commission of the PLA. Next, he was transferred to the Academy of Military Science (AMS). Here, he initially served as a staff officer at the military library. Later, he became an assistant research fellow and an associate research fellow at the Department of Science Research Guidance, and he was appointed deputy director and director of a research office at the Department of Armed Forces Building Studies. From 2002 - 2008, he was deputy chief of the Department of Armed Forces Building Studies and from 2008 - 2011, he served as head of this department. In September 1994, Hu was promoted to the rank of senior colonel and, in July 2003, he became major general. His research focuses on national defence and armed forces building studies. His many publications include *A Study on Military System Development*, *Science of Military Organization and Structure*, and *Introduction to Military Informationization*.

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Major Peter Melgaard has worked for 12 years as an F-16 fighter pilot at the Royal Danish Air Force. He has participated in more than 50 combat missions completed during Operation Unified Protector over Libyan air space and he has also been deployed for air policing missions in Iceland and the Baltic states. He was educated at the Royal Danish Defence College and the European Participating Air Forces Weapon School in the Netherlands. Since 2014, he has been an operational team leader at the New Fighter Programme in the Danish Ministry of Defence.

Senior Colonel Ni Tianyou is an associate research fellow and deputy director at the Center for Military-operations-other-than-war (MOOTW) Studies, the Academy of Military Science. He is a graduate from the aviation school, and he served at the People’s Liberation Army Air Force for 13 years before joining the Academy of Military Science in 2003. His research is currently focusing on counter-terrorism, joint operations command, and MOOTW.

Commander Johannes Riber Nordby is deputy director of the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College. He is a naval officer and has an MA from the University of Leicester in International Security Studies. Johannes Riber Nordby’s focus area is Denmark’s security strategy and the role of the military instrument in Denmark’s pursuit of international influence. He has worked as an analyst at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), focusing on Denmark’s military involvement in East Africa. Occasionally, he is invited to comment on military affairs in national and international media.

Dr. Liselotte Odgaard is associate professor at the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College. She has published numerous articles, edited books and written three monographs on Asia-Pacific security, China’s growing influence on international relations, and strategic theory and practice. She has been a visiting professor at institu-

Senior Colonel Ren Jian is an associate research fellow and a deputy director of the Office on Tactics Studies in the Department of Operation Theories and Doctrines Studies at the Academy of Military Science. He has a PhD in military science. Ren Jian earned his bachelor and master’s degrees from the PLA Military Academy of Artillery in the 1990s and his PhD from the Academy of Military Science in 2000. He has chaired or participated in over 80 research projects at national level and he has also published several books.

**Rear Admiral Nils Christian Wang** is one of Denmark’s leading analysts on issues related to Arctic security and the relationship between Denmark and Greenland. Prior to becoming commandant of the Royal Danish Defence College, he was head of the Royal Danish Navy for five years. Rear Admiral Nils Christian Wang’s more than ten years of active sea duty in the Danish Navy includes five years in Arctic waters around Greenland. In 2011, he was invited by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to act as special advisor on Arctic Security during the finalization of the “Kingdom of Denmark – Strategy for the Arctic 2011 - 2020”.

Senior Colonel Xu Yizhong is a research fellow in the Department of Military Strategic Studies at the Academy of Military Science (AMS). In September 1983, he joined Nanjing Army Academy of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Four years later, he graduated from the academy with a bachelor degree and was appointed as a platoon leader. From September 1990, he was a postgraduate student in the Army Staff College and obtained his master’s degree in July 1993. Until 1998, he worked as a teacher. In September 1998, he was assigned to work in the AMS as an assistant research fellow. He was promoted to a research fellow two years later. From April 2004 - April 2005, he was a UN Military Observer in UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).
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Observations and lessons from the UN mission in Liberia

Brigadier General Jens H. Garly

INTRODUCTION
Based on observations and lessons from the Force Headquarters of the UN Mission in Liberia 2013 - 2014, this paper will provide some thoughts on peacekeeping operations in general and on possible requirements for future force and staff officer contributions to UN field missions in Africa or similar theatres of operation.

Present and future UN field missions will often find themselves in complex conflicts with multiple root causes, where a long-term solution will require considerable civilian effort, also from political hold. Therefore, all military efforts must be coordinated and aligned with civilian efforts and concerns. To do so, the military component needs to fully understand the scope of the civilian effort.

Although this paper has been drafted based on observations from Liberia, it is deliberately held in generic terms, as the observations would apply for most UN field missions in Africa and elsewhere.

UN FIELD MISSIONS
The UN are heavily involved in peacekeeping operations around the globe, especially in Africa. Normally, UN field missions are established following a request from the host nation(s) and/or based on a peace agreement. In Liberia, the peace agreement in question dates back to August 2003.

The overarching aim of UN interventions will normally be to facilitate the (re-)creation of a stable state capable of handling all aspects pertaining to a sovereign nation. Although states can be very different in their basic structures, the UN field mission will normally facilitate a constitutional and democratic type of state with a separation of the powers of government, the judicial system, and a representational system that ensures democratic government. In Liberia, the Constitution dates back many years. However, the civil war 1989 - 2003 made it practically impossible for the changing governments and the state to function according to the constitution.

A prerequisite for understanding the scope of peacekeeping intervention and the mission objective, both necessary for managing conflict and mandate implementation,
is a detailed understanding of constitutional democracy and how it is facilitated by state-building, as well as of the recipient state, including all the actors that are part of the conflict. State-building is the process that leads to the mission’s end state, including lasting peace. However, progress in state-building requires a safe and secure environment. In other words: “no development without peace, and no peace without development”! It is within this context that the role of the military component should be considered and evaluated.

THE FIELD MISSION’S STRUCTURE
The field mission structure can often be characterized as “a small copy of a state”. It enables the UN field mission to couple a UN representative with the counterpart in the host nation.

A complex operational environment in the recipient state necessitates a field mission structure that covers all or most functional areas of interest in the host nation's government structure, including regional and local government structures. This kind of field mission structure is the precondition for the application of a comprehensive approach.

The comprehensive approach involves attempting to address all the needs of the host nation simultaneously, at all levels and with all available tools. Tools include diplomatic, economic, informational and military operations. Every effort is planned and executed to address the root causes of the conflict in the recipient country and to facilitate the state-building project. The most difficult part of this process is to ensure that the various efforts are coordinated and prioritized with regard to time and space.

The UN mission in Liberia has been organized according to these principles at central as well as at local levels. To effectively plug into this kind of organization is quite demanding for the military component. It requires that both the military leadership and the soldiers possess comprehensive knowledge about the operational environment, the culture, and the population of the host nation.

COMMAND AND CONTROL
A UN field mission is mandated in the UN Security Council resolution. The resolution is usually implemented by means of a number of mission-guiding documents. The civilian component normally bases its Mission Concept on the Security Council resolution and a number of other documents developed at the UN strategic level in UN Headquarters in New York. The Mission Concept is the field mission’s overarching mission guidance. It contains the mission’s objectives and method to fulfil them. It addresses the field mission’s entire expected life span. Based on the Mission Concept, the civilian component will often develop more detailed concepts addressing only
some of the mission objectives, e.g. for the Protection of Civilians. In UN terms, the field mission headquarters and the Mission Concept constitute the operational level. The Mission Concept usually operates with a minimum time span of five years.

The military component, defined as the tactical level, will develop a Military Campaign Plan in accordance with the Mission Concept. The Military Campaign Plan is thus based on the Mission Concept and the Military Strategic Concept of Operations, which is the strategic level guidance from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the UN Headquarters in New York. It will be the responsibility of the military component to translate the Mission Concept and the Military Strategic Concept of Operations into a useful Military Campaign Plan and/or an Operations Order. To develop a useful and sound planning complex that includes the comprehensive approach and embraces all relevant guiding documents is a very demanding task for the Force Headquarters. However, the Military Campaign Plan/Operations Order is a key document, which will offer guidance to the subunits of the Military Component and ensure that the force can plug into, and facilitate, meeting the benchmarks and implement the various phases of the Mission Concept.

In Liberia, there was no Mission Concept giving central guidance on components such as the end, methods, and means. The military component was guided by the Military Strategic Concept of Operations (drafted and authorized by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN Headquarters in New York) and by a number of mission policies and plans, including the Transition Plan. The Transition Plan was a key instrument for the Mission Leadership as well as all components and supporting elements, functioning as the tool with which to liaise and negotiate with the Liberian government.

**UN INTEGRATED MISSION CONCEPT**

The combined efforts of the UN field mission are aligned and maximized by means of the “Integrated Mission Concept”. This concept integrates the three main mission components (civilian, including police, military, and mission support components) and places all of them under unified civilian leadership, i.e. the Special Representative of the Secretary General. This integrated concept ensures the prioritization and coordination of mission activities and efforts, including UN agencies that are not part of the organic structure of the field mission, such as non-governmental organizations.

**COMMAND AND CONTROL**

Due to the circumstances on the ground, the main objective may change with regard to time and space. However, it is always the civilian effort and, as such, the political solution that will be the long-term solution to a conflict. Therefore, the civilian com-
ponent is clearly placed at the centre, whereas the military, the police, and the mission support components perform a supportive role in relation to the civilians. For the military component, ongoing operations and security usually have top priority. Consequently, it might be a challenge – and sometimes a dilemma – to act in the “supporting role” with focus on the civilian effort.

The UN Policy on Command, Control, and Tasking Authority for Field Missions are of special interest to the military component. Following this policy, the military enablers (e.g. logistic units, engineers, excluding combat engineers, and non-combat flying assets). Civilian aircraft for civilian purposes, e.g. transportation of personnel or cargo, are controlled and tasked through the Mission Support Component under civilian command. This means that the military component depends on the mission support component to look after all its logistical needs, including the deployment of troops. In Liberia, this way of organizing the support and the tasking system led to some concern and confusion at the Force Headquarters level, and for the military units and staff officers involved. In extreme circumstances, this way of organizing the command and control structure can lead to conflicts of interest and a reduced level of preparedness ultimately hampering the launching of operations, even if they are high priority.

It is crucial that troop-contributing nations understand these relations and challenges when planning their force contributions and pre-mission training. Especially commanders, staff officers at Force Headquarters level, and enablers (supporting units, e.g. engineers, and logistics units) must be aware of the command and control structure of the mission.

THE HOST NATION

The host nation is often only remotely able to meet the requirements of a constitutional democratic sovereign state. Typically, the host nation lacks the institutions that are prerequisites for incorporating a UN field mission. Metaphorically speaking, the UN mission headquarters can hold more “academic muscle” than the host nation government as a whole. Consequently, a key challenge is the fact that the host government is unlikely to facilitate the planning and mandate implementation of the UN mission. Despite pressures from the UN Headquarters in New York for swift implementation, the process is likely to be slow. Besides being a challenge to the state-building project itself, the limited number of academics or civil servants in the host government also hampers the transfer of responsibility for the implementation of state-building to the host nation.
It is essential to take into account the gap between the knowledge resources of the field mission and those of the host nation government in order to coordinate and work with the host nation and its population within an appropriate time frame, as well as a shared understanding of all lines of operations, plans, and milestones. It is essential to start the transfer of responsibility to indigenous authorities from the very beginning of the mission in order to facilitate the government structures of the host nation taking responsibility for state-building, thereby creating the preconditions for the exit of the UN field mission.

This requires that UN field missions insist on focusing on the mission objectives. At the same time, the risks which are likely to occur when dealing with governments of failed states must be taken into account, e.g. the risk of losing funds due to non-completion of projects.

In 2013, only a few tasks and responsibilities had been handed over to the Liberian government. In more general terms, the transition process was moving forward at a very slow pace. One main reason appeared to be the lack of government capacity and the low priority given to the task by the senior leadership in the Liberian government. It is possible that part of the Liberian government would prefer the UN to remain in Liberia, because a UN mission entails considerable financial contributions to the national economy and also employment opportunities for the local population.

THE MILITARY COMPONENT – THE FORCE
The multinational and multicultural military component in a UN peacekeeping operation faces certain challenges which have to be overcome if it is to operate as a coherent and efficient military formation, and to be as effective as required in order to meet its objectives, including facilitating the role of the civilian component. By 2014 in Liberia, 44 different nations contributed troops and staff officers to the military component.

Challenges may exist in the form of a variety of different perceptions such as social conventions, behaviour, the “state”, and the role of the military in society. In addition, the troop-contributing nations may have national agendas, priorities, and/or caveats that might influence the organization and operations of the military component. Cultural understanding and acceptance of differences together with patience and training are the key qualities needed to tackle these challenges.

In order for the military component to fully embrace and apply the comprehensive approach, it is important that all military guiding documents address the issue of how to integrate and facilitate the civilian effort. The comprehensive approach should be in focus in the military guiding documents all the way from the Military Strategic
Concept of Operations (strategic level), the Force Headquarters Campaign Plan (tactical level), the Force Headquarters Operations Orders (tactical level), and down to the Operations Orders of subordinate units.

INTEROPERABILITY
The ability to operate together as a coherent and efficient military formation is complicated by the fact that each staff officer and unit is operating in a context of national military culture. Therefore, different perceptions of soldiering, command and control relationships, doctrines, and field manuals influence how the mandate is implemented. The understanding of how to manage the mission and how to best accomplish the tasks may differ significantly between different troop contributors. Basic challenges such as language and different types of equipment also complicate the ability to operate as one coherent component. Other challenges include insufficient national training for staff officers and units, ill-equipped soldiers and poor equipment that does not meet the UN prescribed and agreed standards. In Liberia, the fact that many nations failed to supply their troops with appropriate and well-functioning equipment turned out to be serious problem. Broken or damaged equipment reduces the force’s ability to operate. This can be detrimental to fulfilling the overall mission objectives.

National prioritization of the UN mission and rigorous and high-end training prior to, and during, deployment is central to ensure a coherent military component contribution. In addition, the UN should consider taking more direct measures against troop-contributing nations by refusing to reimburse their expenses if they fail to equip and supply their troops according to guidelines, such as the Memorandum of Understandings.

The requirement of interoperability also applies between UN military and police forces and the host nation’s security forces.

Many African armies are responsible for internal security. Consequently, the field mission needs to prepare for the training and transfer of tasks which are not normally executed by military forces in this region.

PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING
In order to meet some of the challenges that characterize the multi-national and multi-cultural military component, and to ensure that there is enough time available for mission objectives, pre-deployment training is of paramount importance.

Relevant topics for the pre-deployment training that would greatly benefit any field mission are the study of the Security Council Resolution, the Military Strategic Con-
cept of Operations (strategic level), the Mission Concept (operational level), the Force Headquarters Campaign Plan (tactical level), the Force Headquarters Operations Order (tactical level), and Rules of Engagement (specific guidance for commanders and soldiers on how to apply lethal and non-lethal force according to different levels of threat). Other topics to be studied prior to the mission include the UN Military Decision-Making Process, English language training, and cultural understanding, taking into consideration both the culture of the host nation and the culture of in-mission military colleagues and units. Knowing and understanding these elements prior to deployment enables the military leadership to plan for and execute military operations that reflect and support the civilian effort from the very moment they arrive in the mission area. Supplementary training consisting of courses specifically aimed at staff officers to be deployed in a UN field mission is offered at a variety of military schools worldwide.

In Liberia, we witnessed new staff arriving with no or very limited training, and – even more importantly – with limited English language skills. Some nations appoint their staff with very short notice. Consequently, they miss the option of pre-mission training. As a result, most staff officers spend weeks trying to understand their role and that of the mission. This reduces the efficiency of the mission headquarters.

**IN-MISSION TRAINING**

In order to address the numerous challenges, in-mission training is necessary to maximize the effect of the military effort. Even if the mission is already under considerable time pressure, it is essential to carry out training and exercises. To create a common platform for meeting mission objectives, training in Standard Operating Procedures, Standard Operating Instructions, and mission policies and directives is crucial.

