This book contains Danish and Chinese perspectives on UN peacekeeping objectives by military officers and civilians working in the field of military strategy and international conflicts.

Three officers from the Academy of Military Science (AMS) in Beijing and four officers and one civilian from the Danish Defence present their views on the objectives of UN peacekeeping operations and to what extent they contribute to peace and stability. Under this headline, the authors analyse the problems and benefits produced by the efforts to address global security issues by means of peacekeeping operations which involve formal objectives of promoting security in countries and regions wrecked by violence. The book addresses to what extent informal objectives emerging from individual, national and regional interests and values are at odds with UN aspirations to promote peace and security. The book includes contributions on the reasons that peacekeeping operations often achieve very little in terms of peace and stability from Danish and Chinese peacekeeping perspectives; Danish and Chinese contributions to development and stability in East Africa; the importance of intelligence for successful peacekeeping; the problems of adopting a liberal approach to state-building; a discussion of non-traditional security threats and the extent to which peacekeeping has succeeded in addressing these threats; and an analysis of the multinational UN operation to remove Syria’s chemical weapons. The prefaces of the book have been written by Major General Chen Rongdi from AMS and Rear Admiral Nils Christian Wang from the Royal Danish Defence College.

AMS, China’s primary military strategic research institution, advises China’s Central Military Commission, chaired by President Xi Jinping, on the role of the military in implementing China’s defence, security and foreign policy. AMS plays a major role in the publication of China’s Defence White Papers. The latest version was published in May 2015 and declares that Chinese defence is to play a greater global role, emphasizing the importance of the UN as a framework by virtue of its universal legitimacy. Denmark is similarly planning to continue its emphasis on contributions by the Danish defence to UN missions. This book addresses the historical background and contemporary dynamics that determine the character of these contributions.
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Danish and Chinese Perspectives on the Objectives of United Nations Missions.

Editors:
Dr Liselotte Odgaard (RDDC) and Colonel LIU Silong (AMS).

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Preface

By Major General CHEN Rongdi

In 1990, China’s military for the first time sent five military observers to the UN’s Ceasefire Supervision Organization. Over the past 26 years, China has been actively engaged in such efforts and has sent altogether 31,000 peacekeepers, making China the largest troop contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, or number 7 among the 121 troop contributing countries. In terms of assessed contributions, China was also one of the top providers among all developing countries in the peacekeeping missions in 2015. We rank number six in terms of assessed contributions overall.

In recent years, in order to perform better in peacekeeping missions, China has improved its management and training for peacekeeping operations and we have increased our cooperation with other countries. In December 2001, China established the Peacekeeping Affairs Office under the Ministry of National Defense, which is responsible for managing and coordinating Chinese military personnel participating in UN peacekeeping missions.

In June 2009, we established the Peacekeeping Training Center of the Ministry of National Defense, providing training for Chinese peacekeepers. This centre has been identified by the UN as a core training base of peacekeeping. From 6 to 17 June 2016, the UN Senior Mission Leaders Course was conducted at the centre, involving 26 peacekeeping experts from 17 countries. This is the first time that China is hosting a UN senior mission leaders course.

In September 2015, at the UN Peacekeeping Summit, President Xi Jinping said that in order to support the improvement and strengthen peacekeeping missions, China will join the UN Capability Readiness System and will take the lead in establishing a permanent UN Peacekeeping Police Squad. We will establish a standby force of 8,000 troops for peacekeeping purposes, and we will provide training for 2,000 peacekeepers from various countries. We will carry out ten demining assistance projects. In the future China will play an even greater role in UN peacekeeping efforts, helping to maintain peace and security in the world.

(1) The assessed share of contributions, especially in terms of funding.
It is a well-known fact that Denmark has always been committed to and actively involved in UN peacekeeping efforts. In the field of peacekeeping, our two countries have a lot to learn from one another. Our two organizations represent the highest level of military research organizations in China and Denmark. In that capacity, we carry out academic cooperation in the field of peacekeeping, and this effort will certainly help improve the peacekeeping capabilities of our two militaries and further promote practical military-to-military cooperation. In June 2015, at the invitation of the Royal Danish Defence College, we held the first peacekeeping seminar in Copenhagen, which was a great success. In June 2016, we held the second seminar concerning UN peacekeeping. I believe these seminars will strengthen and deepen our understanding of peacekeeping, making future Chinese and Danish contributions to UN peacekeeping even better.
The objectives of United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding include monitoring cease-fires, facilitating peace by promoting dialogue and reconciliation, protecting civilians, assisting in disarmament, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants, supporting the organization of elections, and assisting in protecting human rights and the rule of law. At the same time, states contributing to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding pursue nationally determined objectives. Denmark prioritizes civil-military cooperation, stabilization efforts such as strengthening the rule of law in fragile and conflict-ridden states, maritime security provision and terror prevention. Reconciling UN objectives with national priorities is sought achieved by trying to influence the UN framework to allocate resources for initiatives which Denmark considers essential. Denmark's UN efforts concerning contributions to peace and stabilization in fragile and post-conflict states are a good example of this effort.

To break down silo mentality and bring the UN together around a coherent peacebuilding strategy, Denmark supported the establishment of a UN peacebuilding architecture in 2005. An inter-governmental Peacebuilding Commission, a Peacebuilding Support Office and a Peacebuilding Fund were set up to remedy critical shortcomings in the management of difficult transitions to lasting peace in post-conflict environments. Such policy changes require patience and long-term effort before substantial results can emerge. Denmark is prepared to continue to contribute to such efforts to increase the efficiency of policies in an area that is of great importance to Denmark's UN policy. Another example is Denmark's contribution to combating economic crime in Ethiopia. From 2011 to 2014, the project aimed at building national structures to combat money laundering, the financing of terrorism, and other types of economic crime constituting a current threat to stability in the Horn of Africa. The project has placed Denmark as a pioneer in international stabilization and has become a source of inspiration for similar UN initiatives. A third example is Denmark's contribution to stabilization in South Sudan. After independence was obtained in 2011, Denmark moved quickly to contribute an overall programme that involved the promotion of civil-military coordination in the UN through advisor assistance to the UN Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Danish Armed Forces have posted a number of officers to the UN Mission in South Sudan, UNMISS.

Denmark and China share a concern for adopting a comprehensive approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding that focuses on a wide array of economic, institutional, diplomatic, legal, security and military instruments to ensure that both objectives concerning immediate stabilization and long-lasting peace are achieved. To build on this shared concern, collaboration between the Royal Danish Defence College and the Academy of Military Science, with the purpose of debating how to work towards common objectives of peace and stability within the UN framework, is an important achievement. Such efforts are invaluable facilitators for expanding military dialogue and cooperation between Denmark and China.
Challenges and Possibilities for UN Peace Operations

By Major General (ret.) Kurt Mosgaard

INTRODUCTION

In our present-day world there are still a large number of areas where populations have to live in fear. They may risk being the innocent victims of armed conflicts, human rights violations and atrocities. United Nations (UN) peace operations are indispensable tools in the hands of the international community for preventing and stopping such armed conflicts, for protecting civilians and for advancing international peace and security. However, in the past, and even at present, there have been failures and lack of success. One main reason might be that UN peacekeeping operations are almost by definition carried out in the most difficult environments, both physically and politically. There are many challenges. What are the possibilities?

This paper intends to provide specific recommendations on how UN peacekeeping missions could be developed to become more effective tools for meeting the international community’s objectives of protecting civilians against physical violence.

Protection of civilians in UN missions is not only about training present and future peacekeepers. Additional improvements in several issue areas need to be undertaken: improved mandates and political support from members of the UN Security Council; strengthening of the UN Headquarters’ peace and security architecture; better training of peacekeepers at all levels; improved information gathering and assessment/intelligence; improved operational capacities including equipment and means for rapid deployment; improved logistics and communication; an improved command structure; the introduction of modern technology.

Improving UN peacekeeping operations may be easier said than done, as the process involves a wide range of actors: members of the Security Council, the General Assembly, several departments of the organization of the UN Headquarters, a large number of troop-contributing countries, as well as other interested parties, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

In this paper, UN peacekeeping operations are considered to include UN peacekeeping missions as well as special political missions, good offices and mediation initiatives.
The emphasis will be on UN peacekeeping missions where UN troops and personnel are deployed in support of a ceasefire and a political peace process.

The empirical evidence used in this paper is observations and experiences from my peacekeeping deployments with the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the Balkans and Africa at various levels of command, including as UN Force Commander; representing a troop-contributing country (TCC) and cooperating with the UN Headquarters and field missions; including membership of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34); documents and interviews; participation in activities and projects with the aim of strengthening UN peacekeeping operations.

Protection of civilians – When we failed

It would not be fair to list a number of failures without at the same time recognizing that the UN peacekeeping missions have achieved much good for civilians and international peace and security. The good stories are at times not as well-known by the general public because these hardly ever make headlines in the media and are often the result of difficult and confidential political negotiations between parties to a conflict. The mere presence of a UN peacekeeping mission and its display of force, for example by patrolling, in part aims at improving the general level of security for civilians in former conflict areas. Certainly, also the UN armed protection of humanitarian convoys helps reduce civilian suffering from the effects of an armed conflict. I believe that the populations of countries like Mozambique, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast and Liberia are grateful for the involvement of UN peacekeeping missions. Even in the Balkans, where the UN was present with a weak mandate, the mission may have prevented more atrocities as the warring factions knew that the international community was monitoring them.


(4) My work included contributions to the Danish input to the work of the HIPPO Panel and to the Danish support for the implementation of the recommendations of the HIPPO Report.
For the sake of keeping this paper relatively brief, I recognize the many positive achievements in the past, but in the paper at hand I focus on analysing the failures of UN peacekeeping with a view to suggesting improvements.

**The historical record and recent tragic events**

The UN track record on the protection of civilians during its peacekeeping operations includes many tragic events. The killing of approximately 800,000 people in Rwanda during three months in 2004 and the killing of around 8,000 boys and men in Srebrenica in Bosnia during one single day and night in 2005 are merely two among many horrible cases. However, recent events also emphasise the urgent requirement to enhance UN peacekeepers’ understanding of and capacity to protect civilians in UN missions. One example is from South Sudan in the beginning of 2016.

On the night of 17 February 2016, violence broke out within the Malakal Protection of Civilians (POC) site, located on a base under the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The following morning, if not earlier, attackers wearing the uniform of the country’s military, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), entered through a breach in the fencing along the eastern perimeter and took active part in fighting and setting the camp ablaze. In the afternoon of the next day, UNMISS forces pushed the attackers out of the POC site. During the attack at least 30 internally displaced persons (IDPs) living within the camp were killed, and more than 120 were injured; around one-third of the camp was burned to the ground.

According to the Center for Civilians in Armed Conflict (CIVIC), UNMISS appears to have responded slowly and ineffectively throughout much of the attack. One reason appears to have been the challenges faced by the mission, such as how to engage attackers who were IDPs themselves and wearing civilian attire; how to respond at night, in a crowded camp where attackers hid behind shelters; and how to stop attackers breaching the camp perimeter with a large numbers of civilians trying to flee the camp. However, other decisions and actions appear, according to CIVIC, to be harder to excuse, and CIVIC suggests that a more effective, robust response could have deterred or deescalated much of the violence—particularly on February 18.

Danish military forces have also experienced the (lack of) protection of civilians in a UN mission. Deployed with UNPROFOR to Croatia, on 8 August 1995 during heavy fighting between Serbian and Croatian units, the Danish military personnel at the Danish logistics camp in Dvor watched as unidentified military personnel killed

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(5) A Refuge in Flames – the February 17-18 Violence in Malakal POC. Centre for Civilian in Conflict (CIVIC), 2016
nine retarded and handicapped civilians in a school next to the camp. The Danish commander did not have a mandate to intervene and was under strict orders not to do so. Furthermore, the incident only lasted for a few minutes and the logistics unit did not have the manpower or the heavy weapons to match the artillery and tanks of the warring parties. The crime was investigated by officials from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), but so far the perpetrators have not been identified or brought to justice.

There are many other cases similar to those at Malakal and Dvor. A report from the Office of the Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations to the General Assembly from 2014 lists ten incidents in the period from 2011 to 2013 where the UN failed to stop attacks on civilians. The incidents took place in North Kivu in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in South Sudan and in Darfur/Sudan. The numbers of killed civilians in each incident range from 100 to 600. The report concludes that UN peacekeeping missions with Protection of Civilians mandates almost never use troops to protect civilians under attack.

**The role of UN peace missions**

The opening words of the UN Charter capture the past and present purpose of the organization: “To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. It is for this purpose that UN peacekeeping operations have been developed.

Today, UN special political missions and peacekeeping operations have more than 128,000 personnel deployed across 40 missions, more than at any other time in UN history. The number of troop-contributing countries is now over 122. In addition, African and European regional organizations are also undertaking crisis management operations mandated by the UN Security Council.

UN missions are multidimensional. Apart from maintaining international peace and security, they also facilitate political processes; protect civilians; assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections; protect and promote human rights; conduct or facilitate the clearing of mines and other remnants of war; and they assist in restoring the rule of law in areas of conflict.

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The UN remains the international organization enjoying the highest level of respect and acceptance in most conflict areas, especially in Africa.\textsuperscript{9} However, several long-lasting armed conflicts remain active hotspots around the globe, not least in Africa and the Middle East, and new intra-state conflicts have emerged in countries like Mali and South Sudan.

\textbf{Challenges to UN peace operations}

The United Nations peace operations have over the years been able to adjust to evolving situations and new demands. The Brahimi-report from 2000 provided the basis for positive improvements, using lessons learned from the failures in the Balkans and in Rwanda in the 1990s. However, since 2008 the number of major violent conflicts has nearly tripled. The number, scale and intensity of the conflicts have now resulted in extremist groups outpacing the efforts of the UN and other actors, such as the African Union (AU), to contribute to peace and security. Recent examples are the wars in Syria, in South Sudan and in Mali.

The number of armed conflicts, and perhaps the lack of political will among UN Security Council members, has often caused the UN to refrain from getting involved with peacekeeping missions at an early stage. One example is Syria, where members of the UN Security Council have different objectives and allies. Furthermore, as suggested by the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), the UN peacekeeping missions are best suited for situations where a ceasefire has already been introduced. The AU has tried to compensate for this by deploying its forces to conflict areas, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

In my view, UN peacekeeping missions are often under-manned and lack sufficiently modern equipment.\textsuperscript{10} When NATO deployed its Kosovo Force (KFOR), the number of troops reached 50,000. The area of Kosovo is approximately 11,000 square kilometres. In comparison, the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has approximately 12,500 uniformed personnel for Mali’s approximately 1,240,000 square kilometres. In other words, MINUSMA only has 25 per cent of the KFOR strength in numbers, and probably much less strength measured in terms of actual combat power, in a mission area that is more than 100 times larger\textsuperscript{11} than Kosovo. Frequently, the operational capabilities and support systems fall short of the requirements, as UN units have to

\textsuperscript{9} A personal observation, but a view I consider to be shared by many experts on UN and Africa.
\textsuperscript{10} This view was also shared by the UN High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO).
\textsuperscript{11} Area sizes are from the CIA World Fact Book. In comparison, the area of China is 9,596,960 km\textsuperscript{2}. The area of Denmark is 43,094 km\textsuperscript{2}. The area of Kingdom of Denmark including Greenland and the Faroe Islands is 2,210,500 km\textsuperscript{2}. 