Training in issues such as the Force’s command and control structure, battle rhythm, reports and returns, the preconditions of the Force for operating as a coherent and efficient military formation (e.g. information flow, the commander’s intent and mission analysis), and the mutual expectations of commanders and units is also essential. Units deployed in remote areas require the use of Mission Command. Exercises serve to improve the force’s capability and interoperability and to ensure that the leadership focuses on rectifying weaknesses. Exercises may include study periods, command post exercises, and field exercises. In Liberia, the sectors (brigades) conducted exercises. At force level, there were quarterly exercises for the Quick Reaction Force. Also, contingency plans were made and pre-deployments were tested.
MILITARY CAPACITY
Forces for the UN field missions are generated by UN Headquarters in New York through the Force Generation process. Potential troop-contributing nations might consider contributing specific capacities that would greatly enhance not only the military component, but also the entire mission capability. Such units should be able to deploy swiftly from camps with a few hours’ notice, to quickly cover long distances and be able to operate immediately and efficiently once they reach the area of operation, thereby enabling the mission to respond immediately to any crisis.

In addition, a valuable contribution to the mission would be units able to deploy “into the bush” for a long period of time and operate independently of permanent bases. Such “expeditionary” units would greatly increase the mission’s operational range and outreach. To facilitate the deployment of troops and equipment that are appropriate for the circumstances and developments on the ground, tactical land and air transportation capacity under the command of the military component would save precious time and increase the force’s freedom of action.

Knowledge about the operational environment and situational awareness is facilitated by Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capacities that would improve and strengthen the overall information level immensely.

Field missions often rely on scarce engineering resources and non-combat engineering tasks and can be tasked by the mission support component. Therefore, integrating a greater number of engineering units into the military component is likely to increase the force’s freedom of action. Finally yet importantly, skilled staff officers capable of understanding the complex environment and of conducting long term planning are in high demand. Any significant troop contributions, regardless of type of unit, should trigger considerations including commanders and staff officers at a more senior level.

CONCLUSION
The UN has a long history of launching field missions to conflict areas in regions such as Africa and the Middle East. The mission mandates have often been limited to traditional peace keeping in more or less well-defined areas of operation with a relatively low level of threat. However, in future the UN are likely to send more robust missions to complex theatres, and the requirements of the military component to fulfil mission objectives are likely to increase. High quality forces with special capacities will be in high demand. Contributing countries should consider how they facilitate sustaining such high quality forces for the duration of the mission.
In a complex theatre of operations, working in the context of an “integrated mission concept” and a comprehensive approach, the military component will need to be able to integrate and closely coordinate with the civilian component, other civilian actors, the host nation government and, not least, the population.

To meet this challenge, both staff officers and units must be able to understand and use the comprehensive approach. This will facilitate contributions to state-building and to conducting future comprehensive planning. It is essential that the comprehensive approach is integrated at all levels in the military component and in all military operations. The organization and training of military units will have to reflect the wide spectrum of threat levels, tasks, and missions – from traditional security tasks to interaction with civilian elements, and the transfer of responsibility for state-building to the indigenous authorities.
China’s Participation in UNPKO: Policy and Prospect

Senior Colonel Xu Yizhong

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursues a policy of independent peaceful diplomacy. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China is an important force in maintaining world peace and stability. Providing more than 30,000 personnel – of which 10 persons lost their lives – for UN peacekeeping missions as of May 2015, China is already the largest contributor to UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

China’s policy on participation in UNPKO

Official statements

Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and the refusal to use external military force to settle conflicts in same constitute sacred principles that form the basis of China’s foreign policy. These principles are also the core of China’s policy on participation in UNPKO.

At the 50th UN General Assembly meeting in 1995, Qian Qichen, Chinese Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, put forward the principles that UN peacekeeping operations should comply with the view of Beijing. This means: 1. To abide by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, especially the principles of respecting national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. 2. To persist in resolving disputes by peaceful means such as mediation, intercession, negotiation. Force will not be used to carry out UN mandates. 3. To oppose dual standards. UN member states may not impose their national policies on the UN Security Council. It is not acceptable that a handful of countries seek mandates for military interventions to pursue national interests in the name of the UN, which is meant to protect the common interest in peace and security. 4. To abide by the principles of consent of the conflicting parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except when used for purposes of self-defence. The principles have proved effective in ensuring that peacekeeping operations are implemented in line with the UN charter. 5. Successful peacekeeping operations require that no UN force is deployed in conflict zones where they risk becoming party to a conflict, e.g. because they are deployed in areas

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(1) Statistics are taken from the Office of Peacekeeping Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, PRC.
where they are vulnerable to being attacked by rebel forces that have not consented to UN intervention.

The Chinese government has reaffirmed its commitment to these principles on many occasions. In order to deal with the current problems of UN peacekeeping, such as shortages in manpower and funding, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented the following proposals at the high-level meeting on UN peacekeeping operations held in 2014:

First, the UN peacekeeping operation mandates need to be improved. When deploying a peacekeeping force, the UN Security Council needs to set realistic and feasible goals with clearly defined priority tasks. Implementation of UN mandates should be assessed in a timely manner and be adjusted according to changing situations. A withdrawal strategy of UN peacekeeping should be formulated during the planning stages of peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except for purposes of self-defence should always be respected.

Second, the efficiency of UN peacekeeping operations needs to be improved. It is of great importance to deploy UN peacekeeping personnel rapidly. For this purpose, the UN Security Council, the UN Secretariat, the host countries, and the peacekeeping force providers should enhance communication and coordination to facilitate the establishment of UN missions. The logistics system should be improved by means of better management of peacekeeping logistics, by making use of practices which have proved successful, and by making better use of existing resources.

Third, UNPKO capabilities should be strengthened. China calls for the provision of more military personnel and equipment for purposes of peacekeeping operations by a larger number of countries with manpower and equipment suitable for UNPKO. The UN should develop uniform criteria for organizing, training, and superintending peacekeepers. The training of peacekeepers at all levels should be enhanced to ensure that they are qualified to perform as expected in UN missions. New technologies, new equipment, and new methods need to be introduced into UNPKO. Legal issues should be studied comprehensively and thoroughly. As stated in the UN Charter, the sovereignty and independence of host countries should be fully respected.

(2) In the 1990s, UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) did not obtain consent from all of the conflicting parties before mandates were made. Consequently, the UN peacekeepers did not secure collaboration from all parties and had to work in circumstances of continual conflicts. UN units were attacked and more than 150 were killed or injured. The UN mission ended in failure.
Fourthly, the UN should collaborate with regional organizations more closely. China recognizes the achievements that the UN has already made in collaborating with regional and sub-regional organizations in the field of peacekeeping operations. This constitutes important improvements of the UN as an international collective security mechanism. The UN Secretariat should enhance coordination and cooperation with regional organizations, such as the African Union, to ensure that they take responsibility for conducting peacekeeping operations in the African region.

In conclusion, China’s policy on UN peacekeeping operations can be outlined as follows:

- Abiding by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN. The UN rather than just a few countries should play a leading role in peacekeeping operations.
- Enhancing collaboration with regional organizations in UN peacekeeping operations on condition that the leading role of the UN is guaranteed.
- Persisting in resolving disputes by peaceful means and to oppose the abuse of force, since it may result in worse or more complicated situations in conflict zones.
- Following the principles of consent of the conflicting parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except for purposes of self-defence.
- Carrying out UN peacekeeping operations in accordance with available UN capabilities to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of UNPKO.

**Analysis**

China’s UNPKO policy reflects fundamental principles of its foreign policy – non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and the refusal to use military force to settle conflicts in other countries. These foreign policy principles are in line with the UN Charter. In practice, Chinese military observers, staff officers, and peacekeeping units all strictly comply with this policy. For example, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not participated in UN missions where it might have ended up being party to one side in a conflict, nor has it provided UN missions with combat units that might be used to overthrow the government in the country where intervention

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(3) The African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) play more and more important roles in preventing and resolving local conflicts in 21st century. The former established the AU African Mission in Burundi, the AU Military Observer Mission to the Comoros, the AU African Mission in Sudan, the latter establishing ECOWAS Mission in Cote d’Ivoire, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia.


(5) For example, China did not participate in the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), nor in the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).
is undertaken. China sticks to its principles on UNPKO very strictly, giving rise to criticism concerning China's unwillingness to adopt a more flexible case-by-case approach to UNPKO. Why does China not change its policy?

In recent history, especially in the 1920s and 30s when warlords supported by various foreign countries fought one another, China was subject to numerous foreign interventions, which resulted in prolonged civil wars with high numbers of casualties, poverty, and lack of central government. These memories form part of China's collective memory. It explains China's determination to maintain non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states as a fundamental principle of UN peacekeeping.

The post-Cold War era saw the outbreak of wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya resulting in the fall from power of the Taliban, Saddam Hussein, and Muammar Gaddafi. However, military interventions did not bring about peace or stability to these countries. Before the wars, atrocity crimes were committed against the populations in these countries. However, after military intervention, these countries remain caught up in civil wars and terrorism. Peace and stability are still not on the cards. These cases demonstrate that military intervention in the internal affairs of other countries not only violates the purposes of the UN, but that they are likely to worsen living conditions and dismantle state structures providing welfare to the population. Military intervention that involves interference in the internal affairs of other countries without governmental consent does not appear to help promote peace and stability and restore security.

According to Chinese policy, states that use UNPKO to intervene in the internal affairs of other states are unable to remain impartial in a conflict. Instead, they end up siding with one of the parties in a conflict, thereby complicating the security situation rather than resolving it and exacerbating conflict rather than contributing to peacekeeping.

China's policy on non-intervention has been criticized for lack of flexibility and unwillingness to respond to atrocity crimes committed by governments. The problem with this criticism is that the criteria for assessing China as a state which ignores atrocity crimes are not clearly spelled out by the critics. Which criteria are used to determine whether a regime is bad or good? In the Cold War era, communist regimes were legitimate targets of intervention according to the liberal West. In the post-Cold War era, a regime in possession of weapons of mass destruction is used as an excuse to overthrow regimes by the use of force. On many occasions, some countries intervened in the internal affairs of other countries on the basis of national interests or their own moral views on what constitutes justice within other states. China has the economic and military capabilities to intervene in the internal affairs of other
countries. If China applied flexibility in its UNPKO policy, she would be accused of being a threat to a much greater extent than is the case at present. Although a policy of non-intervention also has inherent problems, it is the lesser evil. Besides, the motives of states participating in UNPKO are more transparent when non-intervention forms the basis of their engagement.

II. Prospects for China’s participation in UNPKO

Undoubtedly, China will continue to take an active part in UN peacekeeping operations. Indeed, China is likely to play a more significant role in future. I offer the following explanations for this development: first, the conflicts in the contemporary international system require that the UN plays a greater role in maintaining world peace and stability. As a responsible member of the world community as well as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China is obliged to make a greater contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. In line with this, the UN calls for greater contributions from China than was the case during the Cold War. Second, China remains a developing country, and her development depends on a peaceful and stable international environment. In other words, actively participating in UNPKO, which is an important instrument in rendering the world peaceful and stable, will be necessary for China to be able to continue to give priority to domestic economic development. Third, having participated in UN peacekeeping operations for 25 years, China is an experienced contributor capable of providing increasingly professional services to UNPKO.

In May 2015, the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China published “China’s Military Strategy”. In Part VI, the paper says: “China’s armed forces will continue to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, strictly observe the mandates of the UN Security Council, maintain its commitment to the peaceful settlement of conflicts (…) China’s armed forces will continue to take an active part in international disaster rescue and humanitarian assistance (…) will continue to carry out escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and other sea areas as required (…) will engage in extensive regional and international security affairs, and promote the establishment of the mechanisms of emergency notification, military risk precaution, crisis management and conflict control (…) will gradually intensify their participation in such operations as international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and do their utmost to shoulder more international responsibilities and obligations,

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(6) The first five Chinese military observers were sent to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in April 1990. But 20 Chinese civilians were sent to the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989.
provide more public security goods, and contribute more to world peace and common development.”

On this basis, what is China likely to contribute to the UNPKO in future? The following trends are emerging:

First, China will continue to discuss a reform of UN peacekeeping mechanisms with other UN member states on the basis of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. In order to raise the efficiency levels of UNPKO, China will propose improvements in areas such as the recruitment of personnel, logistics support, training of peacekeepers, and chains of command.

Second, UNPKO is facing shortages of both personnel and money. At the same time, regional organizations have inherent advantages of being able to undertake rapid deployment. Moreover, they are familiar with local conditions pertaining to conflicts in their neighbourhood. Consequently, China encourages regional organizations to play a greater role within the framework of UN peacekeeping operations and to collaborate more closely with the UN on peacekeeping. For this purpose, China will assist those regional organizations in carrying out peacekeeping operations with UN mandates by offering to train officers, providing necessary equipment, supplies and funds, and taking part in peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations.

Third, China will provide more military observers, staff officers, and units for UN peacekeeping operations. The PLA is the largest armed force in the world. Its manpower would be a useful contribution to UN missions. However, China refused to provide combat units for UN missions from the beginning. This resulted in much smaller PLA contributions for UNPKO than might be expected. In China’s view, dispatching armed combat units abroad violates basic principles of China’s foreign policy: non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and the non-use of deadly force to settle conflicts in other countries. In 2015, an infantry battalion from the Chinese Army was dispatched to South Sudan. This is the first time for China commits a combat unit to a UN peacekeeping mission, marking a significant breakthrough in its policy. China’s dispatch of a combat unit to a UN mission area does not

(8) For example, opening some positions such as executive staff in UN missions to volunteers in order to narrow the gaps of manpower. Training peacekeepers by making full use of the Internet, such as uploading training courses and as much information as possible about all UN mission areas in order to standardize the training quality, reduce the training time in the mission areas, and ensure that the peacekeepers are trained during the time available to them and are better prepared for their missions, etc.
mean that China has parted company with the principle that force can only be used for purposes of self-defence. The combat unit must not take offensive actions unless it is attacked by deadly force. China is likely to dispatch a second and third combat unit in future with the same restrictions applying to their contribution.

Fourth, army aviation units are needed in many UN mission areas. For example, India and Russia provide helicopter units to the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), including transportation helicopters and armed helicopters. China's army aviation was established in the 1980s, growing slowly over a long period of time due to limited manufacturing capabilities. At present, China is capable of manufacturing many types of helicopters, paving the way for the development of Army Aviation. With the improvement in Army Aviation capabilities and its growing number of helicopters, Chinese army aviation units are likely to take part in UN peacekeeping operations. With the dispatch of a combat unit to a UN mission area, there is no longer policy barriers towards dispatching a helicopter unit.

Fifth, by carrying out escort missions in the Gulf of Aden, the PLA Navy became part of the international anti-piracy operations. The navy task forces have received a lot of praise for their performance, showing that they are competent at fulfilling UN peacekeeping missions at sea, thereby emulating the successful contributions from the Chinese army in the past. If the UN were to extend its mission area from land to ocean in future, the PLA Navy will serve as a standby force and the Chinese government will be willing to provide the UN with its navy task force if requested.

Sixth, China will create more opportunities for international exchange on UNPKO. It will be beneficial for China to listen to numerous voices in the overseas UN peacekeeping community. Such communication will enable China to propose reforms that are seen as beneficial by a majority of contributors to UNPKO. China is also focusing on explaining the motives and considerations behind its policy on UNPKO in more detail to the international community. Chinese peacekeepers still have much to learn. However, they also have experience and ideas that are likely to be beneficial to their foreign counterparts in UNPKO. The PLA has only held one joint peacekeeping exercise with the Mongolian Army as well as a few joint training courses. The PLA is capable of doing much more in this area, and we are likely to see such activities unfold on a much larger scale in future.
Chinese Policy on the Responsibility to Protect

By Peter Melgaard and Liselotte Odgaard

Introduction

At the 2014 UN General Assembly dialogue on Responsibility to Protect (R2P), China made an official statement on the status of R2P among the member states:

“The efforts of the past decade to consolidate the norm as a basic guideline for the protection of civilians against genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity had not resulted in consensus. Further discussion is necessary before the norm can be expanded. At present, there is no standard model for how the international community assists states in implementing R2P.”

The Chinese statement reflects the emerging division in the UN on how to combine a state-based framework for global security management with the protection of people against atrocity crimes. Many analysts argue that China experiences growing dilemmas between an increasing need to present herself as a responsible power, and the fact that China has an understanding of R2P that differs from that of the West. Therefore, China sets out to present herself as a responsible power and an advocate of stability by adjusting and supplementing existing frameworks of order across the board in security, economic, and political spheres so as to allow for more avenues of influence. We argue in favour of a pattern emerging in China’s R2P policy practice. We find that China’s implementation combines continued adherence to absolute sovereignty with the use of military and non-military instruments to prevent and address atrocity crimes.