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allocate a large part of their troops to guard UN camps and secure long-distance supply routes. There would seem to be a widening gap between what is being asked of UN peace operations and what they are actually able to deliver.

There can be no doubt that the UN as an organization has constantly tried to learn from failures. Improvements have been initiated and implemented both at headquarters and at the mission level, often with strong support from member countries. One such example is the development in 2014 of a wide range of manuals with guidelines for present and future UN units and capacities. China and Denmark worked together with twelve other nations and the UN Headquarters to develop the UN Force Headquarters Support Manual. With the various other manuals there is now a common and well-explained set of guidelines on how the various tasks in mission areas should be performed and how the individual unit should be trained and prepared for the job, including how to conduct self-evaluation activities ahead of the deployment.

Other important initiatives have been initiated through the work of the troop contributing countries in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). However, the committee has to some extent been hampered in its deliberations due to disagreements between members on various issues, such as politics and resource and cost considerations. Some nations would like the UN missions to make better use of intelligence in order to improve their ability to respond early to developing threats to the civilian population. Other nations are concerned that the accumulated intelligence could be used against them. Some nations would like UN missions to have more resources in order for the missions to be better equipped with troops and other capacities to perform their mandated tasks. Other nations would like to keep the cost of UN peacekeeping low in order to save funds. And other nations would like the budgets to go up, especially with regard to the reimbursement of troop-contributing countries, in order to earn more money from the deployment of their troops to UN missions.

**THE HIPPO Report**

In 2014 the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon commissioned the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) to conduct a comprehensive assessment of UN peace operations today and how they could be made more effective, efficient and responsive. The Panel delivered its report in June 2015 entitled: “Uniting our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnership and People”.
The main findings of the HIPPO Report are included in the following points:

1. Resources for prevention and mediation work have been scarce.
2. The UN is often too slow to engage with emerging crises.
3. Too often, mandates and missions are developed on the basis of templates instead of being tailored to support situation-specific political strategies.
4. Technical and military approaches often come at the expense of strengthened political efforts.
5. The UN has not been able quickly to deploy sufficient peacekeeping forces.
6. The UN often relies on under-resourced military and police capabilities.
7. Rapidly deployable specialist capabilities are difficult to mobilize and UN forces have little or no interoperability.
8. UN Secretariat departments and UN agencies, funds and programmes struggle to integrate their efforts in the face of competing pressures and, at times, contradictory messages and different funding sources.
9. UN bureaucratic systems configured for a headquarters environment limit the speed, mobility and agility of responses in the field.

The specific recommendations of the Panel are extensive. Some of the major points are:

- Improved UN capacities for conflict prevention and mediation.
- Better protection of civilians. This is a host nation's responsibility, but often host nations need to be reminded and empowered. UN field missions need to step in when required.
- Setting clear direction and forging common purpose, including realistic mandates by the UN Security Council.
- Improving the speed, capability and performance of uniformed units and personnel.
- Putting policy into practice, including improved selection of senior mission leaders, improved safety, higher medical standards and use of modern technology.
- Addressing sexual abuse by peacekeepers and enhancing accountability. Troop-contributing countries must vigorously investigate and prosecute national personnel.
- Improved logistics and administrative support systems for field missions.
- Headquarters must develop a better peace and security architecture.
- A single “peace operations account” to finance all peace operations.\(^{12}\)

\(^{12}\) UN peacekeeping missions are funded through assessed contributions from member states. Other peace missions, including political missions and "good offices" often lack funding and/or are funded in a less predictable way.
Analysis and views

Tragic events like the attacks on civilians in Malakal, South Sudan and in Dvor, Croatia need to be analysed in order to introduce improvements that would prevent or at least reduce such events in the future.

In the case of Dvor, the absence of a POC mandate was part of the commander’s explanation for the occurrence of atrocities. However, such responsibilities have now been introduced in various forms in most UN Security Council mandates, and still the Malakal event was able to transpire after these changes had taken place. Based on my experiences from conflict areas, a firm mandate is required, but it should be supplemented by a number of other changes and activities in order to obtain the required effects on the ground. These should include:

- Stronger political support through joint pressure from nations, and especially from the members of the UN Security Council, on the warring parties to work for a political solution and to ensure that government and rebel forces respect the laws of armed conflicts and actively support the protection of civilians. The same level of political support and active backing is also required to ensure that perpetrators at all levels are brought to justice.
- Improved information gathering and intelligence/analysis in order for the missions to foresee upcoming, potential threats to the civilian population. This would mean that all UN agencies in the mission area should contribute with information, and there should be close contact to communities at potential risk.
- Improved ability to deploy personnel who can mediate in local conflicts before these develop into situations that risk leading to atrocities against civilians.
- Better trained and equipped UN soldiers and UN police, who understand and accept their role in preventing attacks on civilians. Numbers, equipment and weaponry, as well as logistics resources, should match the tasks at hand, which would require the UN Secretariat and the UN Security Council to upgrade missions like MINUSMA and UNMISS and accept the additional costs. It would also mean that troop-contributing countries in general put more effort into ensuring that units and personnel are well trained and that they understand and obey the UN policies and guidelines from doctrines to the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of the local population.
- Fewer national restrictions on the UN’s use of units and personnel deployed by troop-contributing nations in UN missions and an acceptance that command and control of units be the sole responsibility of the UN chain-of-command.
- Better trained UN staffs and carefully selected mission leadership who have committed themselves and the UN mission to actively intervene when civilians are at risk. This would mean the development of proper contingency plans, the
stationing of units at volatile locations and the rapid deployment of capable forces when required.

- Improved use of modern technology, including communications and night-vision equipment, and surveillance systems that would allow peacekeepers to allocate more resources to externally oriented activities rather than the guarding of own camps.
- Training and capacity building of host government forces and other groups with a view to ensuring that they know and respect their responsibilities for the protection of civilians in the areas that they control.

As indicated above, the required improvements are preconditioned on the concerted efforts of several actors, most notably members of the UN Security Council, the UN Secretariat and the field missions, as well as the troop contributing countries.

The UN Security Council member states’ active contribution to the further improvement of UN peace missions is of particular importance. They need to put more effort into finding a commonly agreed political solution to each conflict; a solution that would improve peace and security for the benefit of peoples and at the same time be in line with international laws and conventions. This would often mean that the national objectives should be better aligned with what would be best for international peace and security, including the protection of civilians. This is not always the case, as the conflict in Syria demonstrates. Here, Russia supports President Assad and attacks rebel groups that are supported by the U.S., the U.K and France.

Another example would be MINURSO (the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara). The mission was established in 1991 in order to organize a referendum that would bring an end to the war between Morocco and Polisario, the armed organization of the local inhabitants in the area. At present, 25 years after the ceasefire and 41 years after the outbreak of hostilities, the referendum is still pending due to differing views and the influence of the national interests of members of the UN Security Council. Such national interests include, in the case of Western Sahara, economic interests in Morocco, a desire to control the passage of irregular migrants through Morocco to the European Union, access to fishing licences in the Atlantic Sea, and security concerns. The people of Western Sahara have good reason to be disappointed with the UN, especially the approximately 150,000 refugees that have lived in makeshift camps in the Algerian desert since 1975. Peace has not been secured and war may break out again.

In addition, the UN Secretariat and the field missions have a major responsibility for improving the organization’s ability to conduct effective peace missions. The imple-
mentation of the HIPPO Report’s recommendations would be a major step forward in achieving this. Furthermore, it should be noted that even if the UN Secretariat is not able to train troops from the more than 122 troop contributing countries, it is obliged to ensure that doctrines, training material, manuals etc. are readily available at all national training facilities and in all units preparing for deployment.

The TCCs should ensure that future peacekeepers, including units and specialized capacities, are well trained and equipped ahead of any UN deployment. As pointed out by the HIPPO Report, there are too many UN units and personnel that are unable to meet required standards. Consequently, they are unable to support the implementation of the mandated tasks, and they are confined to UN camps and relatively safe areas. The training should include a better understanding of concepts for the protection of civilians and how this task should be implemented.

Countries with sufficient resources should contribute to the UN operations with more capacities and/or look for ways to enable other countries with fewer resources to do so. The latter might include bilateral training and equipment support.

National contingents should have no or few restrictions on their use in the mission area. Any restrictions should be known beforehand by the mission leadership.

**Conclusion and recommendations**

As noted in the introduction, there are still a large number of areas where populations have to live in fear due to armed conflicts, human rights violations and atrocities. Nations, especially present and future members of the UN Security Council, have to remind themselves of their pledges as enshrined in the UN Charter. The interests of “we the people” should have greater weight in peace and security matters. This should be the formal and real objective of our combined efforts.

The implementation of the HIPPO Report recommendations would be a major step forward in endowing the UN with the required capabilities to foster international peace and security and to protect civilians in areas where UN peacekeeping missions are present.

A wide range of actors need to be involved in the reform process: the UN member nations, especially members of the UN Security Council and troop-contributing countries, the UN as an organization, and NGOs, just to mention some of the relevant parties.

The reform process is not only about better training of uniformed peacekeepers. The improvements need to address a wide range of issues, including training, information
gathering, intelligence and assessments, operational capacities including equipment and means for rapid deployment, doctrines and operational activities, communication and the introduction of modern technology.

The protection of civilians is an important part of the reform process. Despite the introduction of measures such as POC policies and guidelines, there are still too many tragic events where innocent civilians are killed or injured. The UN needs to move on from issuing policies and papers to jointly and actively implementing them.

“….we often hear it said that the United Nations has succeeded here, or has failed there. What do we mean? Do we refer to the purposes of the Charter? They are expressions of universally shared ideals, which cannot fail us, though we, alas, often fail them. Or do we think of the institutions of the United Nations? They are our tools. We fashioned them. We use them. It is our responsibility to remedy any flaws there may be in them. It is our responsibility to correct any failures in our use of them.

Dag Hammarskjöld, New York, May 1956
UN Peacekeeping Operations: Problems and Proposals

By Senior Colonel PAN Youmu

Introduction
Peacekeeping operations are efforts to provide justice, and they have been the UN’s most effective measure for addressing international conflicts since it first began to advance the ambition to provide peacekeeping in 1948, when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East. These observers were meant to play an important role in easing tensions and in maintaining or restoring regional and international peace and security. After the end of the cold war, regional conflicts and wars have occurred more frequently. As a consequence, the UN has also enhanced peacekeeping operations in frequency and scale, with assistance from the international community. The author of this paper has been a peacekeeper with the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur in 2008, and served for a year in the northern theatre of operations. This year of direct experience with peacekeeping gave me insight into some of the problems related to peacekeeping.

Problems
The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, in which I participated, was only one of many UN special missions, so what I saw and heard may not apply to all UN peacekeeping operations. Yet Chinese has an old proverb that says, “You can peep to know the whole picture”, meaning that participation in one mission allows you to learn something about the general problems of UN peacekeeping.

Firstly, external factors influence the process of UN peacekeeping, ultimately leading to the termination of peacekeeping operations. UN peacekeeping can only be implemented after all sides in a conflict have signed a peace treaty, implying that all warring factions are committed to keeping the peace. Cooperation between all the parties to a conflict is the key to the success of peacekeeping operations. However, in order to pursue national interests, some great powers external to conflict regions choose sides in conflicts, supporting only one side of a conflict, making fragile peace agreements even more difficult to implement. During my peacekeeping experience in Darfur, some countries external to the region supported the International Criminal Court (ICC) in issuing a warrant for the arrest of then Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, thereby turning Sudanese government forces against the peacekeeping mission. Opposition government forces used the arrest warrant as an excuse to
encourage unrest. During that period of time, personnel from the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) were frequently attacked and equipment was frequently stolen; the local banks were deprived of money; food supplies were insufficient; many civilian employees and some military personnel were forced to withdraw from their positions; and the peacekeeping operation was struck by crisis. Before this development in Darfur, UN missions to Ethiopia and Eritrea were also influenced by external factors, and peacekeeping forces did not receive enough support from contributing states, encouraging the termination of the mission and the relocation of some of the personnel from here to the South Sudanese mission zone.

Secondly, attacks on peacekeepers were not severely punished, pushing peacekeeping forces into dangerous situations without sufficient protection. Peacekeeping forces do not have the right to use force first, so they were frequently attacked by other armed forces, some of whom even took the peacekeeping forces’ equipment, considering this a major source of supply. On the one hand, the UN expects peacekeepers to protect themselves and give up equipment to aggressors if they are attacked; on the other hand, after the peacekeepers were attacked, investigations seldom reached a conclusion as to who was guilty of aggression because of the complexity of the situation in the theatre of operations. Consequently, many aggressors avoided punishment.

Over time, the militants grasp and take advantage of this state of affairs and they become bolder in their aggression against peacekeepers. During my year in Darfur, attacks on UNAMID occurred almost every month, and nearly 20 peacekeepers were killed, but very few of the aggressors were discovered and punished. One example was a robbery that occurred during my deployment, only a few kilometres away from the UN headquarters in the northern theatre of operations; and the most serious attack resulted in seven casualties amongst the peacekeepers. When peacekeepers realized they risked being killed and their equipment might be stolen, they also understood they were fairly helpless to contribute to peace and security. Such tragedies should not be allowed to continue, and we must find a solution because, otherwise, the willingness of contributing countries to provide personnel and funding for peacekeeping operations will be undermined.

Thirdly, some peacekeepers do not possess a high level of professionalism, which results in a low level of efficiency in peacekeeping. After long periods of service in mission areas, many peacekeepers deployed in Africa have become professional peacekeepers. Their principal objective is not to contribute to peace but to earn a living. Our Rwandan Commander in the northern theatre of operations once said that some peacekeepers in the mission area were only interested in two things: when they would get MSA (Mission Service Allowance) and when they could go on leave. They were
not concerned with how to assist the peace process and how better to accomplish the objectives of peacekeeping missions. As a result of such attitudes, many patrols did not follow the stipulated route, and did not reach the specified task area. Instead, the patrols drove to a cool place and came back a few hours later, having done nothing in the interest of peace and security. Seldom would they engage in the conflicts they encountered because they considered it too dangerous. Such a work ethos made it difficult for peacekeeping operations to yield results.

Fourthly, peacekeeping missions are often extended indefinitely because of the disconnection between political processes and peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping is not the objective in itself but a means to achieve political reconciliation. But the reality is, once the peacekeepers are in place, people seem relieved and set aside the political process. As a result, peacekeeping operations end up being in place without achieving any mission objectives. In practice, UN peacekeeping operations seldom end quickly. The missions in Cambodia and East Timor are among the very few exceptions. Most missions last from a decade to several decades, and are then terminated because of major events. This has been the case, for example, with peacekeeping missions on the Iraq-Kuwait border, in the Syrian Golan Heights, and in Western Sahara, each of which lasted more than 30 years.

Such time-consuming and labour-intensive peacekeeping operations will only complete their missions effectively on the precondition of an accelerating political process in the area of conflict. African Union peacekeeping mission areas which have not been maintained have been taken over by the UN and resulted in the establishment of UNAMID, to which I was deployed. From its establishment in 2008 to the present, UNAMID appears to be yet another case of inefficiency due to the lack of a political process that can ensure that the mission contributes to peace and security, and subsequently allow the mission to be terminated within a few years.

Suggestions for improving UN peacekeeping

Admittedly, UN peacekeeping operations are both successful and problematic. The problems need to be addressed before we can find effective measures to meet peacekeeping mission objectives and ensure that UN peacekeeping efficiently contribute to peace and security. My suggestions for how to address the problems of peacekeeping are provided in the following sections.

Firstly, we should emphasize that UN peacekeeping is not to be used in the pursuit of the national and regional interests of intervening states and entities. In UN peacekeeping, some countries and regional organizations pursue national and regional interests which are not in line with mission objectives, especially with regard to the
amount of troops deployed, the funding contributed and the role that their peacekeepers play. These dynamics contribute to internal friction and mutual constraints in UN peacekeeping operations. UN peacekeeping should be explicitly defined in the UN Charter as a responsibility of member states, so as to ensure that peacekeeping is carried out with the agreement of all UN member states in order to limit the influence of regional and national interests on peacekeeping operations. Once the UN has decided to undertake a peacekeeping operation, all member states are obliged to demonstrate support for this decision.

Secondly, evaluation and supervision should be strengthened by setting up third-party oversight bodies outside the UN peacekeeping system. Their task will be to evaluate the progress of UN peacekeeping every six months, using quantitative measures to assess the accomplishments of peacekeeping missions in order to promote the efficiency of peacekeeping organizations. Moreover, professional external staff can be hired to audit the use of peacekeeping funds, preventing contractors from making profits that serve national or regional interests rather than peacekeeping objectives, and try to allocate funds to appropriate actors to avoid that peacekeeping operations are slowed down by funding problems.

Thirdly, the protection of peacekeeping personnel and equipment should be strengthened. UN peacekeeping operations are not meant to serve the national interests of specific states. Instead, they are meant to promote international peace and security, which are basic common interests of mankind. Peacekeepers and peacekeeping assets are sacrosanct. Any infringement on UN peacekeeping personnel and assets is a challenge to all UN member states and should be severely punished. In addition to reaffirming the inviolability of peacekeeping personnel and assets among UN member states, concrete action in the mission areas should be taken to safeguard said personnel and assets. Before the start of peacekeeping operations, we should sign agreements with the parties of a conflict not to attack UN peacekeeping personnel and equipment, making clear that aggression will be punished. At the same time, we should amend the authorization of peacekeeping operations, requiring investigation of aggression against peacekeeping personnel and assets to ensure that aggressors are legally prosecuted and punished. If UN personnel experience aggression, they should be allowed to use UN peacekeeping forces to arrest the aggressors and prosecute their leaders at the ICC and undertake sanctions against parties responsible for aggression.

Fourthly, coordination between peacekeeping operations and political processes should be strengthened. In the management system of UN peacekeeping, a coordinating body can be established which is responsible for coordination between the UN and the parties to conflicts, and for setting a timetable and a roadmap for political proces-
ses, instead of simply extending the peacekeepers’ mandate annually after symbolic evaluation processes. On the basis of pre-operation evaluations, a time limit, which can be renegotiated later, should be determined for peacekeeping operations. This is to ensure that peacekeeping operations and the missions corresponding to each phase in a particular peacekeeping operation are terminated when they have reached their objectives within a reasonable time frame. Terminating mechanisms should be set up that can terminate the peacekeeping mission on time if the peacekeeping operation or political process ends in a stalemate situation. Peacekeeping resources can then be reassigned to mission zones where results have been easier to accomplish.

Fifthly, the training of peacekeepers should be strengthened. Peacekeepers from different countries have different military competences, training and administrative cultures, which give rise to inconsistencies in understanding the mission and what is considered appropriate action when deployed on the same mission. In order to diminish the differences between the peacekeepers, the UN should not only urge contributing countries to train peacekeepers at home but also to organize training at the UN level. Trainees from countries that are unable to organize training can be sent for training in countries that provide this, or use evaluations to choose several large training institutions as UN designated institutions for peacekeepers’ training, making sure that peacekeepers to the same mission zones are at the same training level. If possible, training can take place in neighbouring countries or, alternatively, in countries that resemble the area where the mission is deployed so that peacekeeping personnel are trained in highly realistic situations. Since there is constant rotation of peacekeepers, the rotation cycles should be linked to the training cycles in order to minimize the cost of rotation for troop-contributing countries. Moreover, efforts to recruit trained personnel can be assisted by offering incentives. The UN should strengthen consultations with troop-contributing countries and improve peacekeeping operations through joint efforts, making peacekeeping operations more efficient in their efforts to maintain international security and promote peace for mankind.
Denmark’s and China’s Contributions to Development and Stability in East Africa

By Commander Sune Lund and Dr Liselotte Odgaard

Introduction

Both Denmark and China make significant contributions to peace and stability in East Africa, either directly as part of UN operations and initiatives, or via activities external to the UN framework that are coupled to the two countries’ UN contributions and policies. Indeed, both countries are arguably aiming at establishing themselves as pioneers concerning the ways and means used to promote regional order. Both countries aim to strengthen existing governmental, political and military institutions to address the problem of state fragility. Moreover, they both emphasize East African historical experiences and preferences in addition to national interests as a basis for their regional involvement. Denmark has been a pioneer in its use of the Peace and Stabilization Fund (PSF) as a political-strategic governance superstructure for its UN contributions and policies in East Africa. This institutional set-up ensures that Danish contributions to regional order are directed towards strengthening the humanitarian aspect of governmental and non-governmental societal structures, so as to increase the influence and security of individual citizens based on East African identity and not merely Danish preferences and interests. China is also a pioneer in its approach to East African peace and stability because Beijing couples its UN policy with its Maritime Silk Road concept. China’s strategy is to provide regional economic infrastructure and communication links to enhance growth and welfare, and to emphasize diplomacy and defensive military force as tools for preventing atrocities against civilians and for promoting peace.

We address Denmark’s and China’s East Africa policy and the interplay with the UN by discussing Denmark’s focus on the humanitarian people-centred aspect of regional order and China’s focus on the non-interference state-centred aspect of regional order and how these preferences are reflected in regional development and stability projects. In the conclusion, we assess to what extent Denmark and China have compatible policies that can be mutually supportive in contributing to improve the welfare and security of East Africa.
Denmark’s approach to East African order

Denmark’s approach to regional order in East Africa is based on a humanitarian emphasis, aiming at facilitating the ability of regional institutions to promote peace and security through a comprehensive approach. These principles define Denmark’s contributions to the African Union (AU). Denmark has been one of the AU’s closest partners since its establishment in 2002. This is indicated by Copenhagen’s support for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the fact that Denmark was a first mover in establishing an AU-accredited embassy in 2004. APSA became a priority because Denmark sees regional cooperation as a significant way for facilitating peace and security. Moreover, APSA is based on a comprehensive agenda for peace and security, including conflict prevention and humanitarian initiatives, in line with the Danish post-Cold War redefinition of security that includes human security. The preference for humanitarian actions was apparent in 2015, when the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) considered a humanitarian intervention in Burundi without consent from the Burundian government. Had the intervention been approved, it would have been considered a continuation of the previous humanitarian interventions carried out in the post-Cold War era, beginning with the Kosovo intervention in 1999 and continuing in the new millennium with the interventions in Iraq and Libya. Copenhagen has supported these interventions politically and militarily due to the severe atrocities committed against civilians, even in the absence of a UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate. The idea of an AU-led intervention in Burundi was, however, abandoned by the AU General Assembly, primarily due to the recipient government’s unwillingness to consent.

While the discarded intervention in Burundi constitutes a blow to one of the APSA principles, namely that of non-indifference, Denmark’s active support to the second principle, finding African solutions to African problems, is being successfully applied in East Africa. In national programmes and in a UN context, Denmark has prioritized enabling the world’s poorest countries to become autonomous providers of basic security and stability when conflicts with severe humanitarian atrocities erupt.

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While this approach seeks to empower the countries in the region to handle local security challenges themselves, it also has the added benefit that it reduces the need for Danish combat troops in the event of a regional conflict. Instead, Denmark can concentrate on providing enabling capabilities, such as logistical support or tactical transportation. Besides having established a close partnership with the AU, which includes embedding Danish personnel as AU staff members rather than Danish representatives, Copenhagen is also deeply involved in sub-regional initiatives.

One priority in the Danish Policy Concerning Comprehensive Stabilization Programme of 2013 is to support stability and security in fragile states and regions. This priority is pursued by means of the comprehensive approach within the confines of the PSF. The PSF has been established with the intention of coordinating the various Danish stabilization programmes. The Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice administer the fund jointly. Funding for the period of 2011 to 2014 amounted to US$ 140m. Half of that amount originated from the Danish development budget. The remaining funds came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. In order to ensure that proper coordination and common strategic aims were applied by the different agencies involved in PSF activities, an intra-governmental coordination group is in charge of the overall process and provides strategic direction. The different programmes within the PSF are aimed at both bilateral and multilateral relations and venues for cooperation. To achieve greater impact, Denmark prefers to embed East African development and stability projects within an international framework such as the UN, the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). One framework used by Denmark is the 17 development goals listed in the UN’s Sustainable Development Agenda. In Africa, impact is prioritized over a broader focus, and East Africa is the main target of assistance and projects because this region is characterized by numerous fragile states with low levels of development and stability. The comprehensive approach is aimed at contributing to both development and stability within a fragile state or region. This is pursued by initiating or re-establishing crucial societal institutions such as a judicial or educational system, by facilitating economic growth and employment, and by contributing to a basic level of physical security. By enabling these positive developments, Denmark furthermore hopes to remove or reduce the risk of such fragile states acting as sanctuaries for terrorists, which constitutes a risk to all states – both in Africa, in the West and in Asia.

An example of Denmark’s application of the comprehensive approach is Somalia. In 2008 Denmark took over the task of escorting the UN World Food Program’s ships providing Somalia with humanitarian assistance. This became a turning point in the scope of Copenhagen’s involvement in Somalia, which was significantly increased in the following years. Denmark’s engagement is based on the five pillars of diplomacy, security, governance, growth and employment, and improved living conditions.19 The maritime military and non-military contribution, which has helped end piracy off the Horn of Africa, is based on a UN mandate. Apart from the UN, Denmark’s involvement is useful due to its position as a leading maritime nation. Denmark has a central national interest in providing secure sea lines of communication. This position has enabled Denmark to exercise influence in this area, for example by chairing the judicial subgroup in the UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. This UN agency is tasked with providing Somalia with legal frameworks and institutions enabling the country to prosecute pirates in the future. In a similar fashion, Denmark has actively supported the UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN’s Development Program (UNDP) in their efforts in Somalia to establish prison services and to strengthen the judicial system and the training and education of legal practitioners.20

Copenhagen’s Somalia Programme is designed as part of Denmark’s regional East African programme. Denmark’s regional contributions comprise bilateral projects between Denmark and East African countries and projects embedded in multilateral organizations such as the UN, the EU and the AU. The approach to East Africa is similar to the approach to Somalia by being comprehensive, with a balance of non-military development programmes and military programmes focusing on providing security within the region. Together with the Nordic countries, Denmark has been supporting the establishment of an East African Standby Force (EASF) as part of the security architecture of the AU and the UN. The purpose of the EASF is to provide a regional tool for conflict prevention and conflict resolution. The EASF was the first of several African Standby Forces (ASF) to obtain a fully operational capability. It consists of 5,000 trained soldiers, police officers and civilian experts that are able to deal with traditional security issues that involve the use of military force and related issues that might derive from a deteriorating security situation. Furthermore, the EASF is working on East African confidence- and trust-building measures by arranging meetings at different governmental and military levels.

(20) “Denmark’s Comprehensive Stabilisation Projects in the World’s Hotspots,” 2013, op.cit., p. 16.
Denmark recognizes the difficulties and risks associated with the implementation of successful stabilization programmes. Such difficulties were highlighted in 2012, when Denmark chose to terminate its programme in Rwanda, aimed at establishing a Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC). The aim of an RDC is to provide the AU with a number of force elements on a high level of readiness compared to the ASF. In 2009 Rwanda was made responsible for setting up an RDC in East Africa. Initially, Denmark chose to support Rwanda in establishing this capability. However, Copenhagen put the process on hold when a UNSC report provided evidence of links between the Rwandan government and terrorist groups in the eastern part of DR Congo.

Denmark’s East Africa policy is based on national interests and a strong tradition of international involvement aimed at furthering a secure and just world order. While the overall policies are based on the ideas and principles founded in the UN Charter, Denmark has traditionally chosen the organizational framework that is expected to give the highest degree of impact and influence – be it the UN, EU, NATO or AU. This, combined with Denmark’s field-tested comprehensive approach, has enabled Copenhagen to enhance the level of security and overall livelihood in East African recipient countries. Denmark seeks continuously to advance the humanitarian agenda within the UN and beyond. This includes supporting partner countries and organizations such as the AU and the EASF in building the capabilities necessary to manage conflicts involving severe atrocities against civilians.

**China’s approach to East African order**

China’s approach to regional order in East Africa is based on non-intervention which entails regime consent as a precondition for operating within the sovereign jurisdiction of other states. These principles form the basis for Beijing’s inclusion of East Africa in its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) strategy. With OBOR, China plans to link 4.4bn people and more than 60 countries stretching from Beijing to Europe, through Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, in a modern version of the onshore and offshore Silk Roads. The strategy is to put China at the centre of a global network of interconnections.21 In East Africa, OBOR encompasses the establishment of economic development projects, port and communication facilities and other infrastructure projects. The strategy constitutes a political superstructure to China’s global economic role in defining the principles of governance to ensure that Beijing’s influence contributes to peace and stability and not just to China’s national interests. East Africa is the part of the maritime Silk Road where China has the most strategic freedom of action due to

a low level of military-strategic US involvement and long-standing diplomatic and military links between China and East Africa.\(^\text{22}\)

China’s commitment to work within a UN context to safeguard East African peace and stability is coupled to OBOR to demonstrate that Chinese-style economic development contributes to regional peace and stability. China’s approach is to use the continent-wide forum of the AU as a platform for Africa-wide policy coordination and to facilitate East African bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental projects. In 2015 China earmarked US$100m for the AU’s standby force. Moreover, China donated US$1.2bn toward improved welfare for the staff of the AU’s mission in Somalia, AMISOM.\(^\text{23}\) These initiatives allow China to constructively participate in resolving hot-button issues in Africa the Chinese way by providing economic assistance for greater regional self-reliance.

China emphasizes the importance of the UN in efforts to safeguard African peace and stability.\(^\text{24}\) China has around 2,600 peacekeepers stationed in UN missions, mostly in Africa. The largest deployment, numbering more than 1,000 personnel, serves in South Sudan. Submission of UN peacekeeping personnel to UN authority is important to China to demonstrate that it acts as part of the international community’s efforts to promote peace and security. UN authority is not based on a leadership approach involving a hierarchy of intervening powers and one state submitting decision-making authority to another state. Instead, UN efforts are based on the legal equality of states and the authority of the UN Security Council in which China has veto powers. Therefore, China’s recognition of UN authority does not violate its commitment to non-interference.