Since R2P was endorsed as a UN norm in 2005, it has been a central political theme in debates on proper humanitarian conduct in the context of global security management. China has played a key role in addressing concerns about the US-led efforts to universalize a liberal interpretation of the UN framework after the Cold War. These efforts do not suggest a departure from the UN framework or proposals for replacing R2P with alternative norms for the protection of people against atrocity crimes.

crimes. Instead, China sets out to manifest a non-liberal approach to R2P, according to which national governments, assisted by the international community, has ultimate authority. Also, China seeks to implement an R2P practice that focuses on eradicating the root causes that engender atrocities, on reforming existing political institutions rather than replacing them, and on coordination rather than extensive collaboration between intervening states. China's R2P policy raises the question: to what extent is R2P Chinese-style compatible with Western R2P interpretations? Despite differences in objectives, instruments, and the world view underpinning Chinese and Western R2P interpretations, China and the West seem to have a common interest in stabilizing the economic, social and political structures in fragile states to limit the threats towards international peace and security emanating from them. This need emerges at a time when both China and the West face growing security challenges, domestically and in their near abroad. China and the West agree that R2P may be one way of bringing about stability in fragile states.

**The debate on the development of R2P and China’s R2P policy**

The R2P doctrine forms part of the norm enforcement efforts in the human security sector in wartime and in peacetime in the post-Cold War era. The concept emerged from the Yugoslavian and Rwandan crises and the subsequent issues raised, should the international community have a right to intervene in a state to stop atrocities. In 2009, the UN General Secretary conceptualized R2P as three pillars, with the first pillar confirming the role of the sovereign state in protecting people against atrocity crimes.¹⁰

In the report, R2P was defined as:

**Pillar 1:** The protection responsibilities of the state.

**Pillar 2:** The international community responsibility to assist states in protecting its population.

**Pillar 3:** The international community responsibility to react timely and responsively to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

The 2009 report suggests a protection partnership that includes sovereign states, regional and international organizations, civil society, and the private sector. The first two pillars are based on the willingness of the individual state to either initiate measures

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to protect its own population from mass atrocity crimes, or to accept willingly that the international community will assist in applying protection measures. By contrast, the third pillar addresses the option for international community intervention where the state in question is manifestly failing, necessitating the use of the full range of political, economic and military instruments. Pillar three may be used without state consent as long as the UN Security Council (UNSC) approval has been obtained. The three pillars of R2P is based on the means available within the existing Charter. Hence, the purpose of R2P is to create a mutual understanding on how to use the existing Charter and implement it at the conceptual or doctrinal level.

An inherent part of the R2P concept is to challenge the sanctity of absolute sovereignty, because the gaze of the international community is squarely focused on individuals in their capacity as perpetrators and victims of crimes, respectively. Sovereignty is not a blank cheque for states to behave as they please towards the people within the territory over which they exercise effective control. Sovereignty is accompanied by responsibility for meeting internationally recognized standards. Governments that do not fulfil their responsibilities to their people forfeit their sovereignty. By questioning the sanctity of absolute sovereignty, R2P challenges a key point in China’s efforts to shape the post-Cold War order, which is to preserve absolute sovereignty as the most fundamental principle of international governance. The emergence of R2P has encouraged China to develop a practice which demonstrates that China participates in countering atrocity crimes insofar as absolute sovereignty is not compromised, arguing that functioning government institutions are fundamental to secure the basic livelihood of people – even in the event of proof that the government participates in committing atrocity crimes.

According to the 2005 World Summit Outcome, intervention for R2P protection purposes has to go via the UNSC.\(^{11}\) In 2009, the UNSC reaffirmed its willingness to respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted, including the considerations on appropriate measures at the UNSC’s disposal.\(^{12}\) The UNSC-authorized military action against Libya implemented in March 2011 became a test case

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\(^{11}\) Paragraph 139 of the document states that “The international community, through the UN, also has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” Cf. United Nations General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/60/L.1, 15 September 2005, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/world%20summit%20outcome%20_doc%202005(1).pdf.

for the invocation of the R2P’s key precepts. Instead of cementing R2P as a universal legal UN-based norm, it generated more contestation concerning how to implement it and which instruments to use. Hence the emerging norm of R2P has not contributed to the creation of new legal rights or obligations to undertake unauthorized humanitarian interventions. However, this was never the intention. Rather, R2P was meant to clarify authority structures regarding decisions on how to address atrocity crimes with the purpose of providing better management of these security issues in both wartime and peacetime.

Since R2P continues to be at the work-in-progress stage, suggestions have been advocated on how to take protection against atrocity crimes further, effectively constituting a revised version of the original norm. In November 2011, Brazil introduced the R2P reinterpretation of ‘Responsibility while Protecting’. China followed suit by pursuing a debate among government-affiliated think tanks on how to reinterpret R2P to address concerns among numerous states emerging from the alleged diversion of the Libyan intervention into a campaign for regime change on the pretext of being a civilian protection mission. For example, in June 2012 a think tank under China’s foreign ministry by the name of China Institute of International Studies published an article titled “Responsible Protection: Building a Safer World”. The article launches the concept of Responsible Protection as a clarification of the R2P concept based on a Chinese interpretation of international humanitarianism. The interpretation emphasizes the importance of non-military instruments and UN supervisory authority, collaboration with governments subjected to intervention, and the obligation of intervening states to undertake post-protection reconstruction.13

R2P has become a rhetorical battleground for different interpretations of what it entails to be a humanitarian power. The key issue is not the endorsement but implementation of R2P. China has played a role in shaping the future trajectory of R2P. Beijing’s role reflects its emergence as a maker rather than merely a taker of methods to provide global security management. China’s policies in the conflicts in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and South Sudan imply that she is gradually developing her own R2P practice. It is seen as a clarification of ways to implement the UN concept that will offer better protection against atrocity crimes than the Western liberal version.

In Libya, as the National Transitional Council gradually took over effective control and assumed political authority, China transferred its social and economic engagement to the new regime in 2011. However, the disintegration of the country combined with

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limited Chinese interests in the region meant that China ended up withdrawing completely from Libya. By abstaining from the UNSC Resolution of 1973, which authorized intervention, China assumed a “spectator’s” approach to the Libyan conflict. Since the use of military force did not coincide with the Chinese understanding of R2P, Beijing has not been an active contributor to the pre- and post-conflict stabilization efforts.

In Syria, China has watched the campaign with disapproval from the sidelines due to Western opposition towards the Assad government, extending limited humanitarian aid and participating in the UN-endorsed demining efforts.

In addition, China provides anti-terror capabilities to regional countries such as Iraq where links to the situation in Syria exist. The requests from the Iraqi government for intervention and Beijing’s designation of ISIL as a terrorist organization means that regime consent has been obtained and regime change is not on the cards in the Chinese understanding of these concepts. Consequently, the third pillar of R2P is not activated and the actions taken are therefore in line with Chinese preferences on R2P.

China’s economic interests in the developing economies, in particular their oil industries, give rise to accusations that Beijing’s pro-government policies are merely driven by national interests and that its limited humanitarian engagement leaves it to the West to bear most of the cost of protecting a common interest in peace and security. By contrast, in Beijing’s view, its economic engagements are precisely the kind of equal partnership that might get these countries on a viable economic and social footing, eventually facilitating political stability. The Chinese are willing to accept a very low per-barrel oil fee without the promise of rights to future reserves. This is possible because the state-owned companies do not answer to shareholders. Moreover, China offers a lot of capital and willingness to quickly get into high security risk areas. By contrast, large-scale aid intervention in countries which Beijing has limited knowledge of, and interest in, is unlikely to help the situation much. Furthermore, China’s differences with the West regarding implementation of R2P policies mean that large-scale Chinese humanitarian engagement in these countries might be seen as undermining Western efforts. Consequently, South Sudan is a welcome opportunity for China to implement its R2P practice where little engagement from other states exists. China has a considerable and long-standing presence in the area. Consequently, Beijing has detailed knowledge of the economic, social and political conditions in South Sudan. The absence of other powers in South Sudan has encouraged China to play a central mediating role, taking the opportunity to demonstrate that Beijing is not merely concerned about its national interests.
China’s R2P practice in the four conflicts encompasses regime consent as a precondition for intervention, the use of force by foreign powers far from their shores for defensive security purposes only, coordination of individual Chinese implementation with other intervening entities, a non-partisan approach to promoting peace and safety, and economic and social development as a precondition of long-term protection of people against atrocity crimes. This approach effectively rules out the use of the third pillar of R2P in cases where sovereign states with an established government apparatus commit atrocity crimes against their own population. China does not approve of this behaviour. However, Beijing lacks an alternative set of tools to address these issues. In China’s view, the Western approach to the third pillar of R2P is not acceptable insofar as it involves using force outside of the Western alignment system.

China’s position on the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as it was presented at the UNSC in December 2014 captures the essence of China’s R2P policy. The DPRK figured on the UNSC agenda due to the request by ten predominantly Western-aligned UNSC members that the situation in the DPRK be a formal agenda item. Referral was recommended on the grounds of violations of R2P due to the commitment of crimes against humanity by the DPRK government, in their view impacting on regional stability and the maintenance of international peace and security. The referring states base their request on a Human Rights Council Report which criticizes China for sending back North Korean refugees to DPRK government authorities which commit crimes against humanity. In line with the positions of the five non-Western members that did not request referral, China argues that large-scale violations of human rights in the DPRK does not justify referral to the UNSC which deals with issues pertaining to international peace and security only. China’s position confirms the sanctity of absolute sovereignty by refusing to deal with an issue which is considered internal to a state, where government authorities are exercising effective control over a territory and its people and where no request for assistance from the international community has been submitted.

China’s R2P approach safeguards the existing principles and mechanisms of the UN system. However, China’s interpretation of legitimate R2P implementation stresses defensive and individual elements, because it focuses on eradicating the root causes which engender atrocity crimes tinged with elements of development aid and governmental military and economic assistance; on the preservation and restructuring of existing political institutions rather than replacing old institutions with new ones; and on coordination rather than extensive collaboration with other intervening entities.

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China’s R2P practice is based on UN-approved principles, but the implementation differs significantly from R2P practice of Western countries.

**China’s emerging R2P policy practice: implications for global security management**

China’s R2P policy is not conceptualized as an alternative to the Western liberal interpretation of UN principles. China and the Western world both seem to agree on the need for the R2P norm. However, there seems to be some disagreement on the preferred objectives and instruments for implementing protection. The Chinese interpretation of R2P emerges as a proposal on how to implement R2P in settings such as South Sudan or in functional areas such as development aid where the West leaves room for other states or even invites them to put into practice their understanding of how best to protect people against atrocity crimes. Consequently, China’s step-by-step and case-by-case practice does not necessarily pose a challenge to the Western liberal understanding of R2P, but rather as a proposal for improved implementation which does not violate other basic UN principles. That being said, the use of military force under the third pillar of R2P is often not a viable option for China, especially in cases where the principles for non-intervention and state sovereignty are compromised. Consequently, Beijing is not always able to address cases of severe atrocity crimes by suggesting viable solutions.

China’s R2P policies appear to consist of five policies. First, China sees absolute sovereignty and non-intervention as fundamental rules of the UN system which entail government consent for intervening to counter atrocity crimes. These rules are not flexible in comparison with the Western interpretation of R2P. Second, far from one’s own shores, the use of the military instrument is seen as potentially detrimental to protecting civilians against atrocity crimes. As such, it should only be used on a case-by-case basis and as a means of last resort. Third, overseas intervention entails focus on coordination between intervening forces with different interpretations of how to implement R2P. Fourth, support for efforts to counter atrocity crimes should be directed towards the political authority exercising effective control, irrespective of the ideological inclinations of the target government. Fifth, in China’s view, both pre- and post-intervention stabilization measures like social, economic, and reconstructional efforts under the auspices of the UN system should be fundamental to any R2P implementation. Our argument that China has identifiable R2P policies implies that China adopts a constructive and proactive approach to R2P and is not merely trying to undermine the concept.

Numerous differences between China’s and the West’s approach to implement R2P imply that if the Chinese and the Western approach are to work in tandem in a particular
theatre, a number of preconditions must be in place. First, an “agreeing-to-disagree” approach which entails mutual acceptance of different approaches to implementation seems necessary to establish collaboration despite fundamental disagreements in their R2P practices. Second, a common end state must be agreed that is acceptable to both to ensure effective implementation. This means not violating basic Chinese or Western preconditions for intervention. For example, regime change cannot be a partial objective due to Chinese insistence on regime consent. Similarly, regime preservation by offering military assistance to regimes who use this instrument to commit atrocity crimes violate basic Western requirements. Perhaps this calls for an end state that merely aims at establishing UN-protected safe havens for groups of people that would otherwise be subject to atrocity crimes. Third, financial obligations should be agreed prior to the intervention to ensure that states that have committed to undertaking specific responsibilities have the means to meet their responsibilities. Fourth, the establishment of a coordinating forum without decision-making powers in the theatre of operation where all intervening powers are represented with an equal voice will ensure that the intervening powers do not work at cross-purposes. Fifth, geographical and functional zones of responsibility are useful to make sure that different types of responsibilities, such as an offensive and defensive use of force, or responsibility for economic, political and military assistance, are designated to the intervening powers according to their particular approach to R2P. Sixth, a very broad UN mandate is necessary for the two sides to operate in the same theatre and to achieve different objectives that are aimed at a common end state.
China’s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO): A Historical Overview

Senior Colonel Ren Jian

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council China focuses on fulfilling its international responsibilities and obligations, and on supporting and actively participating in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO). It plays an important role in maintaining regional and international peace at the same time as China is obtaining insights on how to innovate and promote UNPKO.

First, China has shifted its policy on its own and taken a more active attitude on participating in UNPKO.

The first UNPKO began in 1948, which means that by 2015, the international community has 67 years of experience in implementing this type of operation. The UNPKO main task is to monitor ceasefires, disengage conflicting parties, stabilize situations of conflict, restore order, organize voting, undertake disarmament and reconstruct infrastructures. UNPKO plays an important role in resolving international conflicts and in maintaining and restoring regional security and international peace. It reflects the UN’s authority in international security affairs.

China’s attitude towards UNPKO underwent a process of changes from initial resistance to being a detached observer, then from limited engagement to being an enthusiastic supporter. In the 1950s and the 1960s, China was not a member of the UN and was not able to participate in UNPKO. At the time, the respective superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, were dominating UNPKO, in China’s view diluting its impartiality and effectiveness. Consequently, China was unequivocally opposed to UNPKO.

In 1971, China’s lawful rights as a member of the UN were restored by the adoption of the 26th UN General Assembly resolution 2758. China began to take an active part in international affairs. China’s international engagement was appreciated by the developing nations and acknowledged by the developed nations. However, due to the constraints on the UN’s ability to take action engendered by the ideological rivalry of the capitalist West bloc and the communist East bloc, UNPKO played a limited role in resolving turmoil and in mediating in regional hot spots. As a newcomer to the UN China needed to observe and learn about UNPKO. China adopted the so-called
“three no” policy, which limited China’s engagement in UNPKO by not contributing forces, not taking on financial obligations for UNPKO, and not voting on UN Security Council resolutions concerning UNPKO.

In the 1980s, as China began its economic reform adopting the “Opening-Up” policy, China strived to develop its economy and to improve its relations with the US and other Western countries. At this time, China emphasized that its foreign policy should promote world peace in order to create an international environment that would help China carry out its policy of reform, modernization, and opening up to the outside world. China had obtained a better understanding of UNPKO, seeing UNPKO as an important means to maintain world peace and security, and as a tool for mitigating regional conflicts and disputes that might help promote regional peace. Taking into account its responsibilities towards the UN and its concern to contribute to world peace and enhanced welfare, the Chinese government had a flexible policy on UNPKO. In a discreet and selective manner, China also began to take part in UNPKO. In 1989, for the first time, China sent civilian observers to the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia to supervise voting.15

In the 1990s, as the UN gradually assumed a central role in maintaining world peace, an increasing number of countries participated in UNPKO. Many countries saw participation in UNPKO as an important platform for influencing international affairs and for nurturing their image as contributors to world peace. The scope and functions of UNPKO was continuously on the rise. The UN exercised growing influence on international and regional situations of conflict, and played an increasingly important role in world peace, thereby enhancing the reputation of UNPKO among the UN member states. Participation in UNPKO came to be seen as an important channel for conducting multilateral diplomacy and for influencing the dynamics of the international system. China began to take a more proactive and flexible attitude towards UNPKO, participating in a comprehensive manner in peacekeeping operations and playing an increasingly central role. For example, in 1992, China sent a blue-helmet troop for the first time – a team of military engineers – to Cambodia for a peacekeeping operation.

Second, China has expanded and deepened its engagement in international peacekeeping operations.

In accordance with UN resolutions and agreements between the Chinese government and the UN, China dispatches peacekeeping troops and specialized peacekeeping personnel to designated countries and regions. Chinese personnel carries out peacekee-

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ping operations under the auspices of the UN. They are mainly tasked with monitoring ceasefires, disengaging conflicting parties, providing engineering, transportation and medical support, and participating in social construction and humanitarian assistance.

In 1990, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sent five military observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). It was the first time China took part in a UN peacekeeping mission. In 1992, the PLA dispatched an engineering corps of 400 officers and personnel to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). This was the first time China sent a service-support military unit on a peacekeeping mission. In 2002, China joined the UN Standby Arrangement System. At the request of the UN, China would be able to deploy its personnel and equipment to the designated place within 90 days. In April 2003, China dispatched a medical detachment of 43 officers and soldiers to the UN Special Mission in the Congo and extended its engagement in UNPKO to the medical field. In December 2003, China extended its engagement to encompass transportation services. China sent a transportation detachment of 240 persons to the UN mission in Liberia. On 3rd December 2013, China dispatched a vanguard detachment of 135 persons to the UN mission in Mali. This was the first time that China sent a security force to UNPKO. These developments demonstrate that Chinese peacekeeping forces and their organization have become more complete. They have become able to independently carry out diverse, comprehensive and high-risk tasks in a region far from China’s shores. Peacekeeping forces help fostering a specialized force that is familiar with the principles governing UN peacekeeping and can perform comprehensive tasks. China’s comprehensive engagement helps China assume the responsibilities of a major world power and meet the expectations of the international community. The Ministry of National Defense’s office for peacekeeping affairs claimed that “The types of peacekeeping force is extended by dispatching a security force that conducts guard tasks for Mali. It demonstrates our army’s firm resolve to and confidence in being able to contribute to maintaining world peace, and also scale up our army’s peacekeeping to new heights”. In 2015, for the first time, China sent a peacekeeping infantry battalion of 700 persons to the UN mission in South Sudan.

In the past two and half decades, China has dispatched over 30,000 military personnel to 25 UN peacekeeping missions, making China the biggest troop contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – more than the sum total of the other four permanent members. It also dispatches the largest number of troops for engineering, transportation and medical support among all the 115 contributing

countries. Moreover, China pays and contributes the largest share of UN peacekeeping costs among all developing countries.

**Third, China attaches great importance to the development of domestic institutions and to enhancing international communication on peacekeeping.**

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) established its peacekeeping affairs office in 2001. The office is responsible for coordinating and managing the participation of Chinese armed forces in UNPKO. In 2009, the peacekeeping training centre of the MND was established to serve as a base for providing regular and realistic combat training for Chinese peacekeeping personnel. It also functions as an important platform for training foreign peacekeeping personnel, and international exchange. The training centre was designated by the UN as one of the core global peacekeeping training bases. In 2012, China used decades of experience with peacekeeping operations to issue *Regulations on the PLA’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, which defines the tasks, organizations, dispatch and withdrawal, education and training, management and support related to the PLA’s participation in UNPKO. The Regulations provide the legal provisions for institutionalizing and standardizing Chinese peacekeeping. Regulations related to the management of peacekeeping officers, finance, and personal welfare, have been formulated; relevant textbooks on peacekeeping have also been compiled and printed.

In addition to improving domestic institutions engaged in peacekeeping, China also seeks to enhance its international exchanges. In 2009, the PLA conducted its first joint peacekeeping training with Mongolian armed forces. In 2011, China’s Ministry of National Defense conducted a joint international training course for UNPKO instructors with the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In October 2013, for the first time, China conducted an international training class for UN military observers. Officers from 15 countries were trained for three weeks in the peacekeeping training centre of the MND. This class has 31 courses and 15 exercise subjects, including basic theory and common sense topics such as UNPKO policy, principles, and specialized skills such as patrolling and observing, negotiation and liaison, coping with kidnapping and hijacking, fielding first aid, and identifying mines and explosives. The courses had an international profile with the aim of training actual operations. The instructors were from China, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, and Germany, and all were senior peacekeeping officers. Hervé Ladsous, the UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping, expressed that the course was tailor-made for UN military observers and was conducive to enhancing the ability of military observers to conduct diverse peacekeeping tasks. On 16th October 2013, the 6th peacekeeping expert symposium of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum was held.
in Beijing, China. Over 80 representatives from 22 member states of the UN and the ASEAN Regional Forum attended the meeting. Participants discussed subject such as “the challenges facing UN peacekeeping”. Vice General, Chief of Staff of the PLA Sun Jianguo proposed that all countries and regional organizations support the UN’s leading role in peacekeeping by contributing to coordinating training, and facilitating that peacekeeping training institutions complement each other so as to enhance the training level and ability to conduct peacekeeping operations of all countries contributing to UNPKO. He also expressed China’s willingness to increase its contribution to UNPKO and to world peace. In October 2014, the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the MND, the China Institute for International Strategic Studies and the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy jointly organized the Challenges Annual Forum 2014 in Beijing, topic of which is “Building Capacity for Peace Operations in Response to Diversified Threats”. At the forum, more than 120 delegates from the United Nations and 30 countries carried out in-depth discussions on how to improve peacekeepers’ capabilities in coping with non-traditional security threats, how to enhance the capability of peacekeeping operations to protect peacekeepers and logistics support, and how to strengthen international cooperation for peacekeeping capability building.

**Fourth, Chinese peacekeepers honour their obligations and complete various peacekeeping missions.**

Being a tough, brave, and devoted force, Chinese peacekeepers accomplish their tasks in an exemplary manner. Their efforts testify to the reputation of the PLA as a civilized, powerful, and victorious force. Chinese peacekeepers also receive considerable praise for the quality of their work and their speed and service.

For the past 25 years, Chinese peacekeepers have built and repaired over 10,000 kilometres of roads and 284 bridges, cleared over 9,000 mines and various types of unexploded ordnance (UXO), transported over one million tons of cargo across a total distance of 11 million kilometres and treated 120,000 patients. Chinese staff officers and military observers have displayed a high degree of professionalism in their work at the headquarters and in performing tasks such as patrolling, ceasefire monitoring, liaison and negotiation. The Chinese engineering units deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo worked around the clock to level an area of 16,000 square metres littered with volcanic rocks. The Chinese transportation units to Liberia have worked throughout the country and served as the transportation support centre for nearly 50 peacekeeping troops in this country.

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Chinese peacekeepers also build roads and bridges, repair vehicles and transport basic goods, medical assistance, and agricultural technology to the local population. The Chinese engineering units deployed in Lebanon invented the method of “tilted cross positioning” in minesweeping, which has greatly raised the safety and efficiency of such operations. They can now cover an average of over 500 square metres per day with this method. During the Lebanon-Israel conflict in 2006, over 3,500 unexploded bombs were defused and disposed of by Chinese UN personnel. The Chinese engineering units deployed in Darfur in Sudan have established 13 wells in areas where well-digging was considered impossible. The Chinese engineering units in South Sudan built the first interim training centre for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). The training centre is considered to be of a high standard, making a positive contribution to the process of training indigenous personnel so they can contribute to establishing peace and security.

In retrospect, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council China has participated in UNPKO in a supportive and comprehensive manner. Compared to China's contribution during the Cold War, China is presently sending larger and more diverse peacekeeping forces to wider mission areas. The Chinese contribution has changed from merely logistics support forces to include defensive and combat forces. At present, Chinese peacekeeping forces are able to clear away obstacles, conduct anti-riot tasks. However, this does not mean that Chinese peacekeeping forces will conduct offensive actions or be involved in regional conflict. On the other hand, considering the context in which Chinese troops are deployed as well as the UN’s rules of engagement and labour division, they will allow Chinese personnel to protect the people that carry out peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance and economic development in the conflict area in line with the UN mandate and international law.

China's contributions have changed from company-level support units to encompass battalion level combat units, thus expanding China's contribution from implementing single tasks to implementing a diverse number of tasks. The hardware support has also changed from general equipment support to encompass special operations equipment support. A Chinese peacekeeping battalion is equipped with infantry combat vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, anti-tank rockets, unmanned aerial vehicles, mortars, and heavy machine guns, all made in China.

Though China has made many contributions to UNPKO, challenges continue to meet Chinese peacekeeping forces such as having too few reserve forces for peacekeeping and insufficient language and communications skills.
The world today is undergoing unprecedented changes. Political multipolarity is emerging and economic globalization is deepening; historical changes take place with respect to the international power balance, the global governance structure, Asia-Pacific geostrategic dynamics, and the international competition in the areas of economy, science and the military. The contradictions between developed and developing countries and established and emerging powers makes it difficult, at times, for the international community to take action to secure international peace and security. A growing number of local conflicts and regional hotspots emerge. Frequently, these conflicts are caused by political, economic, ethnic, and religious disagreements and rivalry. Peace and security remains an elusive objective in many parts of the world. At the same time, international cooperation to promote peace and development is growing, and the willingness of the international community to take action to protect the common interest of states in peace and security is growing, because an increasing number of states, including China, recognize that their destiny is closely connected to the destiny of the rest of the world.

At present, China is entering a new historic phase. China faces the opportunities and challenges this involves by adhering to its new security concept of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, linking fundamental Chinese interests with the common interests of the international community. Moreover, China's development depends on world development, and China's security depends on world security. China protects global peace and common international prosperity by maintaining peace and development in China. China's armed forces will remain a powerful force contributing to maintaining world peace and regional stability. It will continue to support and actively participate in international peacekeeping, increase its contribution to international peace and security, and honour its obligations as a big power. China is concerned to ensure that, as it grows stronger, the world will become a safer place.
Good Order at Sea in the Gulf of Guinea

Johannes Riber Nordby and Katja Lindskov Jacobsen

Introduction
The Gulf of Guinea is a vast area with 20 sovereign coastal states and islands plus a number of landlocked states. The area also spans two regions, West and Central Africa. The coastline of the Gulf of Guinea is more than 6,000 kilometres long. The Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) from Senegal to Angola covers an area of 2.7 million square kilometres, which is approximately the same size as the EEZ of the US mainland\(^\text{19}\). The Fund for Peace (FFP) uses 12 social, economic, and political indicators to access the fragility of a state. Their latest estimate concludes that nine of the 25 weakest states in the world are located in West Africa\(^\text{20}\). Such conditions result in a situation where the vast majority of states in the Gulf of Guinea region are incapable of managing maritime security issues in their territorial waters – regardless of whether this pertains to the threat of piracy, illegal fishing, pollution, or other criminal acts. Indeed, the Gulf of Guinea is thought to be the main arena in the world for illegal fishing. Moreover, piracy has marred the region for decades, and the situation has arguably worsened during the last couple of years. Nevertheless, West African states are unwilling to let extra-regional states patrol and assert jurisdiction in their territorial waters, as such activities are viewed as a violation of their national sovereignty.

In this chapter, we first outline the maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea region at present. It is examined in the context of Good Order at Sea. Second, we describe the most recent maritime security initiative launched during the Yaoundé Summit in 2013. During the summit, West and Central African states decided to establish six maritime zones along their coastline in order to improve the maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. A process heavily supported by UN’s International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Finally, the chapter suggests that maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea is a global problem to be addressed by actors from the region as well as by states and institutions from other parts of the world.

\(^{19}\) www.marineregions.org accessed 1 August, 2015.
Good Order at Sea

The concept of Good Order at Sea was introduced by Geoffrey Till as a way to convey a broader understanding of responsibilities at sea. The concept refers to a condition where international as well as domestic waters are governed in such a way that the safety of shipping is ensured, a condition which, at the same time, permits countries to pursue their maritime interests and develop their marine resources in a sustainable and ecological way in accordance with agreed principles of international law. Currently, the global maritime domain is characterized by a lack of sovereignty and jurisdiction. From a liberal perspective, such deficiencies are viewed as positive aspects insofar as they facilitate free trade and movement. However, more problematic aspects emerging from insufficient jurisdiction is that actions that would normally be regarded as criminal in territorial waters might not be defined as illegal in the High Seas. For example, illegal fishing in an EEZ may not be illegal in the High Seas. Moreover, even if such actions were considered illegal, another crucial point is the lack of law enforcement, let alone the problem of discovering illegal activities that occur on the High Seas. Indeed, effective global maritime policing is impossible, not only because of a lack of jurisdiction, but also because of the expenses involved in carrying out such tasks.

Since absolute sovereignty cannot be exercised outside of a state’s territorial waters, the involvement of states and institutions located in maritime areas where these security issues are at play is not sufficient to establish Good Order at Sea. Often, it also requires the involvement of extra-regional states, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations. To ensure that international waters are not marred by criminal activities or unsustainable exploration that jeopardize security in the maritime domain, a high level of international cooperation seems to be necessary.

Furthermore, Good Order at Sea is not just a matter of being able to distinguish wrong from right. It also concerns defining methods for ensuring that states can benefit mutually from utilizing the sea. For example, fishing in the High Seas with a specific type of fishing gear may not be illegal according to current international conventions. However, such activities may still result in significantly damaging an ecosystem with potentially devastating consequences for the future, and hence such fishing methods should arguably not be allowed. Good Order at Sea is a broad concept of sustainable security at sea in as much as it invites us to consider a broad range of activities, which are considered to be the responsibility of individual states, but which

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could gradually be turned into shared responsibilities of all actors using the maritime domain. As such, Good Order at Sea refers to a condition, which can indeed be very difficult to establish. For example, one impediment could be the “sea blindness” of a number of states, which causes them to ignore the importance of the maritime domain. Another impediment is that even if states recognise the importance of the sea, they may nonetheless still officially or unofficially accept illegal activities, such as fishing or waste dumping, carried out by ships in their waters. Furthermore, a number of states recognise the importance of the sea, but they do not have the resources required to police or enforce national and international legislation at sea or ashore.

In order to determine the level of Good Order at Sea in the Gulf of Guinea, we focus on four areas of analysis proposed by Till; The sea as a resource, The sea as an area of sovereignty, The sea as an environment, and The sea as a medium of transportation. These areas cannot be considered in isolation, since many maritime threats could be contained in one or more of these areas of analysis. For example, hundreds of abandoned ships in the approaches to Lagos, Nigeria present a distinct environmental risk, since oil is slowly leaking from their tanks. These ships also jeopardize maritime traffic, because pirates can hide in them and because they make it impossible to approach Lagos by sea at night. The following sections will use these four analytical categories to describe and analyse the present level of Good Order at Sea in the Gulf of Guinea.

**The sea as a resource**

When considering the Gulf of Guinea as a resource, two central issues to be investigated are fishing and offshore oil/gas.

The region has 95 offshore oilrigs of different types mainly in Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. With respect to oil and gas, the main challenges in applying Good Order at Sea are environmental challenges, which will be investigated further below. Accordingly, this section will mainly focus on the issue of illegal fishing.

**Illegal, Unreported or Unregulated fishing (IUU)**

West African waters are among the world’s richest fishing grounds. Yet at the same time, West Africa also has one of the highest levels of IUU fishing activities in the world.

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More than 30 percent of all catches are carried out illegally\(^{26}\). However, IUU fishing is not just a matter of theft. For example, fishermen fishing legally, but using illegal methods can have similarly devastating consequences. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between three types of illegal activities, as they have different stakeholders.