One element in China’s OBOR strategy is to build infrastructure facilitating intra- and interregional economic interaction and peacekeeping initiatives. Djibouti forms a central part of the maritime Silk Road. It will have Chinese-built port facilities for commercial and military use. In 2016, Chinese naval and military contingents arrived in Djibouti. Work is progressing on China’s first permanent overseas naval facility, which will be built at the site of the US-built naval pier in the port of Obock.\(^\text{25}\) As work


is progressing, China has announced that it plans to build additional port facilities. In East Africa, Beijing’s most likely partner is the Seychelles.\(^{(26)}\) Such facilities serve various purposes. In their capacity as military bases, they can facilitate China’s plans to enable its navy to focus on a combination of offshore waters (green water) defence and open seas (blue water) protection, requiring global port facilities.\(^{(27)}\)

However, the facilities are also intended as staging points for operations that are net positive for maritime public goods, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. One purpose is to use the facilities as a logistics hub for naval operations to support Chinese anti-piracy operations. This function is likely to facilitate increasing cooperation between the countries participating in anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean to ensure the safe passage of civilian vessels.\(^{(28)}\)

Moreover, the facilities are intended to facilitate operations similar to the Chinese UN deployment in South Sudan. China’s policy is to only adopt defensive measures and to support government institutions irrespective of ideological or religious preferences. The intention is to strengthen the regime’s effective control of its sovereign territory and people. In China’s view, giving preference to state rights rather than individual rights is likely to minimize violence in the long run because it keeps a lid on intra-ethnic and intra-religious conflicts. In 2015 China for the first time deployed combat troops to a UN peacekeeping mission by contributing 700 troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The troops are armed as defensive security forces only.\(^{(29)}\) This means that the Chinese forces will be used only for purposes such as the protection of civilians and government buildings and not for offensive purposes.\(^{(30)}\)

China also supports national military forces, enabling them to protect national sovereignty. For example, in 2015 China donated US$1m to the construction of armouries for the Somali National Army.\(^{(31)}\) China’s contributions to strengthen weak national militaries in East Africa are accused of increasing violence and unrest on the grounds

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\(^{(30)}\) Interview with peacekeeping police officer, Langfang, China, January 2015.

that China’s assistance is targeting government forces. This is Beijing’s policy even if the recipient states are placed in the lowest category of the Freedom House index of fragility, political oppression and authoritarian political systems, such as Somalia and Sudan.\(^\text{32}\) For example, China North Industries Corporation’s (Norinco) sale in 2014 of US$20m worth of arms and arms-related material to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the South Sudanese government’s armed forces, has engendered criticism for contributing to intrastate violence. However, there is no arms embargo in place against South Sudan, and other countries such as Israel are also arms exporters to South Sudan.\(^\text{33}\) Nevertheless, China halted weapons sales in 2014 in response to the international criticism that China’s armed sales undermined the peace process.\(^\text{34}\)

One element of China’s OBOR strategy is to undertake economic development projects that link economies together by infrastructure and communication without political conditionality. China argues that this strategy helps put developing countries on a viable economic and social footing and facilitates long-term political stability.\(^\text{35}\) The strategy is coupled to China’s UN policy of focusing on both pre- and post-intervention stabilization measures like social, economic, and reconstruction efforts under the auspices of the UN system. China has a substantial and long-standing presence in East Africa and argues that this long-standing engagement gives Beijing detailed economic, social and political knowledge that makes development assistance effective. In 2013, 23 per cent of Chinese crude oil imports came from Africa, and Sudan was among the five largest African suppliers. Sudan is also among China’s top five African trade partners. When South Sudan, host to a large number of Chinese oil investments, seceded from Sudan with UN approval in 2011, China also extended development projects and loans to this new state.\(^\text{36}\) South Sudan is a welcome opportunity for China to implement its development policy in an area with relatively limited engagement from other states, and China is willing to accept conditions such as a very low per barrel oil fee without the promise of rights to future reserves. This is possible because Chinese state-owned companies do not answer to shareholders.


\(^\text{35}\) Interview with peacekeeping police officer, 2015, op.cit.

In regional states such as Ethiopia, China has developed special trade and economic cooperation zones which allow for the improvement of poor infrastructure, inadequate services, and weak institutions by focusing efforts on a limited geographical area.\(^{37}\) Ethiopia is the second most populous African country after Nigeria. Ethiopia’s position as China’s economic and strategic partner has helped Addis Ababa build one of the strongest militaries in Africa, experience the fastest economic growth rate in Africa since 2006 and host the AU headquarters. As a regional centre for East Africa, Ethiopia aspires to regional great power status. However, its regional neighbours do not see Ethiopia as a legitimate great power because its regional policies are characterized by a historically determined bid for hegemony rather than by policies and initiatives taking into account East Africa’s common interests.\(^{38}\) Recognizing this lack of legitimacy, China also supports other regional countries, as implied by Beijing’s development of deep water ports in Djibouti and Tanzania and the construction of a regional rail corridor connecting Kenya, one of the African gateways to the Maritime Silk Road, with Uganda, Burundi and South Sudan.\(^{39}\) Burundi, which is relatively resource-poor, has received US$800,000 from China in financial support of its 2015 national elections. In addition, China has helped fund the construction of a new presidential palace and an electric power plant, and awards 97 per cent of Burundi’s exports to China duty-free access.\(^{40}\) China’s assistance helps maintain a rough balance of power between Ethiopia and smaller countries such as Tanzania, Kenya and Burundi.

Traditionally, China has distanced itself from involvement in regional political and military disputes. Departing also from this position, China has been actively involved in diplomatic efforts to end South Sudan’s civil war, which was ongoing as of August 2016. In September 2016, South Sudan’s government agreed to allow additional 4,000 UN peacekeepers to enter the country with a mandate to use offensive force to disarm combatants and restore peace. In April 2016 China donated US$550,000 and office equipment to the UN-endorsed ceasefire monitoring body of South Sudan’s newly-


\(^{38}\) Mandrup, 2016, op.cit.


formed unity government.\textsuperscript{41} China recognized the new regime in South Sudan when it obtained independence in 2011 because it took place on the basis of a negotiated and voluntary decision assisted by the international community in the form of UN approval, without being forced upon Sudan. Beijing does not oppose voluntary regime change.\textsuperscript{42} Moreover, UNSC Resolution 1996 specifically mentions that UNMISS is established on the basis of consent from the target state.\textsuperscript{43} Consequently, Chinese participation in UN initiatives in South Sudan does not violate its commitment to non-interference.

The continued importance for China of regional positions for the legitimacy of non-interference in the event of atrocities against civilians was demonstrated by Beijing’s support for the Burundian government’s rejection of AU plans to deploy 5,000 EASF peacekeepers to protect civilians. Due to Burundian President Nkurunziza’s objections, any deployment would have required UNSC approval. Russia and China signalled that they would block any resolution infringing upon Burundi’s sovereignty. Moreover, key EASF countries Rwanda and Tanzania announced that they would not contribute troops. Hence, China’s position on intervention was in line with the attitude of key regional states.\textsuperscript{44}

China’s East Africa policy is based on Chinese national economic and strategic interests, but with significant contributions to regional order. Beijing couples its OBOR and UN policies to ensure that economic development projects are linked to Chinese contributions to regional peace and stability. Through this linkage, China moves UN peacekeeping in the direction of increased emphasis on defensive-only uses of military force, of preconditioning interventions on regional and governmental endorsement, of emphasizing government-endorsed economic and diplomatic assistance to strengthen existing national political frameworks, and of continued insistence that non-interference and UN-endorsement form the basis of international security governance.


Conclusion
The overall objectives of both Denmark and China remain coherent – namely stability and security in the region. China focuses on facilitating economic growth and state stability by including East Africa in a global development and communications network based on the principles of non-interference and governmental consent, while Denmark pursues economic growth and stability as a way of preserving a liberal world order of democratic development, market economic structures and human rights. Significant similarities exist concerning the objectives of Copenhagen’s and Beijing’s East Africa policies, which concern economic development and stabilization. Moreover, the approaches of Denmark’s PSF and China’s OBOR are similar in the sense that each country adopts a comprehensive approach to East Africa’s development and stability. Both have adopted nationally crafted strategies combining governance, economic growth and security sector reform in the target countries with Danish and Chinese national interests. In addition, both Copenhagen and Beijing base their comprehensive approach on East Africa’s historical economic, institutional and political identity in addition to their national preferences and interests. However, the means differ in the sense that China focuses on establishing physical infrastructure, such as railways and ports, when contributing to economic growth, and Beijing supports the ability of governments to exercise sovereign authority on the basis of its preference for a state-centred approach based on non-interference. By contrast, Denmark emphasizes the non-physical societal infrastructure, such as judicial systems and education, and supports the inclusion and physical security of the individual citizen on the basis of its preference for a people-centred approach based on basic humanitarian rights.

Increased dialogue and coordination would enable China and Denmark to bridge the gap between their different approaches and exploit the potential for establishing mutually supportive development and stabilization initiatives in East Africa. This potential could for example be realized through increased coordination between Chinese infrastructure and communication network projects and Danish educational and civil society entrepreneurship projects. Furthermore, Chinese financing of government facilities could be coordinated with Denmark’s efforts to establish and cultivate government structures, such as national judicial systems. Finally, the lessons learnt from Denmark’s and China’s cooperation in the anti-piracy effort off the coast of Somalia could be used to advance increased cooperation. The lessons learnt demonstrated the need and benefits of functional specialization, with China focusing on escorting and protecting merchant vessels, while Denmark operated with a broader mandate, including the option of detaining suspected pirates. These lessons could, for example, be used as part of Copenhagen’s and Beijing’s onshore security sector reform projects in East Africa. More coordination of programmes and projects would likely increase the added value of both countries’ regional development and stabilization efforts.
Reflections on Strengthening Intelligence Support in Peacekeeping Operations

By Senior Colonel WANG Longjun

Introduction
Intelligence support in UN peacekeeping operations is very different from intelligence support in traditional operations, and it possesses the following characteristics: it is inherently political; it is difficult to carry out because it requires the cooperation of other countries; it is complex in content; it is restricted in support approaches; and it is conducted in unusual circumstances. As an important part of UN peacekeeping operations, intelligence support plays a critical role in the successful implementation of peacekeeping operations. As China’s engagement in UN peacekeeping deepens, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China also becomes involved more frequently, on a larger scale and in more zones of conflict. Consequently, it is both important and imperative to investigate how to improve intelligence support capabilities in peacekeeping operations in terms of operational approaches, theoretical research, institution building and personnel training.

How to construct intelligence support mechanisms that take into account the changing demands of peacekeeping operations
The PLA has a relatively short history of engagement in UN peacekeeping operations, making it a task in itself to match the efforts of experienced foreign armed forces. To this effect, it is necessary to strengthen the creation of mechanisms for intelligence support in peacekeeping operations.

Developing doctrines and rules for intelligence support in peacekeeping operations
We need to set up a streamlined system of intelligence support in peacekeeping operations through innovation. Depending on the circumstances in specific peacekeeping operations, it is suggested that related departments that contribute to intelligence gathering in governments participating in peacekeeping should improve laws and regulations, allowing for cooperation on intelligence support in peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, related departments in the military of contributing countries should be encouraged to write doctrines such as “Doctrine of Intelligence Support in Military Operations Other Than War”, “Statute of Intelligence Support in Peacekeeping Operations”, “Doctrine of Intelligence Support in Peacekeeping Operations”
and “Statute of Geographical Intelligence Support in Peacekeeping Operations”. It is also necessary to amend and improve the regulations and professional rules of staff officers, military observers and peacekeeping reconnaissance units and other personnel to perform intelligence support tasks in peacekeeping operations, stating the principles, objectives, planning, organization and implementation of specific intelligence support in peacekeeping operations, laying down the rules for gathering, processing, usage, distribution, and evaluation etc. In addition, we should also provide specific solutions for intelligence support, including leadership, the division of responsibilities, procedures and standards etc. according to the different requirements of various peacekeeping operations, so as to offer political support and an institutional basis for intelligence support in peacekeeping operations.

Constructing a scientific intelligence support mechanism in peacekeeping operations.

Before peacekeepers, military observers and staff officers are dispatched to mission zones, the International Cooperation Office of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in China should prescribe the key points of intelligence support in peacekeeping operations, according to the official information provided by intelligence departments of UN special mission headquarters; related departments should take upon themselves the responsibility of gathering intelligence, and send the results of comprehensive analysis and processing to the units engaging in peacekeeping operations. China's departments stationed in foreign countries, such as the Chinese Military Staff Committee to the UN, embassies and military attaches, and correspondents stationed in foreign countries etc. should play important roles, understand the intelligence gathered about conflict, and construct an integrated intelligence network that includes peacekeeping departments, the Chinese Military Staff Committee to the UN, embassies, military observers, and news media. Furthermore, they should set up a comprehensive data base about the deployment, troops, equipment and activities of different armed factions that contribute to instability and violence in mission zones. In addition, after the peacekeepers finish their mission and before the rotation of troops, they should summarize and present all the intelligence gathered in the mission zone and report to related departments, so as to shed some light on the future peacekeeping operations on the basis of evaluating prior efforts.

Developing the theoretical and academic study of intelligence support in peacekeeping operations.

Academic communication and cooperation should be strengthened to promote the development of research. In China, we have accumulated some valuable lessons learned from research into UN peacekeeping operations, but we have relatively
few theoretical studies on intelligence support in peacekeeping operations, so we must learn from others by promoting academic communication and cooperation. Firstly, we need to strengthen the leadership of intelligence by setting up various types and levels of institutionalized seminars. We should strengthen the function of administration and research of the Peacekeeping Center in the Ministry of National Defense (MND), integrate the military, police and civilian research capabilities, and have institutionalized academic conferences on intelligence support in peacekeeping operations, studying the changes in missions and conflict situations, and suggesting solutions to new problems to enhance the relevance and effectiveness of the research on intelligence support in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, experienced personnel from peacekeeping can be brought together to exchange ideas and suggest a suitable intelligence support plan for each mission zone. Secondly, we can communicate more with foreign countries, learning from their research achievements. We can participate in more seminars and conferences on international peacekeeping, improve our understanding about the context of peacekeeping in conflict theatres, and learn from foreign counterparts’ intelligence support in peacekeeping operations. Thirdly, we can strengthen our communication with related UN departments for intelligence support in peacekeeping, and keep abreast of new developments in mechanisms of intelligence support in peacekeeping operations, and track the latest changes and developments of related departments in administration, policies and regulations.

**Conducting communication and cooperation in intelligence support in peacekeeping operations, and equipping troops with information equipment suitable for peacekeeping operations.**

Peacekeeping operations are non-combat operations under quasi-warlike conditions. They are undertaken in complex environments; they involve many parties and problems, and a large number of different forces and personnel. Hence, the conduct of peacekeeping operations requires that the international community undertakes joint efforts, which involves cooperation between countries with different experience and world outlooks. In terms of intelligence support in peacekeeping operations, such joint efforts imply intelligence cooperation and communication in various forms.

*Setting up a scientific cooperation mechanism on intelligence support in peacekeeping operations that assists in mastering the present situation and future trends of peacekeeping operations.*

This requires setting up a reconnaissance intelligence unit or officer suitable for peacekeeping missions within the peacekeeping forces, responsible for the gathering, processing, discrimination and use of intelligence, and for setting up connections with the intelligence department of the UN special mission headquarters, using the
specialized network of command to gather and convey intelligence, making resources available and smoothing the channel for conveying intelligence.