**Illegal fishing** is understood as fishing in an area without any permission or licence. In West Africa, illegal fishing is common, because most African states do not have the resources to patrol and inspect their EEZ, giving fishing vessels the opportunity to work with impunity.

**Unreported fishing** includes both unreported and misreported information. For example, ships or companies might have licences to fish in a certain EEZ, but intentionally avoid submitting the correct information regarding the size of the catch or the size of fishing vessels. The China National Fisheries Corporation (CNFC) under-reported gross tonnage for 44 out of 59 fishing vessels. By doing so, the CNFC avoided taxation fees and was granted access to fishing areas that would otherwise have been restricted. Similar cases exist for fishing vessels flagged under European and other Asian flags.

**Unregulated fishing** refers to fishing activities in areas with no applicable management structures such as agreements or conventions. Unregulated fishing refers to fishing outside the EEZ where vessels use illegal fishing gear or land fish, which would otherwise be protected within an EEZ. Unregulated fishing can have devastating effects on eco-systems and may also have a direct spill-over effect on future fishing prospects, impacting negatively on local and regional income levels.

When approaching IUU fishing from a Good Order at Sea perspective, the level of Good Order does not merely depend on the conditions in and capabilities and responsibilities of West African states. IUU fishing is a *global* problem involving a number of global actors. Responsibilities for illegal activities pertain to flag states as well as to the countries where the offloading of illegal cargoes take place. Illegal actions at sea do not only take place because states are unable to enforce maritime jurisdiction. It also occurs because flag states allow their vessels to use illegal fishing gear or assist their fishermen in issuing incorrect reports and submissions. Harbours where illegal catches are offloaded could be a relatively easy place to both inspect the fishing gear and the catch itself for illegal fishes. For numerous purposes, an effective inspection regime, enforced by harbours as well as flag states, can be just as effective as a coastguard.

The sea as an area of sovereignty

Another important onshore condition with critical implications for maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea is political dispute and instability. Such issues have resulted in an increase in illegal maritime activities, including acts of piracy. In the Gulf of Guinea, politically motivated piracy activities have mainly been related to the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in the southern part of Nigeria. MEND wants a portion of the oil income to be used in the Niger Delta for social and environmental improvements and has, indeed, “admitted to stealing and smuggling oil”, activities that the group justifies by framing them as “re-appropriation of wealth and as a form of protest”.

Not only domestic disputes, but also interstate boundary disputes in the region have increased the problems of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula and the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea illustrates this point. During the period the two countries could not agree to settle their maritime boundary in the Bakassi Peninsula, and therefore the area was governed neither by Nigeria nor by Cameroon. As a result, the area became a “safe haven” for pirates. Another important issue of dispute in the region concerns the question of rights over oil-rich territory and maritime space. Indeed, this issue has become increasingly relevant in the Gulf of Guinea as new offshore oil reserves have been discovered. For example, it will be interesting to see how the maritime boundary dispute between Ghana and the Ivory Coast develops and which consequences the discovery of oil resources in the area will have for maritime regional security.

Directly or indirectly, onshore political conditions and disputes spill over to the maritime domain in ways that reduce the level of Good Order at Sea in this region. These maritime disputes can be linked to how inland borders are interpreted to link into the maritime domain. For example, should a borderline at sea be perpendicular to the coast or should it be a direct continuation of the inland border. Until resolved, such disagreements will contribute to bad Order at Sea.

(29) Explained during interviews in Douala Cameroon.
The sea as an environment

Dumping of toxic waste

In general, similar dynamics pertain to illegal dumping as to IUU fishing. For example, in some cases local authorities have been accused of either allowing companies “to evade prosecution for [their] role in the dumping of the toxic waste” or of selling unofficial ”licenses” to international companies, allegedly allowing them to dump their toxic waste32. However, such illegal dumping only takes place because there are companies and ship owners who are able to circumvent the laws of either the flag state or the state where the waste comes from. Actors exist that are willing to trade in the dumping of toxic waste. Dumping does not just stem from corrupt African states allowing waste dumping to take place. It is also perpetrated by states and companies around the world, which facilitate such actions. Therefore, waste dumping has the same global characteristics as IUU fishing and should be fought in harbours of embarkation as well as in the region.

Environmental disasters

Environmental disasters in the Gulf of Guinea have often been attributed to oil spills and illegal refineries located in the Niger Delta33. Oil that is stolen from onshore pipelines runs into the River Niger before it is washed out into sea. Another environmental concern is the increasing number of offshore oilrigs in the region. Deep water oilrigs, in particular, raise concern. Oil companies are obliged to provide the necessary environmental protection in collaboration and agreement with the state. However, it is questionable whether oil companies or states in West Africa will be able to handle an accident similar to the Deepwater Horizon in the Mexican Gulf in 2010. Not least in terms of resources required34. Consequently, Good Order at Sea is maintained if companies and states join forces to do their utmost to avoid such accidents. Whether the problem is oil theft or an accident on an oilrig, the only effective environmental protection with regard to Good Order at Sea is to reduce the possibility of such events happening at all.

The sea as a medium of transportation
Smuggling of weapons and drugs

Regarding the smuggling of drugs in the region, a United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report noted that around 50 tons of cocaine with a street value in Europe of around US$ 2 billion was smuggled from Latin America through West Africa to Europe. A significant part of maritime drug smuggling passes through Guinea-Bissau, which is used as a transit country. One reason for choosing Guinea-Bissau is its large archipelago which allows smugglers to hide from the coast guard which conducts very little patrolling and is corrupt. Furthermore, in 2013 Guinea-Bissau was labelled as Africa’s first drug state by the US. The designation entails that the state itself benefits from, protects, and even organizes the drug trafficking.

Drugs are smuggled through the so-called Highway 10, a route that runs parallel to the 10th parallel, which is the shortest distance between South America and West Africa. Once ashore, the drugs are smuggled to Europe though the Sahara Desert. In Europe, drugs are the root cause of significant social and criminal problems. In the Gulf of Guinea, drug smuggling also provides different armed factions with a source of income. This may e.g. be used to purchase weapons, thus contributing to conflict escalation and to insecurity in the region. For example, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is financing their fighting by means of protecting smugglers crossing through the Sahara Desert. Drug smuggling contributes to insecurity in the region, and can turn into civil war similar to the conflict that broke out in Mali in 2012-13.

While weapons smuggling is a problem in West Africa, weapons are mainly smuggled within the continent itself. When regimes like the Gaddafi regime in Libya imploded, weapons became easily tradeable commodities that were smuggled into a number of African states. However, close links between weapons smuggling and drugs smuggling, maritime security and Good Order at Sea plays an important role. As drug

trafficking onshore and inland is extremely difficult to fight due to weak and corrupt state institutions, one possibility would be to address drug smuggling at sea instead. Establishing a level of Good Order at Sea will not only assist in combating drug problems in Europe, but also contribute to a reduction in weapons trafficking, rebellions, and terrorist organizations in West Africa. Effective policing of West African waters by ships is likely to have a more significant impact on smuggling compared with anti-drug programmes onshore. This is due to the fact that the points of entrance into West Africa can be monitored, since drugs are smuggled in by air or by sea. Therefore, international policing of West African waters can have regional impact in West Africa and outside the region in Europe.

**Piracy**

Understanding the differences between various kinds of piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea is an important prerequisite for understanding piracy as a whole. Piracy can be divided into four groups: kidnapping-for-ransom, petro piracy, petty piracy and small-boat piracy.

**Kidnapping-for-ransom**

One type of piracy activity in the Gulf of Guinea is kidnapping-for-ransom. It was recently reported that “the first ten weeks of 2014 have witnessed the resurgence of maritime kidnapping-for-ransom off the coast of Nigeria’s Niger Delta”\(^{40}\). However, the situation in the Gulf of Guinea differs from the situation in Somalia where kidnapping-for-ransom has been the dominant *modus operandi* of pirates. First, kidnappings do not only occur at sea. In the past, kidnappings at sea were part of a broader phenomenon of attacks against oil companies. Kidnapping of oil company employees was one of the many activities of Niger Delta militants, and these kidnappings occasionally occurred at sea\(^{41}\). Another difference between kidnapping-for-ransom between Somalia and West Africa is the duration. While captives have been kept for months or even years in Somalia, captives in West Africa are often released after days or weeks. One reason for this practice is that pirates in West Africa demand smaller sums of money than do Somali pirates. Another important reason is the fear of being detected by different authorities. This is important, because, in cases of kidnapping, it is not only a question of policing the sea, but also of finding and prosecuting the kidnappers onshore.

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Petro Piracy
Another type of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is theft of cargo, mainly oil. In the case of kidnappings-for-ransom, the crew is "valuable" (i.e. without them no ransom for the pirates). However, this is not the case with regard to hijacking-for-cargo. In such instances, pirates are only interested in the cargo and are therefore less reluctant to use violence against crew members that might get in their way\(^\text{42}\). Second, these activities are very well-organised and involve tasks of considerable logistical complexity. Emptying a vessel of tons of oil is not a simple task. It requires sophisticated gear and know-how. It also requires navigational knowledge to manœuvre a merchant vessel around for days, and it requires a logistic system and a good network to be able to sell oil illegally to refineries or to re-circulate it back to the market through an oil terminal in the region.

Small-boat Piracy
A specific type of piracy goes unnoticed in international statistics, namely where pirates are robbing criminals\(^\text{43}\). At times, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea attack other boats, which have already been involved in a criminal activity at sea such as petro piracy, petty piracy, or illegal fishery. They rob the boat of cargo, which has already been stolen once. Such instances will obviously never be reported through any official channels. This, however, does not make it less important. Robbing the robber is a sign of the sorry state of the Good Order at Sea and how poorly West African waters are patrolled.

Petty Piracy
A fourth type of piracy is theft from vessels. This often occurs when a vessel is in harbour or at anchor close to shore\(^\text{44}\). It is characterized by theft of stores and equipment from ships docked in ports such as Pointe-Noire in the Congo or anchorages such as Lagos\(^\text{45}\). Even if this form of piracy may be more widespread and extensive in terms of occurrences, it may seem less detrimental when compared with the other types of piracy mentioned above as long as the crew itself does not interfere.

Four different types of piracy and Good Order at Sea
Piracy covers various criminal activities. However, they all thrive on poor economic, social, and political conditions onshore and a lack of effective patrolling at sea.

\(^\text{43}\) Interview at the Kofi Annan Peace Keeping Training Centre.
Furthermore, in West Africa piracy is mainly organised and planned by Nigerian groups. Petty piracy, kidnapping, and small boat piracy might be less well organised. However, organising petro piracy demands a high level of corruption. This type of piracy demands support within a business community as well as some kind of dormant political support. Petro piracy is not simply a matter of criminal actors going to sea with the aim of stealing cargo from ships. Petro piracy is inextricably linked to the extent to which Nigeria has generally proved passive in combating the problem of piracy. It is also linked to the widespread corruption, which entails that powerful people are involved directly or indirectly in piracy activities.

In recent years, piracy began to spread to neighbouring countries such as Cameroun and Benin and changed from a Nigerian problem to a regional one. Poor order at sea started to spread. In response, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) launched an initiative to start maritime security corporation in an attempt to contain Nigerian piracy. The following chapter will describe this initiative and to what extent it can contribute to Good Order at Sea in the Gulf of Guinea in future.

**Maritime institutions and architecture in West Africa**

**Yaoundé Summit, regional zones and inter-regional collaboration**

To understand the drivers behind the 2013 Yaoundé Summit, it is important to go back to the maritime initiatives taken by ECCAS in 2009. A number of security initiatives in Africa have, to varying degrees, been formulated with the involvement of external actors (notably donors). Sometimes this has led to a lack of ownership in cases where such initiatives are increasingly advocated by donors than by states on the African continent. Following the conclusion of a regional study in 2009, ECCAS decided to develop a maritime strategy based on the following six principles: *information management; community surveillance through the detection and the sharing of assets; legal and functional harmonization of States’ action at sea; self-financing, through a community tax; logistics; and institutionalization of a maritime conference for Central Africa*. Following the launching of this strategy, a regional maritime security centre was established in Pointe-Noire in Congo-Brazzaville, Centre régional de sécurisation maritime de l’Afrique centrale (CRESMAC). At the same time, three maritime zones (A, B, and D) were also created (see figure). Each of the three zones has its own maritime operation centre called CMC. The CMC for zone D (comprising Cameroon, Sao Tome e Principe, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea) was placed in Douala in Cameroon.

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(46) Interview at the Kofi Annan Peace Keeping Training Centre.

and became operational in 2009. To help navigate within national legislation and to improve multilateral corporation, the CMC in Douala (zone D) has made sure that it will include representatives from the remaining states within the zone. Furthermore, the navies of Cameroon, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea also carry out joint patrols and exercises.

Besides the effect of such collaborative efforts on the immediate security situation in the waters of zone D, these joint exercises and patrols also serve another important function, namely to minimize and, ultimately, eliminate mistrust between the participating states. Furthermore, these joint efforts also help decrease the legislative challenges of arresting and prosecuting criminals at sea. An important effect that can be accredited to the operationalization of the CMC in zone D has been to eliminate piracy activities from especially Cameroonian waters. This is indeed a significant achievement. However, it also highlights the need for a broader interregional approach: the problem of piracy has not been solved. Rather, the majority of attacks now occur in neighbouring waters that are less well patrolled, notably westward near Benin and Togo. Consequently, after the Yaoundé summit in 2013, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided to copy the approach taken by ECCAS. ECOWAS has now established a similar structure with three maritime security zones:

E, F, and G. The organization decided to establish the first CMC in zone E and, as a pilot project, the centre was to be located in Cotonou in Benin. From here, the centre would cover the waters of Nigeria, Togo and Benin. With this initiative, the region of West Africa is attempting a containment strategy: if both zone D and E can be effectively patrolled, then it will be far more difficult for pirates to hijack vessels in these waters, and it may also be more difficult for piracy to spread further into the Gulf of Guinea, because they have to pass through zones, which are effectively surveyed.

Even though this new method of maritime security maintenance has enjoyed international attention, focus has mainly been on the anti-piracy aspect of the architecture, the agreed code of conduct in practice aiming at a broader maritime security agenda, drawing attention to additional maritime security challenges such as IUU fishing, terrorism, and various types of smuggling. Admittedly, however, the Code of Conduct still focuses mainly on piracy and IUU fishery. From an ECOWAS perspective, this maritime regional architecture is still so new that implementation has only just begun. For example, the establishment of CRESMAC’s parallel in West Africa – called Centre Régional de Surveillance Maritime de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CRESMAO) – has only just been agreed upon in October 2014 and is to be placed in Abidjan.

Finally, in order to coordinate the effort between the two regional centres (CRESMAC and CRESMAO), an Interregional Coordination Centre (CIC) has now been established with headquarters in Yaoundé, Cameroon. With this interregional centre, the new maritime security architecture for West and Central Africa has three different levels: maritime security centres in each of the six zones, regional coordination centres in both West and Central Africa and, finally, an interregional coordination centre (see figure below).

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An important point to be aware of regarding this new interregional maritime structure is the fact that, for the most part, this structure is established through a bottom-up process in the sense that it was initiated from within the region, with ECCAS as an important driving force. This is important insofar as it contributes to giving the project a regional foundation and a stronger sense of ownership. However, the fact that the architecture has been established on the initiative of states in two regions also shows that the political will of states in the region to take collective action to manage security issues constitutes an important element in driving the establishment and operationalization of such initiatives. The creation and operationalization of zone D could only happen because the states in this zone realized the need for such an initiative. The same can be said about the creation and operationalization of zone E. Furthermore, the fact that the states within these two zones have prioritized the development of naval capacities also underlines the importance the states attach to collective action.

Although the political will of states in some of the six zones have been a crucial driving factor in the operationalization of centres and to help ensure efficient collaboration, such developments also highlight the difficulties in obtaining maritime security in areas where this will is non-existent. Therefore, implementation of these zones can be expected to take place at various rates of speed. For example, if states in zone G do not see an immediate need to prioritize resources towards the improvement of maritime security, it will be difficult to establish and effectively operationalize this zone as intended. That said, the regional maritime security architecture is indeed an

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important attempt by the region to create an improved level of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea – and, in some respects, the attempt has already proven successful.

**The Yaoundé initiative, the UN and how we can improve Good Order at Sea.**

Good Order at Sea in West Africa is a global issue. And a very complicated one. The maritime structure initiated by the Yaoundé summit is an important one but cannot stand alone. Developments in Cameroun have shown that, even with limited means available, the Cameroonian navy has succeeded in reducing the number of piracy attacks as well as IUU fishing. The Yaoundé maritime architecture offers the most promising way for African states to maintain or even increase the present level of Good Order at Sea. Therefore, it is also supported by international organisations such as IMO and INTERPOL.

However, in a “perfect world” policing of the sea should not even be necessary. But the World is anything but perfect. Companies, states, and institutions around the world should and can do more. Good Order at Sea is not a local or regional problem. It is by definition a global one. It already forms part of UN organizations such as IMO and UNODC. The UN and IMO would be one platform from which to establish rules and frameworks for how to carry out global maritime policing together with the affected coastal states, since bad order at sea develops into a global problem. Piracy and IUU fishing, and smuggling, lead to more insecurity in West Africa which eventually will lead to further instability in the rest of Africa and, ultimately, in Europe. Good order at Sea should be a task for the UN and every state around the world. It is simply too easy to point fingers at the weak West African states asking them to improve their maritime security and then at the same time flag states ignores or even assists their ships in conducting illegal activities in the Gulf of Guinea such as dumping or IUU fishing.

So, rather than wait for the UN to take action, individual states might as well take action in the meantime. For example, the EU implemented a law against IUU fishing, and the EU states work together to reduce IUU fishing. Similar initiatives and a will to enforce them is required by all states, not least states in the Far East such as China, South Korea, and Japan. If they do not, the Gulf of Guinea will stay in a condition of bad order at sea, regardless of the success of the Yaoundé maritime structure, with unsafe conditions for sailors and ships, a more and more deprived ecosystem with a future risk of a deteriorating security situation in West Africa as a whole.
1. A review of China’s counter-piracy operations

As one of the common hazards of the world, piracy is held accountable for hundreds of ship-raiding incidents each year. These have caused heavy economic losses and claimed thousands of lives. Although piracy is on the wane thanks to joint piracy crackdown policies undertaken by numerous countries, piracy is still posing a menace to the security and development of some waters in the world. Being a peace-loving nation, China has been upholding its time-honoured tradition of taking up the cudgels for others, restraining the powerful and helping the weak. It promises to do everything in its power to participate in the coordinated effort to fight piracy – wherever that may be – together with other countries in the world, including Denmark. By reviewing China’s counter-piracy operations over the past six years and reflecting on the problems impairing current international counter-piracy operations, this paper proposes several pertinent countermeasures deemed conducive to facilitating collaboration and boosting the efficiency of counter-piracy operations.

On 26th December 2008, China dispatched her first naval task force to conduct escort missions far from China’s shores in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast. By 8th June 2015, in the form of rotation, regular accompanying escort, regional escort, onboard escort, on-call support etc., the PLAN has dispatched 20 batches of 59 warships, 44 helicopters, and over 17,000 naval personnel, and escorted 6,005 ships in 848 batches, among which 2,904 ships were Chinese and 3,101 were foreign. In this process, the PLAN rescued, accompanied and assisted over 60 ships in distress and investigated and rejected approximately 2,500 suspicious vessels. China’s escort operations have effectively helped contain the rampant activities of Somali pirates and maintain the navigational security of major maritime passages in the world. Carrying on its escort missions in a regular, reliable, and reputable fashion, Chinese task forces have won the trust of foreign ships as well as the respect of foreign navies. Many officers from escort forces sent by the EU, NATO and other countries once expressed that the PLAN’s escort operations have been effective and have contributed to relieving the workload of regional escort efforts, thus making significant contributions to
the overall security situation in the Gulf of Aden and in Somali waters. The Danish army has also been a major actor in international counter-piracy efforts. As far as I know, in 2012 alone, the Royal Danish Navy succeeded in rescuing a total of 42 hostages and 3 merchant vessels from Somali pirates, respectively, on 7th January, 28th February, and 12th April.

While conducting escort operations, the Chinese navy fleets have also actively engaged in practical and effective exchanges and collaboration with other navies. To date, it has carried out 8 joint escort operations and exercises with foreign escort fleets, held over 60 bilateral naval commander meetings, and visited more than 60 foreign ports on their return voyages. In December 2013, a PLAN ship sailed to the Mediterranean and joined a task force of warships from various countries, escorting ships delivering Syria’s chemical weapons for destruction. In 2011, the PLAN participated in the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya and escorted a Greek passenger liner. In 2015, China dispatched three warships and conducted five transportation missions, evacuating a total of 897 persons, of which 621 were Chinese citizens and 276 were foreign citizens. The PLAN vessels also joined the effort to search for the missing Malaysian airliner MH370. The PLAN’s escort operations have made outstanding contributions to world peace and regional stability. Besides, all these efforts help demonstrate to the world China’s overall image as a responsible great power as well as the PLAN’s image as a peaceful, powerful and civilized force. It also illustrates the meaning of the concept of “the harmonious ocean” advocated by China.

In future, China is willing to work within the UN framework and engage in a wider range of international counter-piracy activities, making use of its growing economic and military strength and assisted by its increasing fighting capabilities for the benefit of the international community. In the first place, apart from Somali waters, West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea and Southeast Asian waters are also marred by severe piracy attacks. However, until now, the UN has not been authorized to assign forces

(53) The above data are derived from materials offered by a PLA navy command responsible for counter-piracy escort missions.
(55) The above data are derived from materials offered by a PLA navy command responsible for counter-piracy escort missions.
(56) “Harmonious Ocean” refers to the concept that all countries in the world should work together for the enduring peace and stability of the oceans. As a signatory state to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China has called for building a “harmonious ocean” on the eve of commemorating the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the PLA Navy in 2009. “Harmonious Ocean” is the application of the “Harmonious World” concept put forward by China at the UN General Assembly in 2005 to govern the maritime domain. It is a response to the new understanding of and demands from international society regarding maritime security and marks China’s new contribution to developing the Law of the Sea.
to these areas to address maritime piracy threats. China is ready to contribute in these areas with other countries in the event of a UN request to jointly eliminate the threat of piracy beyond the geographical areas where UN anti-piracy efforts have already been undertaken. Moreover, China is willing to contribute to future international task forces similar to the naval escort, which assisted with the disposal of Syria’s chemical weapons. China has also escorted 8 World Food Programme ships on the request of the EU, but this year, the EU has not requested China to undertake this type of escort. China hopes that the international community will take into account its readiness to join international escort efforts and further strengthen collaboration mechanisms.

2. Reflections on pertinent problems
A careful examination of the status quo of international counter-piracy efforts warns us that there are still some problems that need to be addressed, namely the issue of failing to eradicate the underlying hotbeds for piracy; new pirate-infested areas may still appear, and there is room for improvement in counter-piracy operations. In view of these problems, the author has the following six suggestions.

2.1 Comprehensive measures are needed to govern piracy-ridden countries.
Counter-piracy operations should be carried out both at sea and on land, targeting specifically the breeding ground for pirates. Unless the roots of piracy are eradicated, it will never be possible to completely eradicate piracy. The fact that a few countries keep breeding pirates is a reflection of their inability to maintain stable governments, establish sound government institutions, exercise competent governance, curb social turmoil and provide the preconditions for eradicating poverty. Therefore, on the one hand, assistance should be directed at developing access to justice and to a judicial system. The UN and/or regional organizations should play a key role in dispatching personnel such as experienced legal experts and law enforcement officials to assist these countries in drafting laws and regulations, identifying the responsibilities of different social groups in the country, improving the legal system and various law enforcement agencies, promoting the training of legal personnel and, ultimately, increasing these countries’ governance and management capabilities. The UN and regional organizations are also advised to send military or police personnel to help quell social unrest by undertaking tasks such as monitoring elections, dispersing hostile crowds, combating criminal gangs, and disarming illegal armed groups. On the other hand, efforts should also be directed at helping those countries to alleviate poverty. The UN should help make economic, cultural, and educational development

(57) The above data are derived from materials offered by a PLA navy command responsible for counter-piracy escort missions.
plans, provide development funds, call on other countries, regional institutions and professional NGOs to invest and build factories as well as schools, and enhance technical and intellectual training so as to lift local people out of poverty. Although some measures have already been taken by several international organizations to fundamentally transform the institutional and political set-up of these countries, there is still a long way to go. The “One Belt, One Road” strategy\(^{58}\) initiated by China is expected to help countries and regions in undertaking efforts such as resource exploitation, infrastructure construction, and agricultural development. It is our hope to work with developed countries in Europe and North America to put an end to the backwardness that gives rise to piracy.

2.2 Preventative actions are called for to keep coastal countries recently experiencing turmoil from breeding pirates.

While sparing no efforts in fighting pirates that are posing substantial threats, we should also keep an eye on coastal countries currently embroiled in turmoil, such as Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Social upheaval in those countries usually results in a large number of homeless and unemployed people who might become pirates. The following measures should be taken to deal with this problem. First, mediation is much needed. The UN and relevant countries should be ready to shoulder their responsibilities and take precautionary measures. By mediating among all conflicting parties and hearing their political concerns, opportunities are provided for proposing possible suggestions and solutions to facilitate mediation. If needed, peacekeeping forces should be sent to stop the conflict or to contain the conflict until peace and stability can be restored. Turmoil in countries like Libya, Syria and Iraq should serve as a very powerful and profound lesson. Before mediation efforts have been fully explored, in some cases a small number of states and parties to conflicts have stirred up trouble and used force to protect partisan interests, thereby inviting chaos at the

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\(^{58}\) “One Belt, One Road”, also known as “the Belt and Road Initiative”, refers to the strategy and framework proposed by Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China in September and October of 2013. It consists of two main components: “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “Maritime Silk Road”. The “Belt” includes the countries situated on the original Silk Road in Northwestern China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean area, and in Southwestern China and the Indo-China Peninsula, and the Indian Ocean. The Maritime Silk Road, also known as the “21st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt,” refers to the area from the coastal area of China to the South China Sea, including the Malacca Strait and the North Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, the South China Sea and the South Pacific Ocean. “One Belt, One Road” is not a substantial mechanism, but rather a concept and initiative for collaborative development. Taking existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms between China and other countries as a starting point, it is based on the concept of the ancient Silk Road and existing regional platforms of collaboration. It advocates “peaceful development and win-win collaboration”, calling for an active partnership of economic collaboration with countries in the areas mentioned and for working together to build a community of common interests, common destiny and common obligations that enjoy mutual political trust, economic integration, and cultural compatibility.
cost of social stability and justifying the authorization of peacekeeping forces. Second, strikes on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) should be intensified. ISIS is a radical Islamist group that came into being due to a combination of factors – double standards in counter-terrorism campaigns, the invasion of Iraq on a pretext which was not validated by a UN mandate, and the “colour revolutions” in some countries. The group is also the chief culprit in changing the trajectory of social decay to a downward slope in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. To prevent these areas from deteriorating into a hotbed of piracy as a result of continual violent upheaval, it would be helpful if the United States as well as other countries engaged in addressing the threat from ISIS and stopped pointing fingers at countries with different views on what needs to be done to counter the threat from ISIS. Instead, focus should be directed at enhancing collaboration on blockade and control, and in the meantime, intensifying ground attacks with a view partitioning, encircling, and wiping out ISIS as quickly as possible. Third, humanitarian aid should be expanded. Facing the growing number of refugees displaced by wars, the UN and countries engaged in dealing with refugee flows should help provide assistance and settlements that are useful for stopping refugee flows, or provide the preconditions of peace and security necessary for allowing refugees to return to their country of origin. Fourth, monitoring efforts in certain waters should be stepped up. The UN and countries concerned about piracy should carry out surveillance at random to prevent pirates from predicting when surveillance is undertaken. Moreover, preventative patrols should be conducted and the personnel deployed must be trained to give them thorough understanding of the situation in piracy-ridden waters, thus deterring maritime criminal activities from taking place and nipping piracy in the bud.

2.3 Strengthened collaboration in counter-piracy operations is desired.

Counter-piracy operations are usually carried out far away from the homeland of the intervening states. Confronted with challenges such as unfamiliar environments, inadequate communication and demanding logistics, one cannot expect to tackle piracy issues unilaterally. Therefore, navies involved in international counter-piracy efforts need to enhance collaboration and strengthen their combined capabilities to accomplish the task. First, more funds should be allocated to intelligence exchange. As experienced peacekeepers and close neighbours, Western countries and organizations operating in Africa are usually well-equipped and experienced. Institutions like the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization and the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa can access in real time basic information concerning vessels passing by; the anti-piracy intelligence centres of some of these organizations often have a comprehensive grasp of maritime movements of task warships and the activity of pirates with help from capabilities such as reconnaissance satellites, maritime patrol
Adequate intelligence support has enabled them to know the enemy better and enhanced their capability to deal with threats from the enemy in an efficient manner. By contrast, for a few navies – including the PLAN – that are not permanently deployed in the region, information sources are mostly limited to shore-based reconnaissance assisted by off-shore reconnaissance, on-line information sharing, real-time information posted on Mercury, meetings of naval commanders, joint exercises, and training. This results in incomplete support channels, limited amounts of information, and poor timing. Consequently, it is hoped that the breadth and depth of intelligence exchange among related countries or organizations could be increased to remove barriers against collaboration and communication. In the meantime, those dedicated to this common cause are also encouraged to establish mechanisms for regular exchange, to fully share international counter-piracy resources, and to strive to achieve a high degree of transparency among themselves to be able to address piracy threats effectively. Second, more observers should be dispatched and joint training and exercises should be held at regular intervals. Countries that do not operate in the region targeted, as well as small and medium-sized states that have insufficient advanced equipment and technology are advised to send observers to NATO countries or local states, assign task forces to conduct stationed training in these countries, and hold joint exercises with NATO troops. Close, long-term, and intensified contacts with relevant personnel allow for more intelligence exchanges thereby facilitating efficient methods of counter-piracy operations to be undertaken; in addition, future coordination and interoperability among entities engaged in anti-piracy will run more smoothly. In September 2012 and August 2013, the US and China conducted two joint counter-piracy exercises off the pirate-prone Gulf of Aden. These exercises included synchronized manoeuvres, live fire drills with light weapons, ship-to-sea gunfire by main artillery, cross-deck helicopter landings, combined visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations, etc. Thanks to successfully conducted joint drills, the counter-piracy operations of both sides are further tested and improved.

2.4 Coordinated efforts in hostage rescue operations should be enhanced.

In all cases of ship-raiding incidents, the safety of the hostages is always the biggest concern of the countries involved and requires great attention and comprehensive rescue efforts. Unfortunately, current rescue operations are mainly carried out by the hostages’ countries of origin, which are usually located far from the target country.

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(59) The Internet Water Army, or Internet thug, refers to the on-line ghostwriters or on-line commentators hired by the Internet public relations companies to conduct online campaigns by making online postings for specific purposes.

Impeded by other difficulties such as lack of intelligence, unfamiliar environments, changing situations, these operations often fail. In view of these problems, all countries involved should feel obliged to rescue hostages by promoting comprehensive collaboration in dealing with hostage issues, especially operational collaboration, in order to ensure a greater success rate. To achieve this objective, first, superior resources of reconnaissance and intelligence should be effectively harnessed. By integrating the technological capabilities of the US, Russian, and NATO forces and the information capabilities of local states and organizations, a more effective combined effort can be made to gather basic information concerning the movements of pirates, the location of hostages, the level of alertness of pirate forces, local conditions, etc. All of these types of information, if processed properly, will allow for more reliable intelligence to guide the decision-making process of both the hostages’ countries of origin and the countries that deploy rescue forces. Second, counter-piracy elite forces deployed in pirate-infested areas should be well coordinated and employed. The UN should play a dominant role in making good use of counter-piracy task forces within regions affected by piracy. Assistance from special operational forces and specialized equipment are particularly important to allow countries far away from the theatre of the crisis and militarily weak countries to conduct rescue operations at manageable costs. Third, countries and organizations involved in anti-piracy efforts should provide sufficient assistance and support to operate efficiently. They should employ all necessary means within their reach, such as intelligence, logistics and equipment support to help task forces rescue hostages as soon as possible. If needed, they should also collaborate on facilitating the detention and trial of captivated pirates.