Sharing intelligence and broadening the channels for obtaining intelligence.

In line with the principle of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, we should share the intelligence resources of all contributing states and entities and strengthen communication and cooperation with related UN departments and institutions, peacekeeping countries, peacekeeper-contributing countries and target countries, making the communication and cooperation institutionalized and normalized. The peacekeeping country and other peacekeeper-contributing countries could provide China with troop protection, language support and intelligence gathering. Moreover, we can take advantage of our organizations stationed in foreign countries, development projects and local Chinese residents to obtain immediate information concerning mission zones, make risk assessments and try to find, predict, dispose and control problems early on. In areas of tension, we should strengthen the exchange of information with various departments and require relevant units to focus on the urgent issues according to the needs of peacekeeping forces if necessary.

Equipping troops with ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) equipment adaptable to peacekeeping operations.

Many peacekeeping forces come from developing countries, and most of them use their own communications equipment, with the exception of the very limited communications equipment provided by the UN. Hence, peacekeeping units from the PLA should conduct research in advance and try to ensure that Chinese equipment is compatible with that offered by the UN and that used by other peacekeepers, so that Chinese peacekeepers can integrate with the information communication and processing systems that are used in UN missions.

Improving training mechanisms for peacekeeping, and strengthening the build-up of intelligence teams in peacekeeping operations.

At present, we have to shoulder increasingly onerous reconnaissance intelligence support tasks in multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Qualified peacekeeping and intelligence support personnel need to be able to perform tasks in a multinational, multi-disciplinary environment, to display understanding and respect for different cultural practices, have enough knowledge about the UN norms and ethics that are inscribed in the UN Charter, which forms the basis for UN activities, and know how to carry out intelligence work in accordance with the diverse needs of peacekeeping missions. At present, China lacks various intelligence competencies in peacekeeping
operations. Consequently, China should pronounce high-calibre intelligence elites as strategic personnel and train peacekeepers in intelligence skills, and aim to select educated, capable intelligence officers for serving with UN peacekeeping missions.

*Compiling and amending textbooks for peacekeeping training by combining the training syllabus and standard operating procedures of UN peacekeeping with our own tradition in the PLA.*

We should set up how intelligence personnel for UN peacekeeping are trained by determining the training content in a scientific way. This should be done by combining the needs of multi-party peacekeeping operations with PLA characteristics and requirements in peacekeeping operations, and finally form a complete skills training system helping trainees to be familiar with intelligence processes and purposes of intelligence equipment operations. We can also invite experienced experts with a high level of theoretical knowledge of this field to be training officers, helping us with our teaching, inspection, drilling, oversight and implementation.

*Increasing peacekeepers’ training in intelligence practice.*

Adding intelligence skill training into the training of staff officers and military observers, optimizing their knowledge and strengthening their training in foreign languages and communication so that the peacekeepers can provide highly intelligent, sharp, accurate, independent observations, being able to find, gather and analyse intelligence at hand.

*Strengthening peacekeepers’ awareness of intelligence.*

Good and strong awareness of intelligence plays a decisive role in helping peacekeeping personnel to perform well in their daily work and to provide useful intelligence support to peacekeeping operations. Therefore, we should add training of intelligence awareness to peacekeeping training. Awareness about intelligence gathering involves considerable sensitivity to relevant situations fragmentally scattered in the mission area in various fields; awareness of how to collect intelligence, which implies the selection of which information to collect on the basis of its relevance for the objectives of peacekeeping missions; awareness of analysis, which entails carrying out analysis and making judgments regarding intelligence on the basis of the local ways of thinking. This is done by considering the mission area culture, geography, politics, law, the background of conflicts and religious factors. The improvement in intelligence awareness can be useful for all peacekeeping personnel to perform better in intelli-
gence support, thereby addressing the problems that arise from insufficient numbers of intelligence support personnel.

Conclusion
Intelligence support is an important part of UN peacekeeping operations, and it plays a vital role in the successful implementation of peacekeeping operations. When China engages in UN peacekeeping more deeply, the PLA is also involved more frequently, on a larger scale, thus rendering intelligence support an important resource. Opportunities and challenges coexist at the same time. Currently, intelligence support in peacekeeping operations faces severe challenges. It is best for China to seek to overcome these difficulties and look proactively for solutions. Hence, China should adapt to the changes and demands of international situations; construct a scientific intelligence support mechanism as part of Chinese peacekeeping; equip the troops with information equipment useful in peacekeeping missions; improve peacekeeping training mechanisms; strengthen the building up of intelligence forces; conduct active communication and cooperation with the international community in the field of intelligence support in peacekeeping operations; broaden intelligence obtaining channels; enhance the capability of intelligence support in peacekeeping operations; thereby lowering the risk for personnel participating in peacekeeping operations and enhancing China’s capability to help maintain world peace.
The UN and State-building - Why Liberal Institutions Cannot Build States: The Case of Somalia

By Commander Johannes Riber Nordby

Introduction
Since the fall of the Barré regime in 1991, Somalia has experienced decades of instability and violence, especially in its southern parts. The ouster of the Barré regime was partly a response to decades of repression of the Somali people, which included forced internal migration. The Barré regime represented a “typical” post-colonial African state, where the ruler uses political power for personal gains at the expense of the population rather than using the power for the benefit of the nation. The coup against Barré had various consequences for Somalia and prompted different reactions: Somaliland declared independence in 1991, and Puntland declared autonomy, while Southern Somalia entered into a decade-long civil war resulting in a high level of human suffering, which prompted the UN to authorise a U.S.-led intervention in March 1993. Six months later, the intervention produced the Battle of Mogadishu. In March 1994, the U.S. completely withdrew, and the second UN mission, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), was terminated a year later, leaving the Somalis and the East African region to deal with the problems in Southern Somalia and the civil war.

The provision of food, health care and human security was left to a few non-governmental organizations and the UN World Food Programme. Somalia was considered not only a weak state, but also a failed state with no functioning institutions and with a government which could only enforce its writ/power in very small areas of Mogadishu. After UNOSOM II in 1995, most states “forgot” about Somalia and many African states only paid little attention to the country during the 1990s.

However, at the beginning of the 2000s international focus returned to Somalia due to various developments. One of these was the 9/11 attack on the U.S.; another development was the increase in piracy in East Africa. Finally, the African Union (AU) was formed, including the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which

is the regional security architecture heavily inspired by the UN and supported by the European Union. After Somalia again became a focal point, continuous attempts have been made to establish a Somali state, under the assumption that only a unified Somalia can establish the conditions for peace and security. However, as is the case with other African states, this paper argues that such an assumption is misconceived. Entities such as the UN, nation states and NGOs have for decades tried to support the establishment of modern Westphalian states and institutional development in numerous African states. Nevertheless, large parts of the continent still suffer from conflict, unrest and oppressive dictatorships. Using Somalia as a case, this paper argues that attempts to establish states and national institutions without understanding the social and tribal dynamics exacerbate conflict in Somalia. As long as states and institutions continue to apply a top-down approach to development, they will most likely contribute to increasing tensions and conflict rather than to promoting peace and security. Instead, states should be left to themselves, allowing political and institutional structures to develop from within on the basis of existing societal networks and practices. Somaliland is an example of this kind of bottom-up approach. Somaliland has received limited international support, allowing it to develop into a de facto independent state on its own terms. This example will be explored in more detail in the following sections.

**Constructing a unified Somali state from within**

*The Somali clans*

Clan systems are essential when understanding the Somali state and the security community to which Somalis belong. From the outside, Somalis might appear as a cohesive group that share the same culture and identity. Mwangi S. Kimenyi et al. claim that Somalia is one of Africa’s most homogenous countries in terms of ethnicity, religion and language.47 Similarly, Clarke and Gosende claim that Somalis speak the same language, have the same religion, are ethnically alike and share the same cultural history.48 The point here is that it is assumed that groups which are culturally similar are more likely to live together peacefully. Such analyses overlook that Somali culture is much more complex and fluid, and cannot solely be defined as different subjects (tribes, leaders, etc.), but must be understood as interactions between different identities. M. Terdman describes the Somali clans in this way: “In a system of lineage

segmentation, one does not have a permanent enemy or a permanent friend - only a permanent context"\(^{49}\).

Joakim Gundel also warns against assessing Somali societies as homogenous. Gundel highlights that Somalis are far more complex, both with regard to language, religion and cultural background. They represent a complex society not only in composition, but also in terms of interaction.\(^{50}\) It is the clan structures, family relations and the different group interactions which determine the formation of security communities, not as a purely amalgamated (individuals creating a state) or pluralistic security community (individuals or states creating an alliance) but as a dynamic and evolving process. Security is rooted in identities (tribes, gender, etc.) and in social interactions such as customary laws and the role of elders; and in order to understand how Somalis understand security, those issues need to be analysed. The international community has failed to do this and has instead approached state building by applying a top-down, neo-liberal model based on the assumption that security, a free market and economic growth are interdependent, without considering the demographic and cultural features of Somalia.\(^{51}\)

In the following sections, I investigate three important identities and institutions in Somalia. I demonstrate that the liberal values, norms and institutions adopted by donors as representatives of the international community are at odds with Somali identities and institutions. Consequently, attempts by the international community to reduce the legitimacy gap between a state system and the population by, for example, introducing democracy engender conflict, rendering the state more fragile. The three Somali identities and institutions are: the hierarchy between the clans, clans as citizenship and the difference between nomadic and agro-pastoralist groups. In the concluding part of the paper, I elaborate on the issue of legitimacy and the creation of Somali institutions, explaining why state-building in Somaliland has been relatively successful compared to state-building processes in other parts of Somalia.

**Hierarchy of clans**

Terdman and Gundel describe four overall ‘noble’ clans in Somalia which have the same mythological ancestor “Samaal”\(^{52}\). These four clans see themselves as superior compared to other groups, minorities or clans, not only within Somalia but also in the

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\(^{(50)}\) J. Gundel, “Clans in Somalia”, ACCORD 15 December 2009 pp. 5-25
\(^{(52)}\) Terdman (2008), pp.11-35 and Gundel (2009), pp.11-17
East African region, in areas such as Djibouti, the Ogaden Province in Ethiopia and the North Eastern Province of Kenya. Another separate Somali clan entity is the agro-pastoral clans who live in the southern part of Somalia and speak another language than the clans originating from Samaal. The agro-pastoralist clans have an ancestor named “Saab”. Furthermore, there is a third clan called “Sab”, which are bondsmen, mainly to the pastoral groups. These bondsmen do not have the same social status or rights as members of the “noble” clans and are denied the right to own land or livestock. The Sab identity is not related to an ancestor but to skills or occupation. They are referred to as blacksmiths, shoemakers etc.

The clans are divided into sub-clans, who again are divided into groups and families. Clans, families etc. are patriarchal, and women and children have only limited rights. The social identity of Somalis has its own hierarchy. The family is the most important identity marker; the second-most important identity marker is the sub-clan; the clan comes third etc. Finally, each clan has a group of male elders who are not leaders of government institutions, but rather act as negotiators settling disputes between and within the clan in accordance with Somali customary law, known as “xeer”.

The clan structures are social constructions within the security communities. There are no formal agreements determining the authority of the clans. Their authority is based purely on identities, gender and “xeer”. Clans are divided into mag-paying groups, which are men able to pay “mag” as compensation according to the Somali customary law, “xeer”. “Mag” is a collective paying method meaning that if one clan member steals or kills something or someone from another clan, the “mag” paying is not enforced on the perpetrator alone, but on the whole “mag” group. “Xeer” means that a sub-clan can be made collectively responsible for the actions of a single member. The construction of “mag” groups ensures payment of compensation to another person or clan in the event that “xeer” is violated. Therefore, “mag” paying groups and clan constructions are closely related because groups are responsible for the actions of each individual. This challenges the norm and ideas behind formal modern state building, especially modern legal institutions, because it is not the single individual that answers for whatever illegal actions he/she has committed but the “mag” paying groups.

Clans and citizenship as a right

The existence and complexity of clans challenge some of the fundamental ideas behind the Western understanding of the sovereign state. These informal structures are difficult to handle within a formal state concept. But how do clans fit into the modern understanding of citizenship? The clans have a monopoly on the use of force, at least insofar as Somalia is a failed or collapsed state. They also represent an identity which is one of Joppke’s three components of citizenship. Furthermore, clans are the escape from Hob-
bes’ state of nature in the sense that “xeer” itself can be said to be an institutionalisation of law and order. However, clan structures do not fit into a modern understanding of citizenship and a liberal democratic state and its concomitant assumptions about territory (the physical base of the state), property rights, accountability, and equal rights of all citizens. The “Samaal” and “Sab” (bondsman) do not have the same rights, and “xeer” excludes bondsmen from engaging in business, participating in politics and owning land. According to a modern understanding, the clan system is only for the noble clans while “Sab” depend on a patron from one of the other clans to provide economic and social security. The clan system is more akin to a feudal system than a liberal one. Furthermore, the exclusion of women and children’s rights represents an example of how “xeer” ensures that blood vengeance is not allowed against women and children. “Xeer” challenges the whole concept of equal rights and equality before the law. This does not mean that a state cannot be formed. Other states around the world also discriminate against women or other groups. The difference here is that the clans also constitute different security communities and that they do not recognise a common external authority. The clan structure does not represent an amalgamated or a pluralistic security community, and consequently the response from the international community is to support the creation of a formal and common authority – a kind of amalgamated security community represented by a government. It is assumed that a government, if elected through a democratic process, will be able to provide the necessary security, honour the social contract, and provide a minimum of public goods to the population. However, such a liberal-institutional approach might have just the opposite effect because it is not based on a Somali concept of justice. I discuss the conflict potential between modern state-building and traditional clan-structures in the following section.

Nomadic groups and agro-pastoralist groups
Somali identity primarily relates to the clan/family and in comparison more vague to being Somali. Consequently, the idea of a nation state is not as relevant in Somalia as in many modern liberal nation-states. The segmentation of the Somali identity is far stronger. Being a Hawiye, which is a sub-clan, is based solely on kinship and on mythological ancestors, whom the clans are named after. The identity rests with the clan and not with the territory, and this contrasts with the modern state-centric approach where territory is a crucial part of identity. History books about the development of the European states are mainly stories about winning and losing territory, as territory became an integrated part of the identity of any citizen in Europe. This is not the case with nomadic clans, as their identity relates to an ancestral understanding. Pastoral conflicts on the Somali-Ethiopian and Somali-Kenyan borders are examples of this dynamic. Here, nomadic people cross borders without official permission, not recognising their legitimacy in the sense that the borders define if they are indigenous
or foreign. Access to land is an informal system of customary rights in contrast to a formal system, where formal property rights are institutionalized. According to Kant and Rousseau, the institutionalization of rights was important to the century-long development of Western states. However, during the time of Kant and Rousseau nomads had become almost extinct in Prussia and France, due to the claim to property rights issued by large landowners, and which were recognized by the central governments. The argument was based on economic exclusion in Europe between different social classes, and individual institutionalized property rights were necessary as they would make vigilantism illegal. The same concepts have now resulted in economic exclusion of the nomads in Somalia, as they never anticipated to own land to provide for their economic security. By enforcing private property rights, former customary laws have been overruled. This has an impact on identity and the understanding of the state for the nomads. In Sudan, the implementation of private property rights have had the effect that nomads no longer have access to the areas they formerly used for their livelihood, and the institutionalization of property rights has also impacted the former methods of conflict resolution between nomads and agro-pastoralists in Sudan. Institutionalizing property rights might increase the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the international community because this entails the establishment of a formal state. However, it can also reduce the legitimacy of the nomads’ rights to access and use of land and consequently fuel conflicts. Formal laws can in principle be adjusted to customary laws, but the process will be somewhat challenging because customary laws vary from area to area. Consequently, it is difficult to agree that one interpretation constitutes the legitimate way of defining right and wrong legal conduct. The preparation of legislation is in itself a huge challenge, even if the institutions have been established by democratic and legitimate processes.