2.5 Coordinated and joint efforts among various navies are needed.

At present, there is a noticeable contradiction between the persistent problem of piracy and the limited task forces which countries are willing to deploy to deal with piracy. Adding to this problem is the lack of coordination among independent navies and the uneven distribution of forces. Since 2012, the PLAN, the Indian Navy, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Republic of Korea Navy have stepped up their coordination of and collaboration on international naval escort activities by arranging an integrated escort schedule. By doing this, it becomes more convenient for all vessels passing through piracy-prone waters to adjust their sailing routes and plans. For example, if navies from China, India, Japan and South Korea are scheduled to be on duty on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday respectively, a Chinese ship could apply to join the PLAN escort fleet, which usually takes place on Mondays (merchant ships from other countries may also join, if necessary). Countries involved in the coordinated operation take turns in being the reference country taking the lead in working out the schedule of vessels that are engaged in anti-piracy efforts. In this way, vessels passing through piracy-infested waters can be safeguarded in a more ef-
ficient and effective manner. Thus, it is recommended that an increasing number of countries, which are currently conducting their missions unilaterally, join this coor-
dination mechanism to increase the efficiency of escort operations. Additionally, the livelihood of pirates is usually sustained by their country of origin and their range of activity is thus limited in geographical terms. Given this, when conducting counter-
piracy operations, it should be manageable for task forces to widen their patrol areas sufficiently to block and control the activities of pirates so as to minimize the threat from piracy.

2.6 More countries should be encouraged to participate in counter-
piracy operations.

With the increasing influence of globalization and informatization, major events hap-
pening in one part of the world may have profound implications for countries far away. For example, piracy activities in a certain strait will affect trade and energy security in many countries outside the region, hence influencing the economic development in numerous states. Therefore, counter-piracy is currently a common security issue for the international community, calling for the participation of a larger number of countries and their navies. On the one hand, a growing number of developing countries should be asked to participate. Currently, many of these have witnessed rapid economic as well as military development, possessing the capabilities to play a greater role in world peacekeeping. The Indian navy has a total strength of 55,000 personnel and 155 vessels of all kinds; the Turkish navy 51,000 personnel and 191 vessels; the Indonesian Navy 45,000 personnel and over 200 vessels; the Brazilian Navy 60,000 personnel and 22 vessels; and the South African Navy 8,000 personnel and 26 vessels.61 These capabilities suggest that more ships could be dispatched by these countries to strengthen the international counter-piracy forces. On the other hand, developed countries should be persuaded to devote more resources to anti-piracy as well. At present, counter-piracy forces sent by some permanent members of the UN Security Council – the US, the UK, and France, as well as developed Western countries such as Germany, Italy, Canada, and Australia are not shouldering enough responsibility for UN anti-piracy efforts. Thus, they should be called upon to shoulder international responsibilities at a level that matches their capabilities and status in the international community. By supplying more resources and offering their skills in a real fight to combat piracy, the overall capabilities and quality of counter-piracy forces would be enhanced.

The Role of Special Forces in UN Peacekeeping – Expansion of Choice and Economy of Force

Prologue
By late 1993, there was a growing concern amongst Danish military top leaders about the risk of casualties to the Danish UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeepers in Sarajevo. The intense fighting during the Serbian blockade of Sarajevo frequently spilled over, putting blue-helmet peacekeepers at high risk from snipers intentionally targeting peacekeepers. On top of a general concern for the soldiers, there was also the concern of an eroding Danish public support for the peacekeeping effort if it meant that the Danish contingent would suffer heavy casualties and nothing was done to counter this threat.

Thus, military top leaders decided to insert Danish Army Special Forces to deal with this problem. The mission was clear: if snipers shot at Danish peacekeepers, the Danes were instructed to return the fire within the legal framework of the right to self-protection. The idea behind the mission was a conventional symmetric approach; if someone fired at you, you would reply in the same way, but more effectively.

After reconnaissance, the mission leader from Special Forces realized that this approach could have been very difficult and even counterproductive. Snipers operated, as a standard, hidden between civilians and there was a high risk of hitting non-combatants if the sniper fire was returned. In addition, target identification was difficult. It was suspected that some Bosnians on their own initiative took pop shots at the Danes to incite them to shoot back at the Serbs. This was reported back to Danish military leaders, but the initial task was maintained. Fire should be answered with fire.

Caught in this dilemma, the Special Forces informally developed an alternative approach together with the Special Forces of other nations. Instead of firing back, an escalation scheme was created. This scheme was openly communicated to commanders from the warring factions. The lowest measure was to point at a suspected sniper with a visible laser (in 1993, laser pointers constituted new equipment). The next was to fire a shot to the left of the sniper, then one to the right, and then it was left to the sniper to imagine where the third shot might be targeted.

But the real game-changer in this non-violent counter-sniper approach was the so called “Camera Kill”. Using sophisticated long-range cameras, a photo was taken of the suspected sniper. Then the Special Forces dressed up in standard blue-helmet peacekeeping uniforms before arranging a meeting with the faction commander responsible for the particular sector where the sniper had been seen. He was told
that the UN possessed this capability, and that these photos would be submitted to the prosecutor at the International Criminal Court after the war to hold the snipers accountable for their crimes.

Applying this alternative countermeasure, not a single shot was fired by the Danish Special Forces during the two years of the mission. Nor was any significant sniper fire against the Danish peacekeepers observed. As the mission was quite conventional and symmetric in its original nature, this non-violent approach turned it into an unexpected, unconventional, and asymmetric approach. Everybody had expected that sniper fire would be countered with sniper fire, but no one had expected that countering violence with documented evidence – countering war with law – would effectively complete the task.

In essence, this story summarizes the potential contribution of Special Forces to UN peacekeeping, namely to provide unexpected solutions that bypasses difficult problems with capabilities that do not escalate the conflict, thereby considerably expanding the range of choice of the UN Peacekeeping Force Commander.

Introduction

In the Balkans in the early 1990s, many European countries experienced irregular war in contemporary conflicts for the first time. Before this conflict, most military forces were focused on the state-on-state confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Had this evolved into war, the consequences would have been a conventional fire-and-manoeuvre war with tanks, artillery, and intensive air bombing, including the option of nuclear weapons.

As the European countries feared a spill-over from the Balkan conflict, they deployed considerable forces to the UNPROFOR, which were inserted in 1992. Immediately following the Cold War, almost all forces were conventional army units, which generally proved ill-suited to this irregular and unconventional conflict.

However, in the search for better tools, many countries embedded elements from their Special Forces in the regular forces in UNPROFOR. In the case of Denmark, a contingent of Army Special Forces was deployed for the task of counter-sniper operations as described above. Other nations used Special Forces as hyper-conventional infantry to reinforce their conventional forces. In general, the use of Special Forces was not very effective during this conflict.

During the Kosovo conflict in 1999, examples of the useful deployment of Special Forces were observed. From the signing of the peace agreement on 10th June 1999,
there was a time lapse until the main peacekeeping force could be deployed and be operational. This led Denmark to use its Special Forces as an advance force, which could be deployed within days. In this way, the peacekeeping mission was very quickly initiated by the Special Forces. Further, this limited force gathered invaluable information about the geography and the warring factions, thus alleviating the deployment of the much larger main force, which arrived later.

On the basis of operations such as this, the UN has developed an understanding of the value of Special Forces during the last 10-15 years, culminating in January 2015 when the “UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual” was released.

With this brief historical retrospective, this paper aims to introduce the thinking behind the use of Special Forces in UN peacekeeping operations and identify possible future tasks of Special Forces within this context, seen from the perspective of ideas and research at the Royal Danish Defence College.

**The characteristics of contemporary conflicts**

To better understand the deployment Special Forces in UN peacekeeping operations, it will be useful to look at some of the characteristics of contemporary conflicts that will affect their possible use.

War between states are likely to be rare; the majority of violent conflicts will be intra-state conflicts where the ability of the state to exercise power is weak or non-existent, and the state is unable to meet the expectations of the population. Armed conflict, or the risk of it, may arise if the state is challenged by an insurgent, who will try to replace the government.

Thus, in the majority of intra-state conflicts, there will be three major elements or actors:

1. The State. (Depending on the context, the State may also be perceived as the challenger – e.g. in a Responsibility-to-Protect context).

2. The Challenger, often named as an insurgent. (In this theoretical context, the singular term is used, but there may be more than one insurgent actor. Also, the transnational character of some insurgency organizations is not included).

3. The Population, a key element from which both rivals need support.
There are an additional number of factors which influence or reduce the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, and which Special Forces may contribute to overcome or alleviate. A few of these are:

- Information about the operational area and its actors is a crucial prerequisite if the appropriate actions are to be taken.
- The mission is often far away from the country, which contributes to the UN peacekeeping mission through:
  - Long and/or strained supply lines.
  - High economic costs of deployment, sustainment, and redeployment.
- Strategic risks for the contributing nation’s soldiers – what if something goes wrong or the UN are too slow or unable to react during a crisis?
- The geographical area of operation may be vast.
- The available conventional peacekeeping force is almost always too small and sometimes even unsuited for the mission.
- The military is only one part of the entire peacekeeping mission. Its actions must be closely coordinated with the civilian effort without which a viable and functioning state cannot be developed.

What are Special Forces/special operations?
Special Forces are not easily defined, as many states define the term within their own national context. In this paper, some aspects of Danish research in special operations will be explained.

Often Special Forces are confused with the term elite forces, which they are not. Special Forces execute the military function “Special Operations”, which is not a sub-category of regular military operations, but qualitatively different. Special Forces are not better or more effective than conventional military forces; they are different. Their purpose is to supplement or complement the peacekeeping mission with something “different”, either independently or in collaboration with the conventional forces, thereby expanding the possible choices for the mission.

What is it that makes them “different”, then? The Special Forces of most nations are specially selected, specially trained, and specially equipped. This offers a comparative advantage in quality and professionalism, but does not in itself constitute anything “different” as applied to e.g. conventional elite infantry.
The conventional Army is constituted by its arms: e.g. tanks and artillery. The Navy is constituted by ships and the Air Force by aircraft. There is a good reason for this, because these forces are designed over a long time and for two purposes: either to defend the state or to invade another state. Conventional forces can conquer, defend, hold, or dominate ground, airspace, or the sea. The Special Forces cannot. Thus, due to their institutional design and tasks, these conventional forces will, in principle, produce “expected” or “thinkable” suggestions, which will normally include their main weapon systems. It is difficult to envisage the Army suggesting something which does not include what it does best. Likewise, it is difficult to envisage the Air Force proposing solutions that only makes use of ships.

This leads us to the question: what constitutes special operations? If the mission of the conventional forces is to propose “thinkable” solutions, then Special Forces should do the opposite; namely suggest “unthinkable” or “unexpected” solutions. Unthinkable and unexpected should be understood as something never seen before.

Thus, the ability to devise and produce novel suggestions that nobody, or at least not an aggressor, has thought possible is the very core of special operations. This justifies their place in the military inventory, and their possible deployment in peacekeeping operations. This is further enhanced by the ability of Special Forces to work with both civilian and military entities. As such, Special Forces should be the component of the military, which always looks for new and creative ways to do things, always breaking norms, always bending or breaking rules, needless to say, within ethical and legal boundaries. This is not new within strategy and warfare. As early as 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu introduced the “ch’i” forces who were to supplement the ordinary “cheng” forces with “extraordinary” capabilities.

To conclude this brief introduction of the nature of Special Forces in the context of UN peacekeeping operations, Special Forces could be said to constitute an *expansion of choice* in respect of actions by any given peacekeeping effort.

**Why use Special Forces in peacekeeping?**

The three actors mentioned in an intrastate conflict: the state, the insurgent, and the population define the structural basis for means to stop a conflict. These actors form an equilibrium in which their respective capacities would normally be in some kind of balance. Quite often, intrastate conflicts may go on for decades, no actor being able to change the balance, not even through excessive use of atrocities and terror.

This can be visualised as a triangular conflict structure. Each of the two rivals has three principal courses of action:
1. To gain control over the population.
2. To disrupt the opponent’s control over the population.
3. To attack and extinguish the opponent’s military forces.

The population is the key element. The state needs the support of the population to secure the necessary level of legitimacy in its effort to ensure that the state does not collapse. On the other hand, the opponent needs the population for legitimacy, too, and, more importantly, for securing resources such as food, finance, and recruits necessary to uphold the insurgency.

Although a peacekeeping force is normally neutral and, in principle, does not support any of the rivals, the force must be able to operate within and influence this underlying structural basis of the conflict. The overall part of the available military forces must come from the conventional forces, as Special Forces are small, but this fact also defines what these conventional forces normally will focus on: namely the military element of the conflict (action 3). Expressed somewhat profanely: “If your tool is a hammer, you will always look for nails to hit!”

Quite often, the military confrontation in a conflict is the factor creating the stalemate. The opponents may have been caught up in years of attrition warfare, unable to win the real game-changer: the total support of the population. Thus, the population is also the key in successful peacekeeping, and the peacekeeping force must, like the rivals of the conflict, be able to “exert influence” on action 1 and 2, and not only on action 3, the military element of the conflict.

Action 1 and 2 are not traditional military domains, but the military peacekeeping force must be able to cope with these dynamics of the conflict also. Without the support of the population, any peacekeeping mission will fail.
How to use Special Forces in peacekeeping?

Given the strength and weaknesses briefly described here, Special Forces may supplement and complement the main peacekeeping effort with capabilities that expand the range of options for the political leadership of the entire peacekeeping operation.

As the task, time, and space of the peacekeeping mission usually exceeds the capacity of the force, Special Forces may contribute to maintaining *economy of force*\(^{62}\) while expanding the available choices by the following actions:

Special Forces may be used as a first-in capacity to start up the peacekeeping operation and support the often time consuming deployment of the main force. Until the main force is in place, the risk level is normally high, but due to their training and structure, Special Forces can mitigate the risk in this vulnerable phase. Being designed for fast, global deployment, Special Forces may be a tool to avoid further deterioration of the situation in the conflict area.

As information gathering is a key factor, Special Forces may be a useful tool to complement the knowledge development about the area of operation, which is crucial if the peacekeeping activities are to be sensible and appropriate. Being designed for independent operations in high-risk environments with minimum support, Special Forces may be the “eyes-on-the-ground”, supplying information about the “human landscape” that technology cannot. In order to maintain an updated picture of the “human terrain”, Special Forces may be used by the peacekeeping force as enablers to execute swift and appropriate responses to unforeseen developments. This factor grows even more relevant if the peacekeeping force is too small, too weak, or has a disproportionally large area of responsibility. Gathering accurate information is a decisive factor if actions 1 and 2 mentioned above are to be successful (action 3, too, of course).

Another key capability of Special Forces is “military support” in which Special Forces can locate and liaise with key leaders of the warring factions and support mutual collaboration. Also in cases where the population is undecided on which of the warring factions to support, historical evidence suggests Special Forces to be successful in village stabilization.\(^{63}\) Possible tasks could be training villagers in self-protection, 

\(^{62}\) To be understood as the principle of employing all available combat power in the most effective way possible in an attempt to allocate a minimum of essential combat power to any secondary efforts.

\(^{63}\) Village stabilization is to be understood as a bottom-up support to the local population by small teams of Special Forces living, working, and fighting along with the locals, thus creating confidence by will and ability to protect them against the threats from insurgents trying to impose a “shadow” regime.
supporting the locals with skills such as medical support, or small-scale construction, advising, and supporting village leadership processes. This can be done within the Special Forces capabilities of operating in remote, high-risk areas for long periods needing little support. By a subtle, low-profile, and non-provocative liaison with warring factions, populations, and political decision makers, Special Forces may add to the overall economy of the force by working as an indirect tool for the peacekeeping mission.

In addition, the capability to gather human and/or political information and to cooperate with civilian actors may enable Special Forces to influence or change political narratives which may support the stabilization effort. The activities are closely linked to the success of actions 1 and 2.

Finally, if stabilization of the growing number of weak and fragile states is to be effective, peacekeepers in general are likely to be exposed to higher strategic and operational risks in the future. In many cases, this would include asymmetric attacks such as hostage taking. This risk may cause states to be more reluctant to send troops to the UN peacekeeping operations. In this context, an embryonic Special Forces task force within every peacekeeping force may mitigate the risk. In many cases, Special Forces will be tasked to deal with hostage situations, and a pre-established capacity already familiar with the area would be an invaluable asset in such cases. Being able to handle e.g. hostage situations effectively gives a first-order effect focused on action 3, but a second-order effect may be that the population perceives the peacekeeping force as a competent and credible actor, thus contributing to an action 1-2 effect.

**Conclusion**

The use of Special Forces is not new in peacekeeping operations. However, until recently, it has been done by the contributing nations integrating Special Forces in their national contingents without coordination by the UN. In future, we may see a more institutionalized use of Special Forces in peacekeeping.

By making use of the distinctive skills of Special Forces, avoiding deployment in the sense of super-soldiers or hyper-conventional reinforcements, Special Forces can provide an expansion of choice while maintaining economy of force to UN peacekeeping missions. Special Forces can supplement and complement the regular troops, and the overall civilian effort to restore peace and stability by focusing on the population central to the operation.
Interventions in Internal Affairs: Challenges and Choices for UN Peacekeeping Operations

Senior Colonel Li Jianhai

Since the end of the Cold War, the UN peacekeeping operations have become more frequent and increasingly important. However, the main objective of UN peacekeeping operations has changed. The majority of UN peacekeeping operations concern internal rather than international conflicts. Domestic conflicts made up 32 out of a total of 41 UN peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 2005. UN peacekeeping operations succeeded in dealing with some domestic conflicts, such as the peacekeeping operations in Cambodia (1991) and Mozambique (1992). However, a long-term problem haunting UN peacekeeping operations is the question of whether and how to intervene.

1. The dilemma of intervening in the internal affairs of other countries: the characteristics of domestic conflicts

1.1 Principles concerning internal affairs

According to the UN Charter, the parties to any dispute that, if not stopped, is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The UN Security Council shall, when deemed necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Three basic principles have been established through the practice of previous UN peacekeeping operations and accepted by the international community as guidelines of such operations. They are, respectively, consent (UNPKO are established with the consent and cooperation of the main parties involved in a conflict), impartiality (a UN force must be impartial and minimize the use of force (non-use of force except for purposes of self-defence or defending the mandate). In internal conflicts, it is essential to have the consent of the countries concerned. Without such consent, the peacekeeping force has no right to enter the conflict zones.

In internal conflicts, domestic turmoil and the absence of central government indicate that it is impossible to obtain consent from the central government. In addition, irreconcilable and profound contradictions regarding religion, race, and history within the countries where the operation takes place often hampers the efforts of UN peacekeeping operations.

Internal conflicts differ significantly from international conflicts in the sense that the domestic conditions entail poorly organized governmental structures, a low level of commitment among indigenous authorities, and limited willingness to respect the fundamental rules of conduct of the UN Charter such as protecting civilians. For example, during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, approximately 800,000 people were killed in 100 days. Compared to international conflicts, domestic conflicts are more likely to engender humanitarian disasters involving high civilian casualties. Deficiencies in indigenous governmental authority typical of many domestic conflicts mean that the main purpose of UN peacekeeping operations is to stabilize the situation and restore peace.

1.2 The dilemma of whether to intervene in internal affairs: the issues facing the interveners.

Essentially, intervention in domestic conflicts concerns “compulsory military-action-forced peace”. Four types of intervention in domestic conflicts exist: the first is the UN blue helmets’ use of force against a party to an internal conflict, such as the UN peacekeeping force in Somalia, which fought against Mohamed Farrah Aidid’s forces, because they had killed UN personnel. The second type is to authorize regional organizations to carry out military operations. Examples include NATO air strikes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The third type is when the UN authorizes the establishment of a multinational force to use force. This type of intervention is relatively common in peacekeeping operations. The fourth type is “quick reaction forces”, such as the forces deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These forces used the UN flag, but they did not wear helmets. Moreover, even though, in principle, the forces were led by a UN commander, they worked independently from the UN system. As a result, the objectives of the forces were unclear, but they also had greater operational flexibility than is usually the case.

Challenges are also involved when UN peacekeeping forces have obtained consent from the authorities of the country in which they intervene, in cases where these authorities are not representative of the main political forces in the target country. The intervention in the Congo in the 1960s illustrates these challenges.
In September 1961, Mobutu and the international community requested UN involvement in the conflicts in the Congo. Subsequently, UN peacekeeping troops attacked separatist militants from Katanga in 1963. More than 200 UN personnel died in the operations to stop the rebels in Katanga from using force. In June 1964, Mobutu established his dictatorship in the Congo with the help of the UN. This secured peace, but the UN peacekeeping force had arguably not adhered to the principle of neutrality, since they demonstrated support for only one side of the political establishment with their attack on the Katanga rebels. If UN peacekeeping forces abide by the principles without considering the specific characteristics of a particular conflict, equally problematic challenges will emerge. For example, if force is not used to stop uprisings that involve genocide, the result will be heavy casualties and humanitarian disasters. This results in criticism of the UN by the international community for deliberately taking no action to protect the fundamental rights of civilians, instead doing nothing or refusing to help prevent human atrocities.

If UN involvement is not sufficient as was the case concerning the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the objectives of peacekeeping, insofar as these encompass stopping domestic conflicts and prevent humanitarian disasters, will be difficult to achieve. In addition, the UN will be criticized for deliberate inaction.

At the time of the Rwandan genocide, the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) had more than 2,500 soldiers, military observers, and policemen in Rwanda. Consequently, many local residents were convinced that they were under UN protection and did not flee. Within a few months, 800,000 innocents were killed, a large number of refugees managed to escape, and another 2 million people were displaced. The genocide in Rwanda happened although UN personnel were deployed in the country, causing widespread criticism of the UN for its inaction. In this case, the problem is not the absence of the UN, but the fact that it had not authorized the intervening forces to stop the genocide by using force, if deemed necessary.

UN peacekeeping operations in places such as East Timor, Haiti, Sudan, Somalia, and Liberia face dilemmas similar to those described above, because these domestic conflicts tend to be characterized by complicated factional political conflicts and the lack of functioning governmental authorities. This results in serious humanitarian crises if the UN does not assist in establishing the preconditions for peace. Inaction does not merely cause domestic disaster, but also tends to jeopardize stability and peace at a regional level.

On the other hand, if UN peacekeeping operations involve too much action, they may be accused of infringing the sovereignty of the countries in which they intervene. As a
result, the peacekeepers may be faced with strong resistance from the local population, resulting in increased intervention costs in terms of financial resources and personnel.

For example, in 1991 unrest broke out in Somalia. This resulted in the authorization of a UN peacekeeping force. The use of force from militant rebels within Somalia resulted in the UN Security Council’s decision to authorize a peacekeeping force in Somalia to take necessary action to punish the rebels by using force, if necessary. The American-led forces that attacked the rebels in Somalia suffered high casualties but did not succeed in establishing peace and stability.

2. Comparative analysis of three types of UN peacekeeping operations

Three types of UN Peacekeeping Operations exist depending on when the peacekeeping operations are initiated: 1) Pre-Intervention before conflicts; 2) Intervention by force when conflicts are taking place; and 3) Rehabilitative intervention after conflicts.

2.1 Pre-intervention before conflicts

The most effective way to diminish human suffering and the considerable economic costs of conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction is to prevent conflicts in the first place. The UN plays an important role in conflict prevention, using diplomacy and mediation to this end. Among the tools the UN uses to bring about peace are special envoys and political missions in the field.66

On 1st June 1992, the UN peacekeeping special committee adopted a policy of expanding the functions of peacekeeping. This policy authorized the UN to become involved in disputes both before and after conflicts break out. In December 1992, at the request of Macedonia, the UN authorized the deployment of more than 700 peacekeeping troops in Macedonia to prevent conflict from spreading to Macedonia from the former Yugoslav republics. This was a pioneering and successful way of using UN peacekeeping forces.

Since the end of the cold war, peacekeeping operations have been expanded to peace promotion, peace maintenance, peace building, and preventive diplomacy. Pre-intervention before conflicts will encounter a series of problems that remain difficult to handle and give rise to dilemmas as described above.

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Legal problems predominantly concern challenges to the sovereignty principle. If peacekeepers are dispatched to operate in peacekeeping missions before the outbreak of conflict, interference in internal affairs is likely to occur and this constitutes a violation of the sovereignty principle.

Problems of managing conflicts predominantly involves challenges stemming from insufficient capabilities. In cases where the international community expects that a conflict is about to break out, the UN may send peacekeepers to the conflict zone. However, the cost and personnel needs of such operations may prevent them from being authorized or result in them being discontinued prematurely.

Political problems mainly concern disagreements concerning when and where to intervene within the international community. It is difficult to obtain unanimous approval from the international community for pre-intervention before conflicts due to conflicts of interest between the countries. For example, the UN failed to implement preventive diplomacy to make peace in Kosovo in 1999 due to the disapproval of some great powers, which had differing political views on whether it was appropriate to authorize intervention as a preventive tool.

2.2 Intervention by force amid conflicts
Intervention by force amid conflicts entails stopping a conflict or preventing a conflict from expanding, or preventing humanitarian disaster. However, in practice it has proved near impossible to stop conflicts or even stopping the spread of conflicts.

Unanimous consent from the different domestic political factions in the target country is unlikely to be obtained. As a result, peacekeepers are likely to be exposed to great dangers. In 1991, for example, unrest broke out in Somalia. Subsequently, UN peacekeeping troops were deployed. Due to the use of force by indigenous militants, the UN Security Council decided to authorize the peacekeeping force to take necessary actions to punish attackers, including the use of force. As a result, the US-led forces suffered heavy casualties.

Intervention by force is highly likely to leave the impression that the UN interferes in the internal affairs of other countries on political grounds rather than with the purpose of promoting peace and security.

In domestic conflicts, the challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations are difficult to foresee, and hence to take into account, when the operations are planned. Because developments in domestic conflicts are usually highly unpredictable, it is difficult for UN peacekeeping operations to obtain support from the international community.
Many additional problems are involved. For example, it is difficult to estimate how strong the peacekeeping forces should be to be capable of securing peace. It is difficult to distinguish military personnel and rebels from civilians, it is hard to obtain the necessary equipment and personnel for the peacekeeping forces from the member states, and it is hard to deploy personnel and equipment in a domestic conflict environment due to malfunctioning infrastructure and similar logistical challenges.

2.3 Rehabilitative intervention after conflicts
Rehabilitative intervention after conflicts, often carried out during the Cold War, belongs to the first generation of peacekeeping operations. Important attributes of this type of intervention is that there tends to be less resistance, risk, and cost involved as it is often initiated with the consent of all parties concerned after conflict has ended.

However, following the Cold War, the high hopes pinned on the role of the UN peacekeeping operations combined with a growing number of humanitarian and material disasters within a number of countries despite peacekeeping efforts, have engendered the view that rehabilitative intervention after conflicts does not reduce conflict, nor does it reduce material damage and human suffering. Consequently, it is no longer considered useful for the conflicts of the post-Cold-War international environment.

3. Conclusions and suggestions
The key to solving the problems of how to intervene in domestic conflicts with UN peacekeeping forces is tied in with the sovereignty principle and the challenges to sovereignty facing many countries in the today’s world. Three recommendations seem particularly relevant to bear in mind in this context:

Peacekeeping operations should be carried out under the traditional three principles: consent of the parties to a conflict, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence or in defence of the mandate. Despite the challenges facing these principles, the UN should focus on continuing to respect them when undertaking peacekeeping tasks, because they have proved to be essential for the purpose of protecting peace and security.

UN peacekeeping forces should strictly observe the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN, respect the sovereignty of the countries concerned, and not intervene in internal affairs such as domestic political transition, domestic regime characteristics, and development strategy because, in the long run, it will exacerbate rather than mitigate conflict. Moreover, disputes should be settled by peaceful means such as diplomatic mediation and negotiation. When conditions are not ripe for peacekeeping operations that are capable of meeting these criteria, the UN should
refrain from intervening to avoid becoming a party to the conflict. UN peacekeeping forces should be obliged to provide humanitarian assistance and ensure that its involvement in internal affairs does not end up becoming politically biased. When UN peacekeeping forces intervene in internal conflicts, the core objective must be to provide humanitarian support and reduce the loss suffered by civilians as a result of the conflicts. This objective must be maintained, also in the event that consent from the parties involved in the conflict has not been obtained. The objective is essential to ensure that peacekeepers stay neutral when implementing the mandate and undertaking the operations. Excepting situations when the UN peacekeepers are attacked by parties to the domestic conflict. In such cases, they should be allowed to respond in ways and with means permitting legitimate self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter. However, UN peacekeepers must never be allowed to become political parties to a domestic conflict or to launch a punitive military attack on any party to a domestic conflict.

Positive steps must be taken to promote mutual understanding and reconciliation between all parties to the domestic conflict and make sure that the responsibility to resolve internal conflicts rests with the indigenous people of the countries concerned. Reconciliation and long-lasting peace must ultimately be undertaken by domestic parties. UN peacekeeping operations can only assist in establishing preconditions for the indigenous people to decide on their own political system. In addition, UN peacekeeping forces can only promote peace, but not force peace upon other countries by using deadly force that may ultimately result in casualties.

Manipulation of the peacekeeping operations by individual countries must never be approved, because it will prevent the UN peacekeeping operation from being conducted in an efficient and fair manner.

Some of the great powers recommend involvement in the internal affairs of other countries for political reasons, and they ask the UN to assist them. During the Cold War, some great powers made huge efforts to stop international conflicts. The contemporary international community is expected to deal with a higher number of very different types of conflicts. Under the UN Charter, the UN Security Council can agree on a binding resolution obliging the Member States to take action if peace is threatened by a particular conflict. In order to implement such resolutions, the UN Security Council may require member states to adopt non-military measures, such as putting a halt to economic transactions and stopping diplomatic relations and communication. However, such provisions are often used by some powers to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries, and even infringe the sovereignty and territory of another country.
The capacity of the UN to command and conduct peacekeeping operations should be upgraded and made more efficient. China calls for more troops and equipment from other military powers to fill the gap in the UN with respect to resources for peacekeeping. In addition, new technology, equipment and instruments need to be introduced to UN peacekeeping operations. Moreover, comprehensive research into the legal challenges regarding the sovereignty issues described above is needed. All UN peacekeeping operations must be carried out under the UN Charter with respect to the sovereignty principle.

Improved authorization of UN peacekeeping operations is essential. It is important to develop realistic and feasible objectives and to establish clear priorities when the UN Security Council decides to authorize peacekeeping operations. The objectives of peacekeeping operations should be limited, clearly defined, and within the capacity of the UN. To assess the implementation of the mandate of peacekeeping operations, the UN should develop an exit strategy for ending peacekeeping operations when no longer required to assist in peace and security. The UN should also discuss how to protect civilians effectively with a view to reaching consensus on how this can be done.
This book gives unique insights into China's and Denmark's views on and contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.

Four officers from the Academy of Military Science (AMS) in Beijing and four officers and two civilians from the Danish Defence present their views on the importance of UN peacekeeping operations in promoting peace and stability. Under this headline, the authors discuss the future contributions and roles of Chinese and Danish defence within the UN. This includes contributions concerning China's and Denmark's participation in UN operations, China's policy on the protection of civilians, Denmark's contribution to the UN mission in Liberia, anti-piracy operations, and the prospective role of special forces in UN operations. The two forewords of the book have been written by Major General Hu Guangzheng from AMS and Rear Admiral Nils Christian Wang from the Royal Danish Defence College.

AMS is China's primary military strategic research institution which advises the Central Military Commission, chaired by President Xi Jinping, on the role of Chinese defence in implementing China's defence, security, and foreign policy. AMS plays a major role in the publication of China's Defence White Papers. The latest version was published in May 2015 and declares that Chinese defence is to play a greater global role, emphasizing the importance of the UN as a framework due to its universal legitimacy. Denmark is similarly planning to continue its emphasis on contributions from Danish defence to UN missions. This book addresses the historical background and contemporary dynamics that determine the character of these contributions.