**The legitimacy gap and the establishment of Somali institutions**

In order to improve the legitimacy of the Somali government in the population, the international community has pushed for the establishment of a Somali parliament that reflects the different clans. It is called the 4.5 power sharing formula by which each of the four “noble” clans are represented, and other minorities represent the last 0.5. The argument for the division is that it reflects the sizes of the clans measured by numbers of people – in other words an attempt to apply a kind of equal representation. The size of the different clans is not accurate, as clans tend to overestimate their own size in order to be perceived as stronger than the others. In addition, the size of the different minorities is larger than reflected in the mentioned formula.

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(53) B. Casciarri, "Between market logic and communal practices: pastoral nomad groups and globalization in contemporary Sudan (case studies from Central and Western Sudan)", *Nomadic Peoples* 13:1 (2009), pp. 69-87
Somalia's government has instead ensured the institutionalisation of the exclusion of different minorities with the consent of the international community. The formula is an attempt to formally institutionalize clan structures, however, it assumes that this construct will increase the legitimacy of a future Somali government in Somalia as well as increase the legitimacy of the clan structures in the eyes of the international community. In the international system, the formal structures of cooperation are based on the principle of territorially delimited states, and this principle dictates the necessity of establishing a common Somali state insofar as it is to form part of the international community. A top-down approach to establishing a formal state through institutions has been tried before, not only in Somalia but in many African states. Most of the attempts have been unsuccessful or have only partly achieved the objective of building functioning political and state institutions that are answerable to and representative of the Somali population. In Somalia, as in most other countries in Africa, there is a high degree of distrust in government institutions. Governmental apparatuses are viewed as corrupt, unaccountable and as means for the ruling class to enrich themselves. Institutions are not viewed as service providers for public goods, such as health care and education, or as legitimate organisations based on the rule of law. The Barré regime was a perfect example of a government that did not provide basic welfare to its citizens and hence obtained little popular legitimacy. Formal government institutions can overrule former clan structures and the power balance they represent because institutions are viewed as a way to enforce a majority’s will on a minority. A formal institutionalization of clan structures might therefore result in oppression of minorities by the majority. Therefore liberal-institutional approach to top-down state building may ruin the possibility of creating a stable Somalia, and in addition engender new conflicts.

**The case of Somaliland**

The above analysis demonstrates some of the essential challenges in state-building efforts and the consequences of the liberal institutional approach applied by the international community to fragile states with a societal structure that is at odds with liberal ideas of state-based provision of justice and public welfare. Instead of taking existing societal structures as the starting point for constructing political institutions, the societal structures are seen as a weak point that must eventually be overcome by the establishment of liberal nation-state governmental institutions. Vallings and Moreno-Torres' working paper demonstrates how modern state institutions continue to handle state fragility from an institutional perspective, even if multiple examples

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of the limited success of using such an approach may call for new approaches to state-
building processes. In Somalia, major areas like Somaliland and Puntland became more
secure and the population’s living standard rose after the collapse of the Barré regime,
and this can be explained by the fact that the repressive state institutions disappeared
and the old clan system took over.56

Somaliland declared its independence in 1991 and has still not been recognised by
the international community.57 In addition, Somaliland has since its self-declared
independence been excluded from the liberal world order. The question therefore
remains why Somaliland has managed to establish a level of security and improvement
in key social and economic indicators and has avoided spill-over from the conflict in
Somalia? One reason might be the fact that Somaliland is mainly inhabited by one
clan, “Isaaq”.58 The Isaaq clan are divided into sub-clans and then into families and
“mag” groups and the identity of those are stronger than a common Somali identity.
However, it is not likely to be as strong as the primary linkage identity.

Without interference from the international community, Somaliland has been able to
construct its own governance system based on customary values, norms and relations-
ships and turn it into a state-like entity.59 Somaliland aspires to become recognized
as a state by the international community, and to this end it has attempted to become
a member state of the African Union since 2005.60 The desire to become a recognised
sovereign state has been an incentive that motivated Somaliland to proceed with its
own state-building. Among its initiatives are a national referendum in 2003 concern-
ing a new constitution and open presidential and parliament elections.61 The next
Somaliland presidential and parliament elections are due in 2017.

By not recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign state, the international community al-
lowed Somaliland to develop its own governing bodies rooted in traditional Somali

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(56) B. Powell, R. Ford, A. Nowrasteh, “Somalia after state collapse: Chaos or improvement?”,
(58) Murphy(2011), p.41
(59) S. Kaplan, “Rethinking State-building in a Failed State”, The Washington Quarterly 33:1,
(2009), p.83
(60) A. Behabtu, “Somaliland Surviving the Agonizing Process of International Recognition”,
Institute for Security Studies, 6 November 2009, http://www.issafrica.org/topics/corruption-and-
governance/06-nov-2009-iss-today-somaliland-surviving-the-agonizing-process-of-international-
recognition accessed 28 January 2014
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concepts of governance by consultation and consent.\(^{62}\) The international community’s reluctance to recognize Somaliland as a state has meant that Somaliland did not become a part of the organizational structures and system of rights and obligations of the international community. Somaliland avoided being a recognised part of the international community. Furthermore, by not becoming a formally recognized state, other states did not interact with Somaliland in a way that engendered national institutions inside the country. The exclusion from the international community allowed Somaliland to reproduce its own state identity and avoid application of the traditional top-down approach to state-building. Although Somaliland has not been recognized as a state by the international community, at the domestic level it has managed to obtain legitimacy among the people living in the country. Popular legitimacy has encouraged international institutions based on the principle of statehood, such as the UN, to support development projects in Somaliland, for example by assisting in the establishment of judicial institutions such as prisons.\(^{63}\) Somaliland might not formally have negative sovereignty (international recognition, a de jure legal state) but has managed to improve its positive sovereignty (functioning state institution, exercise of monopoly on violence) and as such it is building a sovereign state defined by ideas, institutions and a territory similar to the basis of member states in the international community.

The analysis of the Somaliland case implies that it is questionable whether a liberal-institutional approach could have engendered similarly successful state-building processes in Somalia.

**Conclusion**

The institutional approach applied by the international community and the UN constitutes a liberal-institutional approach to state-building. Furthermore, it attempts to institutionalise and simplify the complexity of the social interaction between the clans by combining Somali customs with liberal norms of nation-states. Wendt argues that states are formed because the actors are dissatisfied with the pre-existing forms of identity and interaction. The analysis in this paper has demonstrated that Somalis are not dissatisfied with their complex clan and family identity and the pre-state societal interaction represented by the customary legal system of “xeer”. State-building in a modern liberal sense in Somalia does not arise from the conscious efforts of Somalis trying to create a secure and stable environment. It is the result of attempts by the


international community to create a unified and stable Somalia which fits into the structures and concepts of the international system. Because the international system is based on modern nation-states, the international community does not have an alternative. A divided Somalia would open a Pandora's Box of territorial border disputes for many African states, erode their negative sovereignty and, ultimately, threaten the survival of many African states – not because of a change in military power balances, but because positive and negative sovereignty is either non-existent or fragile in many of these states.

There are important lessons to be learned from the interaction between the international community and Somalia with regard to state-building. In general, state-building should take into account the societal context in which it is meant to take root - this approach is more likely to succeed than efforts to apply a generic universal concept of state-building originating from the Western liberal experience. A formal division of Somalia into several states based on recognition of the importance of social and tribal structures for popular legitimacy might be the only solution to create a stable and peaceful region. Other approaches to state-building are at best likely to engender an interim period of stability before new intra- and transnational conflicts, involving clans from Somalia, will re-emerge and threaten domestic and regional stability. Somaliland should serve as an example from which to learn, both for Somalia as a whole and for the international community’s approach to state-building beyond the Western liberal hemisphere.
New Causes for Unrest and New Reflections on Peacekeeping Operations

By Senior Colonel Ni Tianyou

Introduction
Since the turn of the century, new changes in the causes of unrest and conflicts have arisen. Some of these new causes are characterised by certain countries using terrorist threats or the possession of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) as pretexts for interventions in other countries; sabotaging other countries by supporting colour revolutions; withdrawing troops from unstable regions rather than providing security in a post-conflict environment, resulting in a resurgence of terrorism that further deteriorates stability. This paper proposes four suggestions to address these problems: 1) The international community should commit to joint efforts to stop some countries from stirring up trouble around the world; 2) Certain countries should take major responsibility in peacekeeping operations; 3) Anti-terrorism should be an integrated part of peacekeeping operations; 4) Eradicating the root causes of unrest should be undertaken in a comprehensive manner.

Problems of peacekeeping
On 29 May 2016, the International Day of UN Peacekeepers, we carefully reviewed 68 years of international peacekeeping, celebrating the outstanding contributions made to world peace and regional stability. At the same time, we reflected on various problems in peacekeeping, encouraging the study of these problems in order to produce better results. This paper discusses new reasons for unrest and new measures taken to address these threats in peacekeeping operations.

New reasons for unrest
Peacekeeping operations were originally conceived to manage unrest and conflicts. Addressing the root causes of unrest can make peacekeeping operations more effective. Historically, causes of unrest have mainly included poverty, territorial disputes, religious strife, tribal killings, political turmoil, and conflicts of interest between great powers. Today, some of these causes still exist, while others do not. This paper focuses on the changes.
1. Certain countries use the war on terror or the possession of WMD as pretexts to invade other countries and cause turmoil.

During the first decade of this century, some countries, led by the US, fought two wars, intervening in Afghanistan under the pretext of fighting terrorism and intervening in Iraq with incorrect reference to the Iraqi regime's possession of WMD and secret support for terrorism. This was the first time that a country undertook military interventions in other countries referring to these reasons. The first war was aimed at eradicating Al-Qaeda's ability to undertake terrorist operations such as the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the US. The basis of the second intervention's legitimacy turned out to be false, giving rise to severe criticism from both overseas and from the US public. However, the US continued with the intervention, in reality revealing that the background for it was far more complex than the US had been willing to admit. Anti-terrorism and possessions of WMD tend toward being excuses for plans to bring down governments seen to oppose the liberal world order which the US has taken the lead in constructing. The US and its allies have sought to compel other states to implement Western democratic political systems and to control energy resources in the Middle East so as to maintain US global hegemony. Both interventions infringed on other states' sovereignty and led to the toppling of existing governments. These developments gave rise to long-term political turmoil, grave civilian casualties, severe economic crises, large-scale refugee flows, which in turn engendered deeper ethnic, religious and cultural conflicts and severely damaged regional peace and stability. According to US media, approx. 250,000 to 500,000 people have died in Syria, and 110m have become homeless, and 5m have become refugees since unrest started in West Asia and North Africa. For the foreseeable future, there appears to be little hope of improving the security situation in Syria.

2. Certain countries cause instability in other countries by supporting colour revolutions

Colour revolutions, also known as flower revolutions, were a series of regime changes and political movements by peaceful and non-violent means that occurred in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, West Asia and North Africa by the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st. Most countries' political systems encompass different political parties, whether they form part of the government or the opposition. These parties may be weak or strong, and they may or may not enjoy popular legitimacy. Irrespective of how the political system has been set up, peace and security is best preserved by relying

(64) Quoted from Global Times, 14 October 2015, "Life is like a gamble ---- A story of how ordinary Syrians try to survive". Translated from 《环球时报》2015年10月14日文章，“生活就像赌博——那些普通叙利亚人的生存故事”
on the existing domestic political institutions to govern the state and the people and to sort out domestic political disagreements. It is bound to create more violence and instability if external powers intervene in the domestic political institutions of other states. Instead, the principle of non-intervention should be respected, leaving domestic affairs to be sorted out by domestic institutions and the people holding office in these institutions. However, some countries led by the US have contributed to and also profited from conflict, especially by means of propaganda aimed at spreading liberal democracy; providing economic support for colour revolutions; exerting pressure on allies to participate in military interventions to promote liberal democracy; applying economic sanctions; funding and supporting opposition parties that would help bring down their domestic government; co-opting locals to support colour revolutions; and using force against the governing party. By these means, the US contributed to instability in Libya and Syria, attempting to oust the existing regime in favour of governments paying lip service to liberal democracy. Syria used to have a strong government led by President Bashar al-Assad and weak opposition parties, who should have been able to solve domestic problems on their own and maintain a reasonable level of domestic stability. However, the US insisted that Assad step down, supporting the opposition party with economic funding and military assistance. Nevertheless, the opposition has failed to establish a new functioning government, and Syria has been left with no functioning political institutions to govern the country or provide basic welfare. Even the US has had to admit that supporting the opposition parties was a failure and that the outcome led to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) taking advantage of domestic instability to quickly expand its power and control. Signs that similar developments could take place in Brazil and Venezuela are now appearing. This is a new way for some countries, especially the US, to cause instability in other countries by supporting colour revolutions.

3. Certain countries irresponsibly withdraw troops from unstable regions, leaving space for terrorism to expand quickly, further deteriorating regional stability.

On 18 December 2011 the last 500 US troops withdrew from Iraq, putting an end to the 9-year-long Iraq War. On 26 October 2014 the last batch of US and UK forces

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(65) The Global Times reported on 7 July 2012 that the third conference of “the Friends of the Syrian People” was held in Paris France on July 6th. In the statement after the conference, the participating countries called on President Assad to step down and promised to increase assistance to the opposition parties.

(66) According to the report in the Washington Post of 16 September 2015, a US project costing 500m US dollars, intending to train 5,400 soldiers for the opposition, was pronounced a failure. The US military commander who was in charge of fighting against terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq recently admitted that only four or five of the persons who completed the training were still fighting. Former Republican presidential candidate John McCain said that the project of training 5,000 opposition soldiers was a “disastrous defeat”.
withdrew from Afghanistan, ending the 13-year-long Afghan war. Despite the decade-long operations, stability quickly deteriorated further into widespread terrorist violence and political instability with no functioning government institutions to provide basic welfare, jeopardizing not only domestic, but also regional stability. In Iraq, US troops did not eradicate the causes of terrorism. Instead, the intervention contributed to the emergence of ISIL, which quickly occupied large areas in Iraq and Syria, announcing the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate, and caused panic due to terrorism and the widespread use of violent means to win power and legitimacy among their supporters, especially in the Middle East. In Afghanistan, Taliban forces have made a comeback, conquering numerous cities and regions, such as Kunduz, that were previously controlled by US troops and the Afghan government, leading to rampant terrorist activities again, causing continuous political and social turbulence.67 As a consequence of the deteriorating security situation, the withdrawal of US and allied troops is irresponsible and indicates a refusal to accept responsibility for continuing the attempt to provide peace and security. The withdrawal led to the rapid return of terrorism and worsened the conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

New reflections on peacekeeping operations

China has an expression that says to “choose the remedy befitting of the case”, which means the doctor should treat the patient according to the symptoms. We should take effective measures to eradicate the root causes of the problems of terrorism and widespread domestic violence. Since the causes of unrest and conflicts have changed, we need to adjust the measures accordingly to guarantee the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

The international community should undertake joint efforts to stop certain countries from exacerbating instability in the world.

At present, there are seven major theatres of unrest, conflict and war in the 21st century: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Five out of seven were caused, or worsened, by the direct and indirect interventions by the US and allies. As a result, the US does not maintain peace and security. Instead, Washington contributes to instability and behaves irresponsibly. Without US intervention, there would not have been war and conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. The US intervened in Iraq, but the US did not find WMD in Iraq, and proof has not been produced that Saddam Hussein was collaborating with terrorist organizations. If US had not intervened in the domestic affairs of other countries at the beginning

(67) China News Network reported on 29 September 2015 that “Taliban captured Kunduz and released 500 prisoners”.
of this century, there would arguably have been more peace and stability in the world today. Hence, the US has been criticized for these interventions by other countries as well as by domestic voices within the US. Robert Bowman, a retired colonel of the US Air Force, has said, “We are the target of terrorists because we are hated. And we are hated because our government has done hateful things.” Other countries should keep the US in check instead of supporting its contributions to instability in other countries and regions. US proposals for contributing to regional conflicts should not be readily accepted by its allies. Instead, we should be wary of US incentives for intervention that are not disclosed as the official objectives for taking action. When the US proposes economic sanctions and military intervention against other countries, we need to think about the possible outcomes. What if these measures were to lead to wars? Who would be the victim? Who would benefit from the intervention? If we find that US proposals are counterproductive to peace and security, other countries need to cooperate to prevent the US from taking action by means of persuasion and even sanctions. A more robust approach towards the US is likely to nip misconceived ideas of intervention in the bud.

Certain countries should take major responsibility for peacekeeping operations.

Chinese has an expression that says parents should take away their troubled children. As a major troublemaker, or agitator, of global unrest, conflicts and interventions, the US should not be allowed to avoid taking responsibility for post-conflict environments. Furthermore, peacekeeping operations offered by the global community constitute an important resource for the international community, which should be employed prudently to bring about peace and security. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the US should be a role model in peacekeeping operations. Unfortunately, the US only relies on the UN when the UN is in agreement with US views on the necessary measures to preserve world order, and abandons the UN when this is not the case, even threatening the UN system's viability by refusing to pay its membership fee, or by delaying payment thereof. The US contributes to instability and unrest, thereby enhancing the need for peacekeeping operations which could have been avoided, requiring other countries from regions far away to join the peacekeeping in unstable regions, wasting their resources and lives to help settle unstable situations which the US and its allies helped create. Rather than being carried out by individual countries, peacekeeping operations should always be carried out within the UN framework, and the decision to undertake peacekeeping operations should be made by the UN instead of individual countries. Each country should contribute personnel, equipment and money according to the requirements of the UN. The US should take major responsibility for future peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, especially by contributing equipment and funding. This is the
only way to make sure that the US and its allies do not abuse sanctions and the use of force to intervene in other countries’ domestic affairs to facilitate political systems that support the US’s continued global hegemony. In this manner, peacekeeping operations legitimized by the UN system can come to the fore and ensure that peacekeeping is in line with the UN Charter’s principles and constraints on intervention.

*Anti-terrorism should be part of peacekeeping operations.*

At present, international peacekeeping refers to the operations undertaken by the forces dispatched by UN member states under ceasefire pacts and with the approval by both sides of a conflict in order to maintain peace. Traditionally, the missions mainly include supervising ceasefires, establishing isolation or buffer zones, assisting the construction of local administration and infrastructure, restoring law and order, organizing domestic elections, and conducting humanitarian assistance. However, in recent years the situation has changed a lot. The spread of terrorism, which has global impact and involves using violent means at a new level of aggression that constitutes severe threats against civilians, means that terrorism has become a main cause of instability and atrocities. Terrorism deepens instability and conflict in the world and constitutes a severe threat to international and regional peace. Consequently, anti-terrorist operations are no longer the responsibility of only a few countries. Instead, all UN member states that form part of the international community see this as an issue that requires action to be taken. Hence the UN, the leading organization of all countries, should list anti-terrorism as an important mission of peacekeeping; choose operational forces to undertake anti-terrorist missions and support them with adequate intelligence, communication, logistics and equipment supply; strengthen the planning and organization of anti-terrorist operations by means of in-depth study of terror organizations’ operational approaches; and contribute to strengthening cooperation between peacekeeping forces and local governments in order to eliminate various terrorist organizations at the lowest cost.

*Eradicating the root causes of unrest in a comprehensive manner.*

Eradicating the root causes of instability is fundamental to bringing about lasting peace. This is not only the ultimate goal of international peacekeeping but also the common interest of the international community. To this end, we need to take comprehensive measures to manage the situation in war-torn countries in West Asia and North Africa by means of international peacekeeping. Firstly, we need to crack down on ISIL’s organization. Countries like the US and France should work with the governments of Russia, Iraq, Iran and Syria to establish coordination departments, undertake joint operations, dispatch more ground forces, strike ISIL’s organization
from both the air and the ground, blockade the borders, annihilate ISIL within Iraqi territory and prevent ISIL from fleeing to and infiltrating neighbouring countries. Secondly, we need to accept large amounts of refugee flows until peace and security have been restored and the terrorist problem addressed. It is important to have political negotiations to decide on the amount of refugees countries accept to receive; to carefully plan the reception of refugees and to take proactive measures to fulfil this plan; to guarantee the safe settlement of refugees in other countries; and to take responsibility for re-establishing peace and security in post-conflict environments. According to Xinhua News Agency, Turkey received over 2m refugees and Germany 450,000. Although the US contributed to creating these refugee flows, it received only 1,100 refugees. The US should increase the number of refugees it is willing to accept. Thirdly, we need to help the war-torn countries with domestic reconstruction. When ISIL’s organization has been eradicated, the UN or regional organizations based on the UN Charter should take the main responsibility for dispatching experienced law experts and executives to help improve national legal systems in target countries and strengthen their capacity for governance; dispatch military and law enforcement personnel to help isolate people and groups that contribute to instability; crack down on criminal groups and eliminate illegal armed groups to maintain stability; assist target countries with making and implementing economic, cultural and educational plans and programs; offer funds for future development; offer technical and cultural training to local people. These measures will help eradicate poverty and the root causes of terrorism.

In this new era international peacekeeping must be used by the international community to carry out heavier responsibilities because the world faces increasingly complex and difficult problems. If all countries focused on contributing to the international community by recognizing that we have common interests in preserving peace and security by supporting the development and stability of other countries through joint efforts, the new challenges can be addressed and overcome.

(68) China News Network reported, on 19 September 2015, that according to the latest numbers released by UNHCR, over 2m refugees had been detained in Turkey since the outbreak of Syrian war. Between January and September 2015, around 450,000 refugees arrived at Germany. (69) A number provided by Sina.com on 17 November 2015.
Removing Rather Than Cutting Syria’s Gordian Knot
Formal and Informal Objectives in the OPCW-UN JOINT MISSION in Syria
September 2013 - June 2014

By Major Mikkel Storm Jensen

Introduction
In early September 2013, the US considered military actions against Syria’s chemical weapons, with or without consent from the United Nation’s Security Council (UNSC). Following a Russian initiative on 9 September, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2118 on 27 September stating that Syria, supervised by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), would hand over its stockpiles of chemical weapons and dismantle production facilities before June 2014. The following OPCW-UN Joint Mission on the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons was completed successfully and on time.

This paper attempts to identify the formal and informal strategic objectives of the states who adopted Resolution 2118 or carried out the OPCW-UN Joint Mission. Analysing whether and how these objectives were met, the paper points to aspects of the present case that might inform future UN-led operations and resolutions.

This analysis concludes that specific tactical circumstances and a well-defined end state were conducive, but not decisive, for the Syrian mission’s success. The decisive factor was that UNSC Resolution 2118 and the OPCW-UN Joint mission both addressed and avoided conflict with any of the involved states’ core strategic interests.

Key actors’ involvement, interests, objectives and achieved end states in the OPCW-UN Joint Mission 2013-14
On 27 September 2013 the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2118, which determined that the use of chemical weapons in Syria constituted a threat to international peace and security and appointed the OPCW to carry out the supervision of the dismantling and destruction of the weapons on behalf of the UN. Should Syria
fail to comply, the resolution threatened to impose measures as described under the
UN Charter’s Chapter VII.  

Inspectors from OPCW arrived in Syria on 2 October 2013 and began monitoring
the collection of weapons, the materials necessary for production and the dismantling
of production facilities. The military aspects of the operation were centred on a naval task
force from Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, Russia and China. This mission,
named Operation Removal of Chemical Weapons from Syria (OPRECSYR), was led
by a Danish admiral with an international staff. Despite challenging conditions and
some delays, deadlines were eventually met as the final transfers of materials were
conducted on 23 June 2014. The OPCW-UN joint mission came to a close on 30
September 2014.  

United States
While the US had few immediate strategic interests in Syria; developments here con-
cerned US national interests by negatively influencing regional allies such as Israel,
Jordan and Turkey as well as the general stability of the Middle East. The US involve-
ment in the Syrian civil war was limited until the Syrian use of chemical weapons in
2013, and had not involved military operations against Syrian forces.

However, on 20 August 2012, President Obama set a “red line” for the Syrian govern-
ment’s counterinsurgency efforts by publicly remarking that he would consider en-
gaging militarily should Syria use chemical weapons, lose control over them or hand
them over to third parties. Obama reiterated this red line in April 2013.  

A crisis was eventually triggered by an attack east of Damascus on 21 August 2013, which was
highly likely attributable to Syrian government forces. On 24 August 2013 President

(70) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/489/23/PDF/N1348923,
pdf?OpenElement, UNSC SR 2118, UNSCR RES 2118 page 4, paragraph 21: “Decides, in the event
of non-compliance with this resolution, including unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or
any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;”

(71) http://opcw.unmissions.org/AboutOPCWUNJointMission/tabid/54/ctl/Details/mid/651/
ItemID/343/Default.aspx UN Chief commends Special Coordinator and her team on successful
completion of OPCW-UN Joint Mission, UN Information and Technology Division / Department
of Field Support, October 01 2014

(72) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2013/09/06/president-obama-and-
the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/ President Obama and the ‘red line’ on Syria’s chemical
weapons, Washington Post, Glenn Kessler September 6, 2013

Lu7eY0s7gcXtgONA&cad=rja Syria/Syrian chemical programme – National executive summary
Obama appeared to be in favour of initiating military operations and US naval assets were moved into the Eastern Mediterranean while plans for air and missile strikes were finalized. On 31 August 2013 President Obama recommended military action against the Syrian regime, but sought support from Congress prior to commencing operations. This caused a domestic political impasse and put the military preparations on hold at a very high level of readiness.\(^{(74)}\)

Since the implosion of the Soviet Union, the US had been proactive in expanding the possibilities of legitimately using military force. The US promoted the concept of humanitarian intervention without consent from target governments prior to operations against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999. Elements of humanitarian intervention, referred to as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), have since been partially endorsed by the UN in the World Summit 2005 Outcome Document, but without providing an endorsement that would make it legitimate to use military force in states with non-consenting governments.\(^{(75)}\) As insurrections in Syria in 2011 escalated into civil war, several states attempted to restrain the Syrian government’s counterinsurgency measures through the UNSC. By 2012 the US and some of her allies, including the other permanent UNSC members, the United Kingdom and France, had endorsed three UNSC resolution drafts\(^{(76)}\) that demanded an end to the violence and that the Syrian military return to its barracks. Atrocity prevention was formally declared a US national interest in April 2012,\(^{(77)}\) but the US did not push the issue of humanitarian intervention in Syria in face of the Russian and Chinese vetoes.

Only chemical weapons were stated by President Obama as a reason to go to war with or without UN endorsement. The US considered the use of chemical weapons and the risk of these coming into the possession of others, including non-state actors


in the area, a threat to US forces, interests and allies.\(^7^8\) Their use or proliferation also threatened the broader international order by undermining the consensus that using chemical weapons was illegal.

Also, failure to act after Syria’s crossing of the declared red line could cause a loss to US prestige. This would likely induce future costs of upholding international order and influence by reducing US credibility among allies and enemies, in so far as Washington would have failed to have followed through on publically stated intent to enforce red lines.

Finally, in very general terms, the US had an interest in limiting other parties’ access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), similar to any other power in possession of WMD.

The formal US objective in the crisis was to neutralize Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons, and the informal objective was to do this within a timeframe that would keep US diplomatic red lines credible in the eyes of allies and opponents.

The military options were not promising: As the chemical weapons were too numerous to be neutralized by special forces, their complete destruction could only be ensured by a full-scale invasion of Syria. However, this would entail that the US take on the responsibility of an occupation force in parts of Syria – a mission with no clear end state and enormous potential costs. Hence, the only viable military option was to attack the chemical weapons and stockpiles with bombs and missiles, a solution with significant downsides. An aerial campaign would require thousands of preliminary strikes to neutralize Syria’s air defences, very likely only partially destroy the stockpiles, and almost certainly leave significant amounts of chemical weapons and materials unaccounted for.\(^7^9\)

The UNSC Resolution 2118 achieved the US’s formal and informal objectives as it promised the removal of the chemical weapons. This allowed the US to step back from the brink of war without suffering a loss of prestige. Furthermore, the onus and the risk of losing prestige in case of failure was mainly Russia’s problem because Moscow had proposed the UN resolution. Should Syria fail to comply, UNSC Resolution 2118


authorized enforcement within the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter that may include military action on behalf of the UN. This relieved the US and her allies of the concerns of enforcing the red lines without UN authorization.\textsuperscript{80} Although the UN solution may have caused disappointment among US allies with strategic interests in the military defeat of the Assad regime, the removal of chemical weapons from Syria also removed the possibility of them being shared with or falling into the hands of non-state actors, thus removing a potential threat to regional allies.

An achieved formal objective shared by the US, China and Russia was that the operation reduced the number of states with WMDs by one, namely Syria. This both bolstered international order and had the side benefit of marginally increasing the strategic value of their own arsenals. Due to the technical nature of Syria’s chemical weapons and limited means of delivery, this objective was likely not considered very important by any of the great powers.

If widening the international community’s interpretation of when use of force is legal was an informal US objective, this only succeeded to a very limited degree. Only states already aligned with or allied to the US declared themselves in agreement with the initial US position on the legitimacy to neutralise the chemical weapons by force if necessary, with or without UN endorsement.

\textit{Russia}

Although a close long-term partner of the Syrian government, Russia’s involvement in the conflict to this point had been limited to providing the majority of Syria’s military supplies. Also, Russia had staunchly opposed attempts in the UNSC to impose international sanctions or other interventions.\textsuperscript{81} Russia’s immediate strategic interest in Syria was the Soviet-era naval base at Tartus, but also Russia’s prestige as a militarily and politically dependable partner would be jeopardized if Syria could not be protected from international intervention.

While Russian strategic interests were at stake in Syria, they were most likely not important enough for Russia to consider opposing US operations militarily. This meant that a diplomatic solution was the only viable option, preferably under the auspices of the UN and the traditional interpretation of the UN Charter, which entailed that

\textsuperscript{80} UNSCR RES 2118 page 4, paragraph 21.: “Decides, in the event of non-compliance with this resolution, including unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;”

absolute sovereignty and non-intervention without governmental consent remained a precondition for taking action.

While the US publicly deliberated military action against Syria, Russian diplomats had discreetly sought ways with their Syrian counterparts to avert a US attack. Russia suggested that Syria join the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention and allow UN inspectors to supervise and verify the dismantling of chemical weapons and production facilities. This was announced to the US on 9 September 2013.

The Russian initiative provided a chance for the UN to remove the Gordian knot of chemical weapons instead of the US having to cut it with military means.

Talks between the Russian and US foreign secretaries resulted in the “Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons” on 14 September 2013, the same day Syria joined the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention.

Regarding international order, Russia as a permanent UNSC member had historically demonstrated interest in upholding a conservative interpretation of sovereignty, restricting the use of humanitarian intervention and in upholding the importance of the UNSC in international relations. Otherwise, the value of Russia’s veto power would be reduced. Following the intervention in Kosovo in 1999, Russia held onto a more conservative approach that did not accept the legality of using force to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states without governmental consent from the target state. While Russia abstained from voting against the intervention in Libya in 2012, the implementation of the intervention and the resulting fall of the Libyan regime had by 2013 cemented Russia’s approach to absolute sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.

Russia’s primary objective with the UN solution was most likely to keep the US from taking unilateral actions in Syria. Another objective was to stop the UNSC’s security management efforts from being undermined and halt the continuous challenges to state sovereignty that reached a new stage with the UN-sanctioned military intervention in Libya in 2012.

The formal Russian objective for endorsing UNSCR 2118 was to achieve a successful recovery of the weapons through the UN. Furthermore it was likely important for Russia to avoid that the US undertake unilateral actions that risked undermining the traditional consensus on when international intervention in a sovereign state was legitimate. These objectives were met.
In this regard, it was likely important for Russia to ensure that the resolution’s objective was well-defined, could be measured objectively and left little room for interpretation of the scope of the intervention. Had the resolution included an open-ended objective such as that stated in UNSC Resolution 1973, which demanded “a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians,” there would not have been a clear way to determine when and where to end the international community’s involvement in Syria.

As for informal objectives, Russia likely gained prestige amongst allies for averting the attack on Syria, but also amongst neutral states that shared Russia’s interests in reversing the emerging trend of a less restrictive approach to absolute sovereignty. Furthermore, working out a solution within the undisputed international consensus on international law actually strengthened the consensus. Also, Russia gained prestige by providing the UN with military means by participating in the naval force. Finally, by facilitating diplomatic communication with Syria, Russia increased its prestige by demonstrably being a venue for talks between Syria and other parties, e.g. the US and her allies, which were not able to engage directly with Assad’s regime.

The seaborne nature of the operation suggested by Russia likely facilitated its success. It involved very little risk of casualties or of inflicting collateral damage. The onus was not on the UN task force to get to the chemical weapons, but on Syria to bring the weapons to the UN task force.

**China**

In 2013 China had no significant stake in the Syrian civil war. China’s immediate strategic interests in Syria were arguably limited to very minor military exports and an indirect interest in regional stability to secure supplies of strategic materials such as oil. However, China had a more general interest in upholding international order,

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both regarding the use of military force between states and with respect to the use of chemical weapons.\(^{85}\)

Like Russia, China consistently emphasized the importance of the UNSC in international relations and a narrow interpretation of the legitimate UN authorization of intervention by force in other states. In this regard, China vetoed three resolutions\(^{86}\) in 2011 and 2012, calling for international coercion of the Syrian government to restrain its counterinsurgency and seek a political solution. This was not a routine measure: China had only issued five vetoes since its admission to the UN in 1971.\(^{87}\) Endorsing UNSC Resolution 2118, China’s primary objective was likely to reverse the undermining of the UNSC’s influence on global security management, reverse the trend to question the sanctity of absolute sovereignty, and demonstrate China’s support for international order.\(^{88}\)

China achieved its formal and informal objectives by supporting a UN mission that was within all the permanent UNSC members’ interpretation of post-cold war international law. Moreover, the UNSC increased its relevance by being instrumental in avoiding that the crisis developed into an international war between Syria and the US and her allies. This strengthened the value of China’s veto power and the international community in general. China also gained prestige by providing the UN with a naval contribution and other assets.\(^{89}\) In this regard, China likely appreciated the tactical


advantages of contributing to a naval task force as it involved little risk of casualties or of incurring collateral damage.

Syria
Since early 2011 the government in Syria under President Bashar al-Assad had been trying to defeat growing internal uprisings. As pressure mounted, the Syrian government had employed increasingly desperate measures, including weapons that are illegal according to customary interpretations of international law. Syria’s principal strategic interest in the conflict in September 2013 was the survival of the state – here understood as the survival of the Assad-regime. Survival depended on the government’s military capabilities and these took precedence over all other strategic interests.

Syria was special among the analysed states in the sense that it did not become a part of the UN mission as a matter of choice, but was forced to accept it as an alternative to being attacked. While Syria’s use of chemical weapons against insurgents may have offered tactical advantages, it was a strategic mistake in the sense that it triggered a possible US military intervention and thus jeopardized the survival of the regime. Hence, Syria’s overwhelming strategic objective was to deflect US military intervention while retaining as many of its military capabilities as possible.

Syria faced the choice of giving up its chemical weapons or risking a US attack that would likely involve the loss of much of its military capability, especially its defensive and offensive air force capabilities. Syria’s possession of chemical weapons had strategic value as a deterrent against Syria’s long-term enemy, Israel. However, this value was likely deemed less important than the potentially catastrophic effects on the regime’s ability to continue its counterinsurgency campaign, should the US decide to decimate Syria’s military in order to neutralize its chemical weapons. Furthermore, Russian military supplies were a precondition for victory against the domestic opposition. This likely gave Russian diplomats significant leverage in persuading their Syrian counterparts to accept the UN solution, as maintaining good relations with Russia was a strategic priority for Syria.

Syria’s position in relation to the international community likely only played a minor role in Syria’s decision to accept the intervention. However, as an authoritarian government depending on the ability to control parts of its population by coercion, Syria had an interest in defending a narrow interpretation of the international community’s right to interfere in individual states without governmental consent from the target state.

By adhering to the terms described in UNSCR 2118 and joining the 1992 convention, Syria achieved several objectives. First, Syria avoided a US military attack that would
most likely have led to the fall of the Assad government. This offset the cost of losing chemical weapons that were of some use as a deterrent against Israel, but only marginally useful in the counterinsurgency campaign. Also, Syria may have regained some international legitimacy by cooperating with the UN as it demonstrated international responsibility and an ability to maintain internal control over the parts of its territory that would be subject to inspection. Only one facility was out of reach to the inspectors.

**Denmark**

Before 2013 Denmark’s involvement in the Syrian civil war had been limited to funding humanitarian support. Denmark’s immediate strategic interests in Syria, besides the general interest in a stable Middle East, were negligible. Being a small nation, Denmark had an inherent interest in strengthening the international community’s role as protector of international order and peace. As part of the NATO alliance, international order in a liberal sense was in Denmark’s interest, as was the preservation of the UNSC/UN as a principal forum for global security management. Being militarily insignificant, Denmark could be expected to support a narrow legal interpretation of sovereignty as stated in the UN charter.

However, since 1999 Denmark had supported and participated in several military interventions led by the US, only some of which were sanctioned by the UN. By 2013 Denmark had participated in US-led operations in Serbia/Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Libya (2012), and Iraq (1990 and 2003). The interventions in Serbia/Kosovo and the second Iraq war were not sanctioned by the UNSC⁹⁰ and, along with the intervention in Libya, they challenged the international consensus on interpretation of absolute sovereignty.

As on previous occasions after 1990, the US intention to engage Syria militarily made engagement in the conflict a strategic priority for Denmark, and the government publicly considered supporting US operations militarily without prior endorsement from a UNSC resolution.⁹¹ This demonstrated that Denmark’s primary objective was its relations with the US. However, a solution that strengthened the international community by unifying the permanent UNSC members rather than exacerbating conflict between them was preferable to military intervention without UN endorsement.

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Ultimately, Denmark’s formal objectives in the mission were those stated in Resolution 2118, namely the timely removal of chemical weapons and the destruction of production facilities. Denmark also achieved several informal objectives: The international community was strengthened, always considered an advantage for small, liberal states. In addition, Denmark gained prestige by providing the international community with means to carry out its resolutions, as Denmark demonstrated the diplomatic and military capability to take on the task of commanding the UN mission’s naval task force, OPRECSYR. While three of OPRECSYR’s five contributing states (Russia, China and the United Kingdom) were permanent members of the UNSC, the two small contributors, Denmark and Norway, provided the task force’s nominal leadership. Denmark likely appreciated that a naval mission provided a high profile for Denmark’s contribution to international peace and security while entailing limited risks.

Although a close ally of the US, Denmark (and Norway) seemed in this regard to be considered by other powers to be a relatively neutral state without major interests in the Middle East. The Danish commander was able to interact in a flexible manner with his counterparts to overcome practical difficulties without having to worry too much about a potential loss of national prestige. The usefulness of having a commander from a minor nation was highlighted when Russia triggered an international crisis at the height of the operation by annexing Crimea in March 2014. With a small country leading OPRECSYR and Russia in a supportive role, the disturbances this caused to the UN mission could be circumvented at the tactical level. Thus Denmark increased its value as a partner in international affairs in the eyes of the other participating states as well as its value to the US as an alliance partner.

**Conclusion: Common strategic interests were decisive for success**

Several factors explain the success of UNSC Resolution 2118 and the OPWC-UN Joint mission. A clear end state and manageable tactical circumstances contributed to the success of the mission: the fact that the removal of the chemical weapons could be precisely accounted for and carried out within a specific timeframe ensured a clear beginning and end to the international involvement in Syria both in time and scope. This alleviated any concerns states may have held for mission-creep and becoming involved in a decade-long engagement in Syria. At the tactical level, major parts of the mission would take place at sea, not involving combat. The naval nature of the operation reduced the need for self-protection as well as the risk of losses and

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collateral damage, further alleviating any doubts states might have harboured over endorsement or participation.

However, the decisive factor was strategic: The OPWC-UN Joint mission was not in conflict with any of the participating states’ core security interests.

Had the resolution not authorized the complete removal of chemical weapons from Syria’s territory, it would have failed to address the US’s core objective. Hence the US might have found it necessary to attack Syria to demonstrate the credibility of its red line.

Had the resolution been too ambitious, for instance authorizing the establishment of a no-fly-zone as in Libya, Russia would likely have vetoed it to protect its interests in Syria. Even if Russia were not to veto such a resolution, Syria would likely oppose the intervention militarily, hoping that after the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the international community would not have the resolve to become involved in another prolonged war with the potential burden of implied moral responsibility to reconstruct a fragile state.

When comparing the formal and informal objectives with the achieved end states, it is clear that the OPCW-UN joint mission had the potential to meet all the involved states’ formal objectives and even several shared informal objectives that concerned their core strategic interests. Among the formal and informal objectives that were met were prestige, relations to allies, and international consensus regarding the protection of formal and informal rules and institutions. These common interests gave the states resolve to ensure that the operation was successful. Arguably Syria, which the UN resolution was directed against, had the greatest incentive to ensure its success.

Strategically, the situation in Syria in 2013 was unique in the sense that the international community sought to solve only a very limited aspect of a very complex situation, not the complex situation itself. The issue to be dealt with was strictly Syria’s crossing of the US red lines against employing chemical weapons. However, the civil war as a whole was not addressed by the UN mission. By limiting the question to the red line-issue and refraining from addressing any other aspects of the civil war, the mission could be completed by removing a single, well-defined element, namely the chemical weapons, from Syria.

The situation was also unique due to the fact that the formal objectives could be achieved without seriously jeopardizing Syria’s ability to continue to oppress major parts of its population by military means. The Syrian government could consent to the UN’s demands because they did not significantly influence Assad’s position in the civil war.
This is a major difference compared to the position of the Libyan government in 2012. Here the military intervention of external powers left Gaddafi’s government in a weak position militarily and prevented him from winning the civil war.

Thus, the uniqueness of the dynamics at play before and during the UN mission in Syria makes it difficult to apply lessons from UNSC Resolution 2118 and its application to future crises.

**Recommendations**
The recommendations following the analysis are that future resolutions will stand a better chance of being endorsed and successfully implemented if they fulfil these conditions:

Resolutions must resolve the core strategic objectives of any involved state that is ready to go to war with or without UNSC endorsement. Otherwise, resolutions are unlikely to prevent war.

Resolutions should not go against any of the permanent UNSC members’ core strategic interests. Otherwise, these members are likely to veto the resolutions.

Resolutions should not jeopardize the survival of the state they target. Otherwise, the target state is likely to oppose implementation with force. If the target state is regarded as an important ally by any of the permanent UNSC members, it is important that resolutions take this possible consequence into consideration. Otherwise, these member states are likely to veto.

It is a conducive factor but not a necessary condition for success that resolutions authorize missions with clear limits regarding scope, time and purpose. Moreover, success is easier to achieve if missions tactically can be carried out in ways that limit the risk of participants sustaining casualties and inflicting collateral damage.
List of Contributors

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This book contains Danish and Chinese perspectives on UN peacekeeping objectives by military officers and civilians working in the field of military strategy and international conflicts.

Three officers from the Academy of Military Science (AMS) in Beijing and four officers and one civilian from the Danish Defence present their views on the objectives of UN peacekeeping operations and to what extent they contribute to peace and stability. Under this headline, the authors analyse the problems and benefits produced by the efforts to address global security issues by means of peacekeeping operations which involve formal objectives of promoting security in countries and regions wrecked by violence. The book addresses to what extent informal objectives emerging from individual, national and regional interests and values are at odds with UN aspirations to promote peace and security. The book includes contributions on the reasons that peacekeeping operations often achieve very little in terms of peace and stability from Danish and Chinese peacekeeping perspectives; Danish and Chinese contributions to development and stability in East Africa; the importance of intelligence for successful peacekeeping; the problems of adopting a liberal approach to state-building; a discussion of non-traditional security threats and the extent to which peacekeeping has succeeded in addressing these threats; and an analysis of the multinational UN operation to remove Syria’s chemical weapons. The prefaces of the book have been written by Major General Chen Rongdi from AMS and Rear Admiral Nils Christian Wang from the Royal Danish Defence College.

AMS, China’s primary military strategic research institution, advises China’s Central Military Commission, chaired by President Xi Jinping, on the role of the military in implementing China’s defence, security and foreign policy. AMS plays a major role in the publication of China’s Defence White Papers. The latest version was published in May 2015 and declares that Chinese defence is to play a greater global role, emphasizing the importance of the UN as a framework by virtue of its universal legitimacy. Denmark is similarly planning to continue its emphasis on contributions by the Danish defence to UN missions. This book addresses the historical background and contemporary dynamics that determine the character of these contributions.